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SUMMARY 
 
 
The failures of state implemented development programmes have been largely 
attributed to governance issues. I study one of the largest child development 
programmes in the world, the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) 
programme of India to understand how its governance is determined and gaps 
between design and practice produced. Building on a non-normative concept of 
governance, my research ethnographically examines the everyday processes and 
practices of the ICDS, through ten months of fieldwork in a community development 
block of Aurangabad District, Maharashtra. 
 
State practices have been studied but the role of state functionaries has not been 
adequately addressed. I research everyday state practices as performative - 
negotiated and constructed by ICDS functionaries in interaction with the local politics of 
caste, vertical systems of ‘corruption’ and initiatives of bureaucratic reform. I find that 
ICDS functionaries use state practices to: (a) perform caste, exercising dominance but 
also contesting caste-based subordination, (b) develop and manage informal systems 
of financial practices, and  (c) stage performance to make it appear as if targets have 
been met and rules followed. 
 
The improvisation of programme practices by ICDS functionaries generates gaps and 
variations from programme design including the dominant caste capture of field level 
ICDS positions, exclusion of Scheduled Caste beneficiaries and localities from 
programme benefits and manipulation of programme records and performance audits. 
But such improvisation is also facilitative providing sites for challenging the dominant 
political and social order and enabling the delivery of ICDS services despite resource 
poor contexts and unsuitable programme rules. These findings suggest that ICDS 
governance at the sub-district or implementation level is determined in interaction with 
the politics of caste and the un-implementability of bureaucratic rules. Additionally, I 
highlight that implementation gaps do not always reflect the incapacity of state 
functionaries but may also represent their ingenuity in constrained circumstances. 
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Glossary 
 
Ahmednagar  District in western Maharashtra 
Anganwadi  Community based centre of the ICDS programme 
Anganwadi Helper  Community based woman volunteer tasked with supporting the 
activities of the anganwadi worker  
Anganwadi Worker Community based woman volunteer tasked with delivering ICDS 
services at the anganwadi 
Asli zindagi  Real life 
Aurangabad District in Maharashtra where the study was located 
Brahmin  Hindu priestly caste  
Bhil Tribal group classified as a Scheduled Tribe in the Indian 
Constitution  
Chambhar Third most numerous ex-untouchable caste group in 
Maharashtra 
Chivda   A crispy savoury snack made with puffed rice and nuts 
Dalit Identity taken by ex-untouchable castes under the leadership of 
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar 
Dal   A thick soup made of dried split pulses 
Dhangar Group whose caste occupation was raising sheep (shepherd) 
classified as Nomadic Tribe – C in Maharashtra but counted with 
the Other Backward Castes category in the ICDS MIS 
Dhobi Caste group that traditionally provides laundry services classified 
as Other Backward Castes in Maharashtra 
Durrie   Cloth mat 
Gram Sevak Village level functionary who functions as secretary to the 
Sarpanch 
Godavari  One of the major rivers of India 
Gurav Caste group that traditionally provides religious services 
classified as Other Backward Castes in Maharashtra 
Gur   Jaggery 
Halagi   A type of drum 
Hindi   A major Indian language 
Jain   Community that follows Jainism religion  
Jalna   District that adjoins Aurangabad District 
Jajman  Patron 
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Jajmani  System of traditional occupational obligations 
Jat   A traditionally agricultural landowning caste 
Jati   Endogamous social grouping 
Jugaad  Improvisation 
Kahar   Caste group classified as Other Backward Caste in Maharashtra 
Karma   Spiritual principle of cause and effect 
Kammas  An agrarian and trading caste from coastal Andhra Pradesh  
Kayastha Caste group that has traditionally worked as scribes and 
recordkeepers 
Khichdi A mix of rice and split lentils/pulses cooked with some 
vegetables 
Kharch   Expenditure 
Kolhati   Nomadic tribe counted as Other Backward Caste in ICDS MIS 
Kshatriya  One of the four varnas in which Hindu society is divided 
Ladoo A sweet ball made either with roasted peanuts and jaggery or a 
mix of wheatflour and gramflour, clarified butter and sugar 
Laldera  Name given to one of two ICDS supervisory beats that I studied 
Lapshi   Sweet broken wheat porridge 
Lingayat  A socio-religious, landowning, dominant group 
Loksatta  Local Marathi newspaper 
Madhli   Middle 
Mahar   The most numerous ex-untouchable caste in Maharashtra 
Maharwada  Village locality where Mahars traditionally live 
Mali  Caste group that traditionally worked as garderners, classified as 
Other Backward Castes in Maharashtra 
Maliwada  Village locality where Malis traditionally live 
Mandal short for Mandal Commission or the Socially and Educationally 
Backward Classes Commission headed by B.P Mandal 
Mang Second most numerous ex-untouchable caste group in 
Maharashtra 
Mangaon Name given to a village where I studied anganwadi centre 
functioning 
Mangwada  Village locality where Mangs traditionally live 
Maratha  A landowning politically powerful caste of Maharashtra 
Marathi  Language of Maharashtra 
Marathwada One of 6 revenue divisions of Maharashtra state of which 
Aurangabad district was a part 
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Marwari  a trading community from Northern India 
Namantar  Name change 
Nasik   District in western Maharashtra 
Navi  Caste group that traditionally worked as barbers, classified as 
Other Backward Castes in Maharashtra 
Nivad Mandal  Regional selection board 
Palak Parathe Shallow fried flat, thick unleavened bread made of wheatflour 
and spinach leaves  
Dhapate  a mix of whole wheat flour, sorghum flour and gramflour with 
spinach leaves 
Pakit   Envelope 
Panchayat  Elected village governance committee 
/gram panchayat 
Panchayat Samiti Elected governance committee at the block level 
Patidar   A politically influential and traditionally peasant caste of Gujarat 
Patil   Village leader 
Prashaskiya Badali Administrative transfer 
Rajegaon  Name given to one of two ICDS supervisory beats that I studied 
Rangoli  Patterns created on the floor using flour/coloured sand/petals 
Reddy Landowning, dominant caste from Andhra Pradesh and 
Telangana 
Sakaal   Local Marathi newspaper 
Sarkari zindagi Official life 
Sarpanch   Elected chair of the village panchayat 
Shanwadi name given to a village where I studied anganwadi centre 
functioning 
Sheera  A sweet preparation of semolina 
Shudra   One of the four varnas in which Hindu society is divided 
Sundar  Beautiful 
Sutar  Caste group that traditionally worked as carpenters, classified as 
Other Backward Castes in Maharashtra 
Takkewari  Percentage 
Thakur   A dominant landowning caste of Northern India 
Vaidu   A nomadic tribe that traditionally sold herbal medicines 
Varan bhat  Steamed rice and split lentil/pulse soup 
Varan chakule/  Wheat flour dumplings in a lentil soup 
varan phal   
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Varna   Four large traditional divisions of Hindu society 
Vasti   Habitation 
Vinanti Badali  transfer by request 
Vokkaliga  Landowning, formerly peasant caste from Karnataka 
Wadari a denotified tribe that traditionally worked as stone carvers from 
Maharashtra 
Zamindar  Landlord 
Zilla Kaksha  District Office 
Zilla Parishad  Elected district council 
Washila  Political Influence 
 
 
 
  
		
11 
Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
It was a wintry Monday morning and I was sitting on a narrow wooden bench in the 
Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) 1  Project Office of Sundar★ Block 2 
waiting for the weekly Supervisors’ meeting to begin.  The ICDS Project Office was 
located on the edge of a compound, which held a motley collection of government 
offices responsible for the economic and social development of the block. It was next to 
a busy road and the sounds of traffic were a regular part of office conversations. The 
office peon had brought in more chairs from the Block Development Office meeting hall 
as the Supervisors of an adjacent project were also expected to join the meeting. This 
joint meeting was to be presided over by the Child Development Project Officer 
(CDPO) in-charge of the ICDS Project I was studying but who was the Assistant CDPO 
of the adjacent ICDS project, sent on deputation to this project to fill the vacancy here. 
The meeting had been called because a new Deputy Chief Executive Officer (Dy. 
CEO) had taken charge of the ICDS programme at the District level.  The CDPO had 
recently attended a meeting with her new boss and had some important information 
and orders to pass on to the Supervisors. 
 
Once all the Supervisors had settled in, the CDPO began the meeting by saying that 
the new Dy. CEO was not like the previous one. He was not interested in innovative 
ideas and projects. Rather, his focus was on regular ICDS programme services, 
infrastructure and records. He had visited several ICDS centres known as anganwadi 
centres around the district and asked ICDS field workers called anganwadi workers to 
list the six services that the ICDS was expected to provide. He had been disappointed 
to find that not all were able to do so. He was yet to visit Sundar Block but in 
preparation all Supervisors should ensure that the anganwadi workers they supervised 
were able to list the six ICDS services. The Dy. CEO was particularly interested in one 
of the six services – pre-school education, which he felt should be the focus of the 
programme. The CDPO directed all Supervisors to ensure that each anganwadi centre 
under their supervision, puts up a board outside the anganwadi centre detailing the 
daily schedule of pre-school activities from 9 in the morning to 12 noon. She added that 																																																								
1 The ICDS is a national programme designed to provide health and nutrition services to pregnant women, 
2 A block is a designated geographical area and the smallest administrative unit of rural government in 
several states of India.  
★ Name anonymised to protect identity of informants. 
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as the new Dy. CEO was also interested in anganwadi infrastructure, each Supervisor 
should take note of the anganwadi centres under construction in their area, identify 
those that were past their expected completion date as well as the reasons for the 
same. The CDPO asked all Supervisors to maintain appropriate records regarding 
anganwadi centre construction adding that the Dy. CEO believed that only recorded 
work could be considered as actual work done. Finally, she asked all Supervisors to 
make regular visits to anganwadi centres as the Dy. CEO had been shocked to find 
that some anganwadi centres had not been visited for nearly four months. She also 
asked Supervisors to ensure that they reached their first anganwadi centre at 8 in the 
morning when they were expected to open.   
 
This supervisory meeting was the first among many meetings that I attended during ten 
months of ethnographic fieldwork with an ICDS project in Sundar Block of Aurangabad 
District, Maharashtra, India. My objective was to understand the governance of the 
ICDS as a state implemented development programme. Governance in the context of 
the developmental state has been largely understood in terms of ‘good governance’ 
(Bevir, 2009). Given the normative and ideological aspects of this conception (de 
Sardan, 2011), my approach builds on a non-normative understanding of governance 
as an ensemble of everyday state practices, to study the ICDS. I focus on the 
processes and practices through which the ICDS is implemented in the everyday.  
State practices have been studied to understand how citizens imagine and engage with 
the state (Gupta, 1995) and how states see populations (Scott, 1998) but the role of 
state functionaries has not been adequately addressed (de Sardan, 2009). This 
research addresses this gap. I study the practices of state functionaries and 
understand how they negotiate the politics of caste, vertical systems of ‘corruption’ and 
bureaucratic reform to implement the ICDS. I find that the improvisations and 
negotiations of ICDS functionaries produce differences from programme design. 
Dominant castes colonise field level ICDS positions, capture benefits and produce the 
Scheduled Castes or Dalits as ‘untouchable’ subjects who are then excluded from 
programme services. ICDS functionaries manage and negotiate, local and dynamic 
systems of informal financial practices that affect the quality of programme services as 
well as worker motivation. In addition, they manipulate financial receipts, MIS records 
and performance audits to make it appear as if targets have been met and programme 
rules followed. However, I also find that the intersection of local caste politics with state 
practices opens up avenues for confronting the dominant political order and 
reconstituting this politics. Further, the improvisations of ICDS functionaries emerge 
from a context of limited resources and un-implementable programme rules and often 
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enable service delivery. In sum, this research suggests that the disjuncture between 
development programme design and implementation can also be facilitative and 
instead of reflecting the incapacity of state functionaries, may highlight their ingenuity in 
constrained circumstances.      
 
In this chapter, I provide the background to my research. I begin by outlining the 
significance of studying ICDS governance and my approach to governance. The next 
section then details key aspects of my multi-sited ethnography including the setting, the 
fieldsite and the process of fieldwork. The last section provides sketches of the 
chapters in which the thesis is organised. 
   
The Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) Programme  	The Integrated Child Development Services Programme (ICDS) of India is one of the 
largest child development programmes in the world (Planning Commission, 2011). It 
was started in 1975 to ensure the development of the nation-state through the 
development of its human resources. Children were regarded as a ‘supremely 
important asset’, who needed to be nurtured to enable their growth into skilled, 
motivated, physically fit and mentally alert citizens (National Policy for Children, 1974). 
The ICDS, thus, is emblematic of the developmental ideology that was part of the self-
definition of the postcolonial Indian state (Chatterjee, 1997). At the same time, it is also 
representative of transnational influences on the nation-state through the involvement 
of multilateral agencies such as UNICEF and the World Bank as well as international 
NGOS such as CARE in its design, funding and overall resourcing (Gupta, 2001; 
Gupta and Sharma, 2006).  
 
The ICDS programme was inaugurated by the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in a 
context of high rates of infant and maternal mortality (Planning Commission, 2011). It is 
designed to offer a comprehensive package of health and nutrition services to women 
and children during critical periods of the lifecycle. Implemented by 2 community based 
women volunteers, the Anganwadi Worker  (AWW) and the Anganwadi Helper (AWH), 
at a centre known as the Anganwadi (AWC), the ICDS is expected to provide 6 
services - supplementary nutrition, immunisation, health check-ups, referral, pre-school 
education and nutrition and health education services - to 3 beneficiary categories - 
pregnant and nursing mothers, adolescent girls and children in the 0-6 year age group. 
The health services, viz. immunisation, check-ups and referral, are to be provided by 
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the public health system in coordination with the ICDS at the community level 
(NIPCCD, 2006).   
  
Administratively, the ICDS is a ‘centrally sponsored scheme’ which implies that it is 
largely designed by the central government, implemented by the state government and 
funded by the central and state governments jointly (Sreerekha, 2017). At the central 
level, the ICDS is administered through the Ministry of Women and Child Development, 
at the state level through the Department of Women and Child Development/ 
Department of Social Welfare/Department of Social Justice, at the district level through 
the office of the District Programme Officer and at the project level by the Child 
Development Project Officer (CDPO). The ICDS project is the basic administrative unit 
of the ICDS as it is the smallest entity of the programme that receives and manages 
funds. It is often considered to be co-terminus with the community development block, 
the smallest unit in the administrative structure of India, comprising of approximately 
115 villages. However many blocks have more than 1 ICDS project.  A typical ICDS 
project serves a population of approximately 100,000 persons in rural and urban areas 
and 35,000 in tribal areas. As per current norms, 1 anganwadi centre is set up for a 
population of 400-800 persons and a mini anganwadi centre provided for a population 
of 150-400 persons in rural and urban projects. In tribal projects, 1 anganwadi centre is 
set up for a population of 300-800 persons whereas for a smaller population of 150-300 
persons a mini anganwadi centre is provided. An average rural and urban ICDS project 
thus includes 125-150 anganwadi centres, whereas in a tribal project there maybe 50-
75 anganwadi centres. Anganwadi centres are organised into beats/circles/sectors of 
20-25 for the purposes of supervision with each beat monitored by a Supervisor. A 
rural and urban ICDS project usually has 5-8 Supervisors reporting to the CDPO. The 
CDPO is supported in her management of the ICDS project by office staff including 
clerks, an accountant, an extension officer (responsible for MIS), peon and driver. 
Larger projects in some states also have an Assistant Child Development Project 
Officer (ACDPO) to support the CDPO (Planning Commission, 2011). 
 
The ICDS is a national programme and according to data released by the Government 
of India currently operates 1.34 million AWCs (as on March 31, 2015) covering 82.9 
million 6 month-6 year olds for supplementary nutrition and 36.5 million 3-6 year olds 
for pre-school education (Ministry of Women and Child Development, 2015) out of a 
total population of 164.5 million 0-6 year olds (Office of Registrar General & Census 
Commissioner, India, 2011).   
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The ICDS was started as a pilot project in 33 community development blocks across 
22 States and 1 Union Territory and scaled up subsequently. However, despite its 
national importance and 39-year-old history, more than 50 percent of its growth has 
occurred after 2005, in the last decade (Planning Commission, 2013). For nearly 26 
years of its existence, until 2001, the ICDS was implemented as a targeted programme 
by policy and until 2005, by practice. ICDS services were targeted to poor areas and 
poor households with national guidelines specifying a coverage norm (often interpreted 
as the upper limit by states) of 80 under 6s, 20 pregnant and nursing mothers and 2 
adolescent girls per AWC. Beneficiaries, especially for supplementary nutrition, were to 
be selected from amongst households at the highest risk for malnutrition - those of 
landless labourers, marginal farmers, scheduled castes and tribes (Measham and 
Chatterjee, 1998; NIPCCD, 2006; Saxena and Mander, 2004). In 1997, with the 
introduction of targeting in the Public Distribution System and development of the 
‘Below Poverty Line (BPL)’ criterion and methodology for the identification of poor 
households, several states switched to using BPL as the criterion for targeting in the 
ICDS as well (Saxena and Mander, 2005).  
 
The Supreme Court of India universalised the ICDS in November 2001 in response to 
a public interest litigation seeking enforcement of the right to food as part of the right to 
life, enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian constitution (Chhibbar, 2001). Filed in a 
context of severe and persistent drought in several parts of India, large scale starvation 
and governmental apathy despite burgeoning food stocks (Srinivasan and Narayanan, 
2007), Writ Petition (Civil) 196 of 2001 recast the ICDS through a child rights 
perspective converting ICDS services into legal entitlements and rendering the Central 
and State Governments legally accountable for the provision of these services (Dreze, 
2006; Mander, 2012). 
 
The court’s orders directed the Indian state to provide an ICDS centre in every 
settlement of the country and ensure that every 0-6 year old child, adolescent girl and 
pregnant and nursing mother receives supplementary food from the programme 
(Supreme Court of India, 2001). Additionally the court ordered that BPL could not be 
used as an eligibility criterion for ICDS services (Supreme Court of India, 2004). India’s 
highest judicial authority not only gave orders for the universalization of the ICDS, it 
also defined universalization operationally (in terms of coverage norms, beneficiary 
eligibility and the total number of AWCs required) and set up its own independent 
monitoring mechanism to ensure the compliance of these orders (Mander, 2012). Such 
in-depth judicial intervention was facilitated by the advocacy and civic action of the 
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petitioners – the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and the Right to Food 
Campaign, an informal alliance of grass roots and national NGOs (non-governmental 
organisations), activists, professionals, media persons and conscientious public 
servants who produced a wealth of material – field reports, surveys and articles3 –on 
the performance of the ICDS programme and the interventions needed to strengthen 
its working. After protracted arguments, the Government of India in 2004 initiated the 
process of universalization (Saxena and Mander, 2005) and by 2008 had sanctioned 
the 1.4 million AWCs that the Supreme Court deemed essential for universalization 
(Ministry of Women and Child Development, 2007).  
 
Despite universalization, evaluations of the ICDS have found several gaps in the 
coverage and quality of services (Citizens’ Initiative for the Rights of Children Under 
Six, 2006; Das Gupta et al., 2005; Gragnolati et al., 2006; Gupta and Gumber, 2001; 
Kandpal, 2011; National Institute of Public Cooperation and Child Development, 1992; 
NIPCCD, 2006).  A comprehensive national evaluation (Planning Commission, 2011) 
found that only 31 percent of eligible children received supplementary nutrition from the 
programme for an average 16 of 25 days per month. However, there were striking state 
level differences – in states such as Assam, Orissa, Karnataka and West Bengal 
supplementary nutrition coverage estimates ranged from a high 51-49 percent of 
eligible children whereas in others such as Bihar, Haryana and Rajasthan they were a 
low 17- 18 percent. On aspects of quality as well states varied significantly, for instance 
while the national average for the percentage of 0-72 month olds weighed every month 
was 43 percent, it ranged from a high of 93-94 percent in Maharashtra and Orissa to a 
low of 2-8 percent in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Bihar. A composite performance index 
across various parameters classified Karnataka, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh as 
the top 3 high performing and Uttar Pradesh, Assam and Bihar as the bottom 3 low 
performing states. The ICDS is centrally sponsored scheme, which implies that the 
same programme design is implemented through the same system with the same cost 
structure and funding pattern across the country. Why does programme performance 
then vary so widely across states? Several scholars attribute these differences to 
differences in the way the states are governed (Biswas and Verma, 2009; Haddad, 
2009; Menon et al., 2009). 
 
In this understanding, the poor performance of the ICDS in Bihar, for instance, is a 
function of poor governance reflected in the state’s inability to implement the ICDS - 																																																								3 Please see < www.righttofoodindia.org> or < www.righttofoodcampaign.in > 
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build approved ICDS infrastructure, recruit, pay and train workers, collect data 
accurately, deliver services and ultimately, utilise sanctioned funds. During 2006-11, 
Bihar failed to operationalize 13 percent of sanctioned AWCs and construct 70 percent 
of sanctioned AWC buildings even five years after approval. Disbursement of 
honorarium to AWWs and AWHs was irregular, with money being released even on a 
quarterly and half yearly basis due to shortage of block level administration staff. Less 
than 10 percent of Supervisors received any training (Comptroller and Auditor General 
of India, 2012). Nearly 53 percent of all 0-6 year olds, as per the census, eligible for 
ICDS services were not included in the annual survey conducted by AWWs, a third of 
those surveyed did not receive any supplementary nutrition and nearly half – 47 
percent – of those reported as having received supplementary nutrition by the AWW 
did not actually do so (Planning Commission, 2011).  
 
In contrast, the state of Karnataka, one of the high performing ICDS states as per the 
Planning Commission evaluation, during the same period of 2006-11, had utilised the 
entire sum of Rs.9308.0 million released as the ICDS General Grant from the central 
government, spending an additional Rs.969.0 million from its own coffers. According to 
the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2012), it is one of the few states with 
limited or no shortfall in expenditure on supplementary nutrition, 90 percent of checked 
AWCs with drinking water facilities, near 100 percent availability of baby weighing 
machines and all AWWs trained to analyse growth charts. Moreover, in Karnataka, 92 
percent of all eligible 0-6 year olds, as per the census, were included in the annual 
AWW survey and 80 percent of 7-72 month olds reported as having received 
supplementary nutrition by the AWW, actually did so (Planning Commission, 2011).       
 
A significant body of literature, over many years, has located reasons for the limited 
performance of the ICDS in its cumbersome design4, insufficient infrastructural, human 
and financial resources5 and diffused focus - neglecting the critical group of 0-2 year 
old children, crucial services such as growth monitoring and nutrition counselling and 
serving neither as a crèche, day care or early childhood education centre. In terms of 
processes, frontline workers were found to suffer poor working conditions, were 
overburdened and poorly supported, with inadequate and decontextualized training. 																																																								4 The programme design of the ICDS is cumbersome because it combines services from the three sectors 
of health, nutrition and education and expects these services to be delivered through a single worker with 
a helper (and some support from the health system) to five beneficiary types – pregnant women, nursing 
mother, 0-3 year old, 3-6 year olds and adolescents, through both centre and field based work. 5 Scholars and activists have long argued for a need for 2 AWWs in every AWC, appropriate honorarium 
and benefits for AWWs, increase in allocations for infrastructure, equipment as well as universalisation of 
services. See Working Group for Children Under Six, 2012  
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The programme had limited community participation, centralised planning, an unwieldy 
and unreliable MIS with no feedback loops, poor monitoring and unsupportive 
supervision (Citizens’ Initiative for the Rights of Children Under Six, 2006; Ghosh, 
2006; Gragnolati et al., 2006; Gupta, 2001; Measham and Chatterjee, 1998; Saxena 
and Srivastava, 2009; Working Group for Children Under Six, 2007).  
 
Consistent advocacy to reform the ICDS and address these design, allocative and 
operational concerns culminated in 2012, with the Government of India rolling out an 
ambitious scheme to strengthen and restructure the ICDS as part of the Twelfth Five 
Year Plan (2012-17). A key aspect of the proposed strengthening and restructuring 
involves implementing the ICDS in a mission mode, as the ‘ICDS Mission’. The Mission 
includes several programmatic, managerial and institutional reforms (see Box 1), and 
has increased total financial allocations to the programme.  
 
However, a significant question that remains is: whether states with poor governance 
records which were unable to implement the previous design of the ICDS programme 
effectively, will be able to implement the new restructured and strengthened 
programme any better? Will they be able to hire the new ‘Mission’ staff and utilise 
sanctioned funds? Experience from the National Rural Health Mission, launched in 
2005, on which the ICDS Mission is modelled, suggests otherwise. The latest CAG 
audit report of NRHM implementation in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh reveals 
shortages of 68 percent in the appointment of contractual Auxiliary Nurse Midwives, an 
important provision in the NRHM, even 6 years after the launch of the Mission. 
Box 1: Key Features of the ICDS Mission 
 
The Mission will be rolled out in 3 phases, starting with 200 high burden districts in the 1st year of 
the 12th Five Year Plan (2012-17), followed by an additional 200 districts in the 2nd year and the 
remaining 240 districts in the 3rd year. It has the following key components: 
 
Programmatic reforms: 
• Repositioning the AWC as a vibrant Early Childhood Development Centre (increasing working 
hours from 4 to 6, introducing Anganwadi cum crèche in 5% of AWCs, introducing an additional 
worker in 200 high burden districts etc); Focusing on under 3s and Early Childhood Care and 
Education; Improving AWC infrastructure, Raising supplementary nutrition allocations 
Managerial reforms: 
• Decentralised planning, Improved Training Systems, Technical assistance at all levels, Flexi 
funds at the AWC level, Civil Society & Institutional Partnerships for 10% ICDS projects, 
Strengthening MIS, Using ICT. 
• Strengthening human resource policy - separate ICDS cadres, using outsourced workers, 
raising honoraria, increasing avenues for promotion of AWW etc 
Institutional reforms: 
• Setting up National, State and District level Mission offices for implementation of the ICDS 
Mission with financial, human resource, logistical, operational and monitoring, systems and 
powers. 
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Underutilisation of training funds ranged from 19 to 87 percent annually across 2006-
11 (Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2011).    
 
There is little doubt that the ICDS programme needs to be reformed, although there is 
much debate about the nature of reform required, but is reform enough to improve 
programme performance in all states? Or does reform need to be accompanied by 
improved governance? How can we improve governance? What determines 
programme governance? 
 
My research addresses this last question. I study how the everyday governance of one 
of the largest child development programmes in the world, the Integrated Child 
Development Services (ICDS), is determined at the sub-district level. I examine the 
processes and practices through which the ICDS is implemented and variations from 
programme design and policy produced. My approach is ethnographic and I contribute 
to the understanding of how state implemented development programmes work rather 
than whether they work.  
 
Governance, government and governmentality 
 
Governance is an old and much used concept. Traditionally, the term has been 
associated with or used synonymously with government, with the exercise of power by 
political leaders (Kjaer, 2004; Weiss, 2000). However Bevir (2012) distinguishes 
governance from government both empirically and theoretically. For Bevir, while 
government refers to political institutions, governance refers to processes of decision 
making and ruling throughout society. Governance is what governments do but it is 
also what corporations and other organisations do with respect to their employees and 
members. The concept of governance focuses attention on the complex processes and 
interactions that produce the policies, practices and effects of governing.    
 
Empirically, Bevir (2007) and Kjaer (2004) associate governance with the public sector 
reforms of the 1980s and the 1990s. These reforms led to the increased involvement of 
markets, quasi-markets and networks in the delivery of public services. In his 
Encyclopaedia of Governance, Bevir (2007) identifies two main phases of reform: New 
Public Management (NPM) and joined-up governance. The former implies 
marketization of public services and the application of corporate management 
principles to the public sector. However, such changes led to the fragmentation of 
services and raised accountability concerns. In response, ‘joined up governance’ or 
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‘new governance’ focused on horizontal and vertical coordination, through networks 
and partnerships, between the many organisations involved in public policy making and 
implementation. It also led to the development of accountability mechanisms such as 
citizen awareness and participation. Governance, in this context thus, refers to a 
pattern of rule in which the state depends on complex sets of public, private and 
voluntary organisations to secure its intentions and deliver its policies and strategizes 
to create, regulate and make accountable these sets/networks/partnerships (Bevir, 
2007). Such an understanding of governance is conceptually similar to the notion of 
governmentality (Bevir, 2011; Blundo and Le Meur, 2009) which refers to the conduct 
of conduct not just through the laws and institutions of the state but also social 
organisations, discourses, norms, identities as well as self-regulation – techniques for 
the disciplining and care of the self (Gupta, 2001). The similarities between the two 
concepts lie in their decentred approach to state, focus on social processes rather than 
structures and institutions and acknowledgement of porous borders between state and 
society.  
 
However, Kjaer (2004) highlights that the meanings of ‘governance’ vary across 
disciplines and fields with de Sardan (2011) calling it a plurivalent term. Blundo and Le 
Meur (2009) emphasise its emergence in the field of business in the 1930s as 
corporate governance and then trace its transfer to public affairs as urban governance 
in the 1960s/70s, developmental ‘good governance’ in the 1980s and subsequently as 
global governance. Governance in the context of development is often associated with 
‘good governance’, a normative agenda promulgated by the World Bank that 
prescribes a democratic state, efficient and transparent administration and competitive 
markets as essential for economic development (Bevir, 2009). However de Sardan 
(2011) argues that developmental governance may also be conceived without 
normative or ideological judgements based on the managerial and political dimensions 
of collective or public actions. He focuses on the routine functioning of public services 
and interprets everyday governance in terms of the ‘…entire processes of the 
production and supply of public goods and services’ (de Sardan, 2009, p. 41) including 
‘…the operating modes of the public service, the professional culture of civil servants, 
the forms of administrative management and the relations between government 
officials and service users or citizens’ (de Sardan, 2009, p. 41). I build on this 
understanding of everyday governance to study the entire process of the production 
and supply of ICDS services at the sub-district level and like de Sardan, I employ an 
ethnographic approach. I focus on the sub-district or block level since it is at this level 
that people’s everyday experience of the programme is largely shaped.  
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Ethnography of ICDS governance 
 
I use multi-sited ethnography to understand ICDS governance as a composite of 
service delivery by anganwadi workers and helpers at the anganwadi centre as well as 
the administration of these workers and centres by supervisors and programme 
officials at the level of the ICDS project. My observations of anganwadi centre 
functioning at the village level had three nested foci: at the centre was the everyday 
delivery of services at the anganwadis – preschool sessions, distribution of 
supplementary nutrition, weighing of children, immunisation sessions and so on; the 
next was anganwadi worker and helper interactions with the village community and the 
ICDS programme administration; while the third focus was the village social and 
political context within which anganwadi centres operated. At the ICDS project level, I 
observed the practices of anganwadi worker recruitment, training and supervision, 
management of supplementary nutrition contractors, assimilation and reporting of MIS 
data, monitoring of anganwadi centre construction and so on. These processes were 
implemented by office based as well as field level staff called Supervisors who 
supervised a beat of 20-25 anganwadi centres each. There were thus three main sites 
across which ICDS programme practices were implemented– the anganwadi centre, 
the supervisor’s beat and the ICDS project office and these formed the focus of my 
ethnography. 
 
Multi-sited ethnography essentially involves following people, connections, 
associations and relationships across space because they are substantially continuous 
but not spatially so (Falzon, 2012). The field site thus comprises of multiple sites that 
are interconnected in such a way that the interconnections between sites are as 
important as the relationships within them (Hannerz, 2003). Coleman and von 
Hellermann (2011) worry that such following of interconnections, themes and topics 
across space implies that ethnographers are simply submitting to a laid out track rather 
than actively choosing and constituting their ethnographic path. However Fairhead 
(2011) argues that the ‘field’ can only be considered ‘agentive’ if there is only one 
possible pathway to be taken but given that there are usually a variety of possibilities, 
the ‘field’ does not shape ethnography outside of researcher engagement. For 
Coleman and von Hellermann (2011) fields are always made and never given. Multi-
sited ethnography has also been critiqued for lacking depth in comparison to more 
traditional approaches since studying multiple sites usually involves spending less time 
in each site. But Hovland (2011) argues that if spatially differentiated sites and routes 
form an important part of the research subject then such multi-sitedness adds 
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interpretive depth while for Riccio, (2011) following people strengthens relationships. 
For Falzon (2012) all study, whether single or multi-sited is likely to be partial in its 
understanding. And as Gupta (2012) argues, the state is translocal, multileveled and 
pluricentred and can only be partially understood. In this research, I therefore used 
multi-sited ethnography to study the three-levelled sub-district ICDS programme 
hierarchy as a series of interconnected field sites that determined the everyday 
functioning of the programme.    
 
The setting: Sundar Block, Maharashtra 
 
I located my ethnography of ICDS governance in Sundar Block, Aurangabad district, 
Maharashtra. My choice of state and district was deliberate and was based on my 
familiarity with the ICDS programme in Maharashtra, given my earlier work in a grant 
making organisation, and the Marathi language. My Supervisor had also been involved 
in a research project on the ICDS programme in Maharashtra and was able to put me 
in touch with senior bureaucrats in the state. I was thus easily able to obtain the state 
and district level consent required for my research. However, the process of selecting 
the ICDS project where I would be based to observe the everyday functioning of the 
programme was more involved. I used both methodological and pragmatic 
considerations. The methodological parameters were that the block should (a) be 
largely rural as the ICDS has more rural than urban projects, and (b) be at some 
distance from the district headquarters as projects near the district headquarters tend 
to be showcased for the many official visitors of the programme. My pragmatic 
considerations included the presence of a co-operative and, ideally, female CDPO in 
the block as it would be easier and more socially acceptable for me to interact 
frequently with her.  Moreover, I looked for a block headquarters that was large enough 
to allow me as a single woman to rent a room with some independence and privacy. 
Aurangabad district had 9 blocks and 14 ICDS projects. I visited 4 blocks and 4 ICDS 
projects and based on discussions with district officials and my criteria, selected an 
ICDS project located in a rural, border block with urban block headquarters and an 
approachable woman CDPO, Deepa Pardeshi∗★ for my fieldwork. To maintain 
confidentiality and protect the anonymity of my participants, I refer to the block as 
‘Sundar Block’ and the ICDS project as the Sundar Block ICDS project. 
 
 																																																								
∗	★ Name anonymised to protect identity of informants	
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Figure 1: Aurangabad district in the state of Maharashtra 
 
 
 
Sundar block is predominantly rural (96 percent of the block population) (Census of 
India, 2011a) but villages located near major highways and Aurangabad city are 
experiencing increasing urbanisation. Sundar block adjoins Aurangabad city, which is 
not only the headquarters of Aurangabad district and the Aurangabad revenue division 
but also one of the 53 million plus cities or urban agglomerations (Census of India, 
2011b) in the country and a major IT and manufacturing hub of the state of 
Maharashtra. In 2010, Aurangabad city made national headlines when a group of 
wealthy residents including doctors, builders, industrialists and professionals placed a 
bulk order for 150 luxury cars of a popular international brand (Kulkarni, 2010). 
Aurangabad’s urbanisation and industrialisation, if not its affluence, spills over into 
Sundar Block along its edges and along the highways which lead from it and pass 
through the block to other cities and districts. One such highway connects Aurangabad 
city with Sundar town, the block headquarters located 50 kilometres deep into the 
block. All along the highway are pharmaceutical, machine tool, electronic appliance, 
fertiliser and automative system manufacturing factories. Some of the more new age 
industries include biotech, meat packaging and frozen foods. This growth of industries 
has been facilitated by the setting up of a designated industrial area by the 
Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation near Sundar town. 
 
Industrialisation in Sundar block over the past decade has led to the emergence of a 
second urban centre near Aurangabad city (Census of India, 2011a) as well as the 
peri-urbanisation of villages around Sundar block town. Agricultural land has been 
converted to commercial and residential use with a lot of new apartment buildings and 
houses coming up on the outskirts. Sundar town itself is an old historic city, a 
pilgrimage centre with temples, narrow lanes and congested homes so all change has 
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registered on the periphery including slums for industrial labourers, homes for those 
displaced by a dam project, homes for the development bureaucracy, professionals 
and those newly enriched by these changes. I rented a room from one such family. 
They were Marathas, from a nearby village, who had sold about 10 acres of their 
agricultural land to an upcoming food park and used the money to buy a residential plot 
in a peripheral locality, build a ‘posh’ three storey house with all modern amenities and 
open a ready made garment and saree shop. Many members of the development 
bureaucracy, ICDS supervisors, schoolteachers and health workers, outsiders who had 
come from other villages, blocks and districts and made Sundar town their home, lived 
in the same locality.  
  
While highways and peripheries of both the town and the block were zones of change, 
their centre was dominated by agriculture and related industries. Sundar town as the 
block headquarters was a major agricultural market and home to Marwari traders and 
Maratha landlords. In the block interiors farmers grew sugarcane, cotton, sweet lime, 
vegetables and millets depending on their access to irrigation. As part of the drought 
prone Marathwada region, water was of crucial importance in Sundar block and 
shaped much of social life and politics. The block was drained by the Godavari river, 
one of the 10 major perennial river systems of the country and had one of the largest 
irrigation projects of the Marathwada region, built near Sundar town in the 1970s. 
However droughts were a regular phenomenon and had occurred consecutively during 
2013-2015 (Gadgil, 2018). My Maratha landlord family, who gave up agriculture 
entirely because of irrigation difficulties, blamed regional politics. They pointed out that 
although the dam was built to irrigate fields in Sundar block and other downstream 
areas, much of the water was blocked by upstream dams constructed by powerful 
politicians from western Maharashtra to irrigate grape and sugarcane fields in their 
constituencies in Nasik and Ahmednagar districts – an analysis corroborated by 
journalists (Ghoge, 2016; Purohit, 2012) and researchers (Dandekar and Naravade, 
2013; Purandare, 2013). However, my landlords also highlighted that a significant 
percentage of the remaining water was transferred downstream to Jalna District via a 
pipeline as Sundar Block was part of the Jalna parliamentary constituency and hence 
represented by a Member of Parliament from Jalna. Moreover, despite the dam being 
commissioned in 1976, the channel network from the main canal required to irrigate the 
fields was never built with only the fields near the canal receiving its water.  In the 2009 
Maharashtra state election, when a powerful leader of the Nationalist Congress Party 
(NCP), held a massive rally in Sundar block and promised to sanction Rs.2000 million 
for an irrigation project if elected, an NCP MLA was voted in for the first time. However, 
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the MLA failed to deliver on his promise, building only a few channels of inferior quality 
and was voted out in the subsequent election in 2014. According to Ganesh, my 
landlord’s adult son, usually when a politician won an election his supporters 
benefitted. But the NCP MLA hoarded all benefits and didn’t let his supporters gain, so 
they abandoned him in the next election. In the absence of a suitable distribution 
network, villages had to implement specific schemes to access the canal water through 
pipelines and as per the anganwadi worker of Shanwadi village, the measure of a 
Sarpach lay in his/her ability to access and implement such schemes. She maintained 
that only a person of means should be elected to the Sarpanch position as only a 
wealthy and well-connected Sarpanch could work the development bureaucracy to get 
benefits for the village. The politics of water in Sundar Block was not only limited to the 
dam’s distribution network but also extended to the communities displaced by the dam. 
Sundar town had a specific locality where they had been resettled but many were 
resettled in different villages as spatially distinct communities with a different name. 
The Rajegaon beat of the Sundar block ICDS project which included villages settled on 
the banks of the river had many such communities. Given their small numbers, the 
communities were included for political and administrative purposes in the panchayat 
of the larger village where they struggled to be adequately represented.  In Mangaon 
village, the re-settled community had to protest on the streets for adequate drinking 
water supply. 
 
Besides water, politics in Sundar block was based on caste. The Marathas constituted 
nearly 44-49 percent of the population and were the most numerically significant caste 
group. The OBCs or other backward castes such as Malis, Sutars, Navis, Dhobis, 
Kahars, Guravs and Kolhatis constituted approximately 20 percent of the population, 
Scheduled Castes including Mahars, Mangs and Chambhars were 14 percent and 
Scheduled Tribes such as Wadaris and Bhils were 3 percent while Muslims accounted 
for 12-14 percent of the population6. Higher castes such as Brahmins, Jains and 
Marwaris were also present in the block but in very small numbers. Caste in the 
villages of Sundar block had a distinct spatial character. Marathas along with the higher 
caste Brahmins occupied the village centre while the OBCs lived on the periphery and 
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled tribes on the outskirts. All of the peripheral 
localities had caste specific names such as Maliwada, Mangwada, Maharwada and 
separate entrances – separate roads along the periphery of the village connecting 
these localities to the village entrance. This physical segregation was designed to 																																																								
6 Based on Sundar Block ICDS Project MIS data. Figures are indicative. 
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maintain the ritual purity of the so-called higher caste Marathas and Brahmins. Besides 
their superior caste status and numerical preponderance, Marathas also owned a 
majority of the land and were the biggest landowners with landholdings of upto 100 
acres, they resultantly were the economically and politically dominant caste in Sundar 
Block. Marathas controlled a majority of elected political positions at the village and 
block level as well as co-operative institutions in agriculture-allied sectors such as 
banking and agro-industries that facilitated the agricultural economy.  However, the 
agricultural economy had also changed in the recent past – a significant change was in 
caste based labour practices, agricultural labour particularly Dalits were increasingly 
mobile opting for seasonal migration as brick kiln workers or sugarcane cutters which 
enabled them to earn Rs.40-50,000.0 per season, decreasing their dependence on the 
landowning Marathas and the village economy. Dalit mobility affected Maratha 
agriculture both socially and economically but this change though substantial was not 
permanent and was based on the availability of labour outside the village. In the village 
Dalits remained under the socio-political dominance of the Marathas (see Chapter 3 for 
a more detailed discussion of Maratha domination). Against this backdrop of change 
and continuity, I studied the practices through which the ICDS programme was 
implemented. 
 
Constructing the field site 
 
Sundar block had two ICDS projects. I studied the functioning of one project, which I 
refer to as the ‘Sundar block ICDS project’. This project served a population of 162,374 
persons out of a total population of 306,437 (Census 2011) through 209 anganwadi 
and 26 mini anganwadi centres operated by 162 anganwadi workers, 164 anganwadi 
helpers and 15 mini-anganwadi workers. The 235 anganwadi centres in the project 
were organised into 8 beats of 24-35 anganwadis each, with each beat managed by a 
Supervisor. Of these, I closely observed the functioning of 2 supervisors and a total of 
5 anganwadi centres from 2 villages across their beats. My choice of participants was 
entirely pragmatic. The foremost consideration was place of residence – only 4 of the 8 
Supervisors lived in the block headquarters and hence could be considered for the 
study. Of these 4, I approached one Supervisor, Lata Shinde∗★, because she and her 
family had been very friendly from the beginning, helping me to find a place to stay and 
settle in. Shinde madam belonged to the Vaidu caste, which falls in the Nomadic 
Tribes-B category of the state. She had worked in the ICDS for 15 years and easily 																																																								
∗	★ Name anonymised to protect identity of informants	
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agreed to my observation of her work including supervisory visits to the villages and 
anganwadi centres in her beat, beat meetings, office meetings and office work. 
However, the involvement of the second Supervisor, Shailaja Joshi∗★, a Brahmin, was 
due to some pressure from block officials and other Supervisors. Joshi madam was a 
close confidante of the CDPO, assisting her in sending requested reports to the District 
office, conveying her daily instructions by mobile phone to all other Supervisors (who 
were required to report to the Project Office only once a week) and having updated 
information about her schedule. She had been promoted to the Supervisor position 
after more than two decades of work as an anganwadi worker, had received several 
awards for the quality of her work and was considered very knowledgeable about the 
ICDS programme. Almost the entire project felt very strongly that if I was serious about 
understanding the working of the ICDS then I should be observing her work. As the 
lauded resident expert Joshi madam also expected her involvement in my research as 
her due. So I conceded to everyone’s pressure and requested Joshi madam’s 
participation to which she graciously agreed. 
 
Shinde madam’s beat Laldera★ had 33 anganwadi centres across 11 villages while 
Joshi madam’s beat Rajegaon★ had 30 anganwadi centres across 14 villages. To study 
the functioning of anganwadi workers, I selected Shanwadi★ village from Laldera beat 
and Mangaon★ village from Rajegaon beat. The choice of Shanwadi was entirely 
pragmatic – it was the only village in the beat, amongst those approached, where the 
senior anganwadi worker, Mangala Narke★, a Maratha, was agreeable to my observing 
her work and interviewing her. She also helped me find a place to stay in the village. In 
Rajegaon beat, I chose Mangaon village based on the diverse caste identities of its 
three anganwadi workers – Maratha, Muslim and Scheduled Caste (Chambhar). 
However Joshi madam objected to my selection. She had chosen a village and 
anganwadi worker for me, whose work she believed reflected her superiority as a 
Supervisor and she was quite insistent that I select it, taking the matter to the CDPO 
when I did not agree. She based her case on the argument that Mangaon village had 
unruly politicians and was not a safe place for women. I assured the CDPO that 
selecting Mangaon village was important for my research and I would promptly quit the 
village if I felt myself to be at risk at any time. The CDPO agreed, however Joshi 
madam refused to help me find a place to stay in the village. Fortunately, my landlords 
in Sundar block town had relatives in Mangaon village and I was able to make 
arrangements for my stay there 																																																								
∗	★ Name anonymised to protect identity of informants	
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The field site is depicted in Figure 2 below:  
 
   
 
 
Producing data, ethics and positionality 
 
I undertook fieldwork for 10 months from October 2014 to July 2015 during which I 
conducted participant observation of the two Supervisors for 6 weeks each, of 
anganwadi centres in Shanwadi and Mangaon village for 6 and 4 weeks respectively 
and of the Sundar block project office for 4 weeks. My plan was to be more of a 
‘participant’ than ‘observer’ (Holy, 1984) and I had identified, in consultation with 
District Officials some innovative initiatives that I could document for them. However, 
once I started fieldwork at the sub-district level, I quickly realised that focusing on the 
documentation of initiatives would cause me to miss out on the everyday working of the 
project functionaries. I therefore changed my plan and had to be content with being 
more of an ‘observer’ than ‘participant’.  
 
I began fieldwork in the Sundar Block Project office with the participant observation of 
Supervisor Lata Shinde followed by anganwadi centres of Shanwadi village within her 
beat, after which I moved on to observing the working of Supervisor Shailaja Joshi, 
then to anganwadi centres from Mangaon village of her beat and then finally to the 
Project Office. As Supervisors connect anganwadi centres to the Project Office 
undertaking both field level and Project Office based work, this sequence allowed me 
to iterate between the three ethnographic sites of the anganwadi centre, the 
CDPO  
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supervisory beat and the ICDS Project Office and study the interlinkages between 
them. 
 
The participant observation of Supervisors involved accompanying them as they visited 
anganwadi centres in their beat for supervision, organised and conducted beat level 
meetings of anganwadi workers, attended weekly meetings at the Project Office in 
Sundar town, training and other programmes in Aurangabad city and prepared beat 
and block level Monthly Progress Reports. With Shinde Madam, I visited 26 of the 33 
anganwadi centres in her beat and attended 4 beat level meetings whereas with Joshi 
Madam I visited 28 of her 30 anganwadi centres and attended 3 beat meetings. For 
each beat, I also built a social profile of anganwadi workers collecting information on 
their caste, work experience, educational qualification and kinship networks within the 
ICDS. Anganwadi workers were also surveyed on the ISO certification initiative. I 
assisted Shinde Madam to prepare the block and beat level Monthly Progress Reports, 
collate the beat level supplementary nutrition bills and provide feedback to anganwadi 
workers and Supervisors on their errors. In-depth interviews of both Supervisors were 
also conducted. 
 
At the village level I observed the functioning of anganwadi centres in the mornings – 2 
in Shanwadi village managed by anganwadi workers Mangala Narke and Ranjana 
Wakde∗★ respectively and 2 of 3 anganwadi centres in Mangaon village run by 
anganwadi workers Shabana Syed★ and Meera Kale★ respectively. The third 
anganwadi centre held by anganwadi worker Savita More★ was not regularly operated. 
As part of my observation of anganwadi centres, I noted the attendance of pre-school 
children, delivery of supplementary nutrition, assessment of nutritional status, conduct 
of pre-school activities, organisation of Village Health and Nutrition Days, Pulse Polio 
immunisation, deworming, home visits, interpersonal counselling and women and 
adolescent group meetings.  In the afternoon as the anganwadi workers updated their 
records, we discussed their experiences of working in the ICDS, in the village and the 
activities of their trade union. In the evening, I visited community members including 
families whose children were enrolled in the programme but did not attend regularly 
and/or were undernourished. I also studied anganwadi centre records including the 
annual survey, attendance register and weight register. Besides this, to understand the 
social and political context of the village I met with the current and previous Sarpanchs 
and other political leaders and visited the different caste based localities. For Shanwadi 																																																								
∗	★ Name anonymised to protect identity of informants	
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village I also helped prepare a village social map. My main informants in the village, 
besides the anganwadi workers, were retired angawadi helpers and ASHA workers 
who were community based volunteers affiliated with the public health system.  I also 
had the opportunity to attend anganwadi worker union demonstrations along with the 
anganwadi workers. Additionally, in-depth interviews of all 5 anganwadi workers were 
conducted. 
   
I spent the last month of fieldwork observing the working of the ICDS Project Office 
particularly the CDPO as she discharged her various responsibilities. Notable amongst 
these were supervision of staff, organisation of anganwadi worker recruitment and 
training programmes, consolidation of the programme MIS and reports, management 
of the budget, contractors such as self help groups, political leaders, block and district 
officials and coordination with other departments such as the public health department 
and the works department. I conducted indepth interviews with the CDPO as well as 
other office members including 4 of the remaining 6 Supervisors and the office staff – 
the clerk, retired accountant, peon and driver. I also studied the office records including 
those relating to finance and human resources.  
 
My access to ICDS functionaries, processes and records was largely facilitated by the 
permission letter I had received from ICDS Aurangabad District Officials. However the 
need to cooperate with my research sparked a variety of reactions amongst 
functionaries. Gupta, (2001) and Sharma (2010) highlight the practice of ‘staging 
development visits’ by programme functionaries for senior officials, politicians and 
international and other external visitors – enacting idealised programme realities to 
assure development programme performance and gain acclaim. Many of my initial 
interactions with ICDS functionaries involved such staging with the CDPO warning staff 
to refrain from discussing informal financial practices in my presence; Superviors 
informing anganwadi centres in advance regarding my visits, and anganwadi workers 
ensuring higher pre-school attendance and serving supplementary nutrition in 
programme issued utensils during initial visits. However, as I stayed in the background 
during meetings and visits, maintained the assured confidentiality and interactions with 
me produced no repercussions, negative or positive, many functionaries became more 
relaxed in my presence. For instance, anganwadi worker Savita More continued to be 
irregular in her running of her anganwadi centre despite my stay in Mangaon village. 
However, others such as Supervisor Shailaja Joshi came to resent the time spent 
answering my questions, as she perceived little advantage for herself in doing so. 
Whereas still others such as anganwadi worker Shabana Syed became frustrated with 
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my neutrality and demanded that I report programme rule violations such as the 
absenteeism of Savita More to higher officials, accusing me of being complicit if I failed 
to do so. In response I contacted my Supervisors and was advised to maintain 
confidentiality as my one time involvement was unlikely to address the problem and 
may even result in untoward complications for Shabana Syed.      
 
While an official letter provided access to programme functionaries, in the village 
community, my access was ensured by my caste. I was able to find a place to stay, a 
family to have my meals with as well as enter Maratha homes because of my Brahmin 
caste identity. However, this caste-based acceptance meant that I was conscious of 
violating caste norms when I visited Scheduled Caste localities and homes. At the 
same time such ‘transgressions’ increased my acceptability amongst the so-called 
lower caste communities. While caste identity provided access, my status as an older, 
urban, childless, married woman travelling alone aroused suspicion regarding my 
morals and motives. In Shanwadi village the Sarpanch did not really accept my 
introduction as a PhD student researching the ICDS, suspected that I was really a 
journalist and avoided me for much of my 6 week stay. I finally had to seek the help of 
the senior anganwadi worker to secure an appointment with him and even then caught 
him only by chance as he was leaving the village just before the agreed upon meeting 
time. In Mangaon, some women standing on the main village street loudly questioned 
my presence in the village raising doubts about my morals for travelling alone. I had to 
show them my family photographs to convince them of my identity and purpose.  
Additionally, the threat of gender based violence was an underlying constant 
throughout my fieldwork and I was regularly advised by ICDS functionaries regarding 
safety. Mangala Narke, the anganwadi worker from Shanwadi village even spread a 
rumour that I was connected to powerful politicians and was under police protection to 
shield me from any harassment during my stay in her village. On my part, I made sure 
to conform to gendered social norms regarding appearance, social interactions and 
mobility – not going out at night and keeping my landlords apprised of my movements. 
I was able to complete my field work, in large part, because I interacted mostly with 
women. 
    
Analysis 	
One of my central ethical concerns was maintaining the anonymity of my informants, 
given the sensitive and confidential information about ICDS sub-district level 
programme processes that I had from them. Since project functionaries could easily be 
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identified from official records based on location and time period, I decided to 
anonymise the name of the ICDS project that I studied as well as the name of the 
community development block where it was located. Additionally I anonymised the 
names of all informants and places. As analysis and data collection are iterative in 
ethnographic research (O’Reilly, 2005) I began analysis during field work writing 2-3 
page notes on emerging themes such as ‘Recruitment, patronage and caste’, 
‘Supervsion, caste and class’ and ‘Performing  ICDS’. On completing fieldwork, I wrote 
up a detailed 10,000 word document on fieldwork reflections based on what I had 
observed and understood. These two exercises helped me identify the key themes 
such as caste, gender, politics, informal payments, supplementary nutrition, 
entrepreneurship, ISO certification, MIS and performance under which data from field 
notes and interview transcriptions was then organised. The data sorted by themes was 
then colour coded to detail important sub-themes and identify concepts. 
 
Chapter Sketches 	
In Chapter 2, I locate my study of the everyday governance of the ICDS in literature on 
development programme implementation and the developmental Indian state. I outline 
the problem of the ‘vexedness of implementation’ – the gaps and variations produced 
in the translation of development programme policy into practice – which, in the Indian 
context has been largely attributed to the social embeddedness of the state. I identify 
three prominent explanations for the blurred boundaries between state and society in 
India: (a) that the state is dominated by a coalition of classes, (b) that the modern state 
can only be accessed by a majority of the population through political brokers and 
mediators and finally, (c) that the state-society boundary is created as an effect of 
everyday bureaucratic practices reflective of social relations of power and control. I 
build on the third frame to understand the bureaucratic practices that determine ICDS 
implementation. Although state practices have been studied anthropologically, the role 
of state functionaries has not been adequately addressed and this is where I locate my 
contribution. In the remaining chapters, I study how state functionaries, working at the 
implementation level of the ICDS programme, construct, negotiate and perform state 
practices in the everyday to determine ICDS governance. Lower level state 
functionaries have been found to work in a context of political mediation with politicians 
using government programmes for patronage as well as generating funds for electoral 
expenses. Parallely, reforms to the Indian developmental state have also been 
undertaken. I therefore identify three main factors influencing the construction, 
negotiation and performance of ICDS practices by state functionaries - local political 
		
33 
relations, informal incomes and payments and reform initiatives. I explore these factors 
to define a broad framework for the study of the state practices implemented by ICDS 
functionaries.   
 
In Chapter 3, I examine the engagement of ICDS functionaries with the local political 
order. Exploring the links between the politicisation of caste and the political mediation 
of the ICDS in Sundar block, I ethnographically detail the strategies by which the 
dominant Maratha caste colonises field level ICDS positions to capture programme 
benefits and resources and influence the uptake and delivery of ICDS services. In 
particular I highlight how Maratha ICDS functionaries use state practices to perform 
caste and produce Dalit beneficiaries and workers as polluting and untouchable 
subjects. However in a departure from much existing literature I also present two case 
studies of Dalit ICDS functionaries’ resistance of Maratha attempts to reproduce caste 
power as state power. Dalit ICDS workers confront Maratha dominance within the 
ICDS by invoking the rules of Weberian bureaucracy. I conclude by highlighting that 
interactions of caste and state do not only produce gaps in development programme 
implementation but can also serve to challenge social inequalities and reconstitute 
politics. 
 
In Chapter 4, I explore the informal financial practices of ICDS functionaries and their 
links to the political mediation of the ICDS. I study the informality associated with two 
components of the ICDS – the Supplementary Nutrition Programme, one of the 6 ICDS 
services and the administrative processes of promotions, transfers and postings. In the 
first component, I find that anganwadi workers confronted with the un-implementability 
of formal bureaucratic rules devise informal practices to facilitate programme 
implementation paying percentages or takkewari to block officials for their involvement. 
I elaborate the dynamics of the takkewari system and its sub-systems. In the context of 
promotions and transfers, I trace anganwadi worker attempts to traverse a confusing 
arena of bureaucratic agents and political brokers. I conclude by examining the links 
between percentages and promotions and the formal and informal. 
 
In Chapter 5, I examine the engagement of ICDS functionaries with an initiative of local 
level state reform – ISO certification. Scholarship on international standards and 
standardisation initiatives emphasises that these technologies generate new relations 
of governance and power. However, I build on the insight that the relationship between 
technologies and rationalities is mediated through the problematics of implementation 
to study ISO certification in the Sundar block ICS project. Under this initiative ICDS 
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functionaries were expected to resource and refurbish anganwadi centres to resemble 
private pre-schools by entrepreneurially raising funds from local businesses and 
communities. However unable to implement this design in a resource poor context, I 
found that anganwadi workers resorted to routine implementation practices of staging, 
patronage and personal investment to standardise their anganwadi centres and gain 
ISO certification.   
 
In Chapter 6, I conclude by highlighting that the negotiations and improvisations of 
ICDS workers serve to facilitate rather than impede programme implementation.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The vexedness of implementation7 
 
 
My study of the everyday governance of the ICDS at the sub-district level in India is 
ultimately a thesis about the ‘vexedness of implementation’ (Mathur, 2016) – the 
translation of policies and programmes designed at higher levels of the developmental 
state into practice at the sub-district or block level. A prominent understanding of such 
translation is in terms of a gap between policy and practice – programmes are not 
always implemented as designed and/or planned (Mosse, 2004).  
 
In this chapter, I review political and anthropological literature on development 
programme implementation and the production of disjuncture between design and 
practice in the Indian context. Much academic work attributes such differences to the 
social embeddedness of the Indian state in society. I locate three broad explanations 
for the porous boundaries between state and society in India, which I categorise, as the 
‘dominated’, ‘modern’ and ‘imagined’ state. I build on the third frame to study ICDS 
governance in terms of everyday state practices and argue for a focus on the 
understudied role of state functionaries in state practices. Existing research highlights 
that state functionaries work in a context of political mediation of everyday public 
services. State and local politicians use state programmes to extend patronage to their 
voters and supporters and generate campaign finance. At the same time, reforms to 
the developmental Indian state have also been initiated in a transnational context of 
neoliberalism and ‘good governance’. I therefore identify the three factors of local 
political relations, informal financial systems and bureaucratic reform to study how 
ICDS functionaries construct, negotiate and perform everyday programme practices. I 
review existing literature on each of these themes to devise the frame and approach for 
understanding the negotiations and improvisations of ICDS functionaries. The political 
mediation of the Indian state has been linked to the politicisation of caste. I review the 
links between caste and state in terms of the three perspectives of ‘hierarchical’, 
‘political’ and ‘performative’ caste and build on the latter two for my study of state 
functionaries. The informal financial practices of bureaucracies have been studied as 
‘corruption’ in political and economic literature. However, I take an anthropological 
approach, which avoids moral framings and instead builds on legal pluralism to 																																																								7 This phrase has been used by Mathur (2016) 
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understand informal practices. Finally, I trace a range of state reform initiatives in the 
Indian context that began with economic liberalisation and were informed by 
transnational discourses of neoliberalism and ‘good governance’. I build on the 
contention that such measures do not simply produce the economisation of the political 
and seek to study the conflicts and contestations that result from bureaucratic and 
state reform.   
 
The chapter begins by outlining the problem of the vexedness of implementation and 
subsequently comprises of three main sections. The first reviews literature on the 
socially embedded Indian state, the second on state functionaries and the third on the 
three factors that emerge as significant in the determination of everyday state 
practices- local political relations, informal financial practices and reform initiatives. I 
conclude by summarising the frame through which I study ICDS functionaries, their 
practices and ICDS programme implementation in the subsequent chapters.   
 
Development Programme Implementation 
 
Mosse (2004) highlights that although there is extensive scholarship on policy models, 
‘..little attention (has been) paid  to the relationship between these models and the 
practices and events that they are expected to generate and legitimize in particular 
contexts…At best, the relationship between policy and practice is understood in terms 
of an unintended gap between theory and practice, to be reduced by better policy more 
effectively implemented’ (Mosse, 2004, p. 640) Prominent scholarship on such 
implementation gaps has focused on issues of design as well as the process of 
designing developmental programmes. Scott (1998) in his seminal critique highlights 
that states need to make the messy complexity of societies legible for development 
planning and employ standardised systems of measurement and recording for the 
administrative ordering of nature and society. Such ordering, in turn, produces 
simplifications- generalised, abstract, ‘thin’ mappings of complex local realities. 
Development plans and programmes based on such misrepresentation inevitably lead 
to failure and may cause terrible human suffering, especially in nondemocratic political 
contexts. Ferguson (1994) focuses on the role of the development sector - international 
and bilateral aid agencies and other transnational organisations - in the design and 
implementation of development programmes. He highlights that such agencies usually 
work on time bound budgets and are oriented to provide technical and apolitical 
interventions.  They largely define problems in technical terms, undermining the role of 
historical and political processes and viewing the state as a neutral partner rather than 
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as a political force, thereby depoliticising development. Ferguson’s critique of the 
‘development industry’ has been associated with ‘post-development’, a school that 
rejects mainstream development thought and practice as external, based on western 
models of industrialisation and capitalism, culturally homogenising and ecologically 
destructive (Pieterse, 2010). While Ferguson is sympathetic to the critique of 
mainstream development, he does not uphold its complete rejection given that it forms 
a part of the aspirations of the poor in many contexts (Matthews, 2017). Post 
development, in turn, has been critiqued for essentialising the differences between the 
West and the Rest, condemning science and technology out of hand and promoting 
cultural relativism (Corbridge, 1998). Mosse (2004) dismisses the critical turn in the 
anthropology of development as an ethnographic blind alley that destroys its object and 
subsequently is left with little to say. He argues for studying ‘how’ development works 
by researching institutional practice and the social life of development projects, 
organisations and professionals. I build on this focus to study the local state in India 
and its implementation of the ICDS programme. 
 
The socially embedded Indian state 
 
In the Indian context, disjunctions between development programme designs and their 
outcomes have been largely attributed to the embeddedness of the state in society. 
While the ideal-typical Weberian state is expected to be impersonal, autonomous and 
distinct from society governing populations without fear or favour, much scholarship 
has revealed the Indian state to be ‘… profoundly penetrated and influenced by social 
forces…’ (Fuller and Harriss, 2001, p. 10). Analytical work on the blurred boundaries 
between state and society in India and its impact on state functioning comprises of 
three distinct strands. In the following section, I examine these frames of the 
‘dominated’, ‘modern’ and ‘imagined’ state and present my approach to studying the 
local state.  
 
1. The Dominated State 
 
The first frame builds off a Marxist perspective and characterises the Indian state as 
permeated by the dominant classes - the industrial capitalists, rich farmers and the 
professionals and bureaucrats. According to this analysis, the pre-liberalised, 
developmental state was hampered in its realisation of Nehruvian expert led planned 
development by the interests of the big capitalists and rich agrarian class.  Bardhan, 
(1984) explains that as neither class was able to exercise hegemony on its own, there 
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was a compromise of power, which in turn enabled the state office-holders, the 
professionals and bureaucrats, to exercise relative autonomy. Vanaik (1990) and 
Varshney (1995) on the other hand emphasise the relative political strength of the 
agrarian bourgeoisie in this dominant coalition. For Kaviraj (1984) and Chatterjee 
(1999), there was a ‘passive revolution’ with the progressive modernising elite building 
alliances with the rich peasantry ‘…so that it could no longer dictate to them and 
instead began to reflect their interests’ (Fuller and Harriss, 2001, p. 8).  With 
liberalisation in the 1990s, Chatterjee (2008) identifies a change in the framework of 
class dominance, namely a distinct rise in the relative power of corporate capital vis-à-
vis the landed elite and the bureaucratic-managerial class. The ascendance of the 
corporate capitalist class, Chatterjee elaborates, negatively impacted state autonomy 
such that increasingly it was the capitalist requirement of maintaining high rates of 
national economic growth that set state policy. However, the state parallely also 
continued to invest in welfare programmes because as Chatterjee, building on Sanyal 
(2007), explains, capitalist growth in the context of electoral democracy required a 
reversal of the effects of the primitive accumulation it produced – the dis-possession of 
primary producers from their means of production. Reversing the effects of primitive 
accumulation thus, became a political condition for the continued growth of corporate 
capital.  
 
At the local level, Harriss-White (2003) finds that the state is dominated by an 
intermediate class comprising small businessmen, traders, rich peasants and petty 
officials operating through a ‘shadow state’ of contractors, fixers and brokers who 
govern an unofficial market of government licenses and subsidies. The ‘shadow state’, 
according to Harriss-While, surrounds and hollows out the official state for private 
benefit. Such de facto privatisation along with the informal nature of a majority of the 
Indian economy challenges the very legitimacy of the formal state.  
 
A significant critique of such Marxist analysis is that it tends to apply universal political 
economic frames to understand specific contexts. In contrast, the subaltern school 
historicises and contextualises the Indian state highlighting the centrality of spatial and 
temporal location in understandings of modernity, citizenship and liberal democracy. I 
examine this post-colonial scholarship in the following section. 
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2. The Modern State 
 
The second strand of academic work on why the Indian state is not more Weberian in 
its functioning builds on the writings of Chatterjee (2004), Kaviraj (2010), Madan (1997) 
and Saberwal (1996) and offers a more culturalist explanation. According to these 
authors the idea of the Indian state in the Constitution was based on the principles of a 
secular, liberal modernity, which were not shared by a majority of the population. For 
Madan (1997), constitutional secularism was incompatible with the way of life for most 
Indians. Similarly Saberwal (1996) maintained that there were large gaps between the 
social logics underlying Indian and Western traditions such that Indians found it difficult 
to operate institutions of Western inspiration such as courts and bureaucracies set up 
in post colonial India. For Chatterjee, it was a matter of capacity.  Notable in this strand 
of work, Chatterjee, (2004, 2001) contends that while constitutionally all Indians are 
citizens with equal rights and freedoms; practically, the majority lack the cultural capital 
and resources to exercise the same8. They, thus engage with the state not through the 
liberal ideal of universal citizenship but as communities and through mediators and 
brokers, creating conditions for rent seeking and patronage. Reciprocally, the 
postcolonial Indian state also does not regard the majority of the Indian people in terms 
of the universal of citizenship, but rather as subjects or population groups who need to 
be modernised into citizens through governmentality. This process paradoxically 
creates multiple, shifting classifications of population, reaffirming particular cultural 
identities and reinforcing a democratic politics that is predominantly based on socio-
cultural identity rather than universal, undifferentiated citizenship. With the state 
dominated by the modernised, liberal elite (urban middle classes) but dependent for 
popular legitimacy on the religious, communitarian subaltern (poor and rural 
populations), Chatterjee postulates a deep split in India between the politics of the elite 
and that of the subaltern. He classifies the subaltern and their politics of informality, 
patronage and brokerage as ‘political society’. For him, although civil society as an 
ideal energises an interventionist political project, it is in political society – an arena of 
intense competition between different social groups demanding welfare and 
entitlements from the state – that India’s political modernity is being defined.  
 
Kaviraj (2010) extends the postulated split between the elite and the subaltern to the 
developmental state conceiving of a corresponding split between the modernist 																																																								8 This includes aspects such as literacy, language, skills to deal with complicated bureaucratic procedures 
including legal matters and the gap between the socio-cultural ethos and the politico-administrative culture 
of the system (Ram Reddy and Haragopal (1985) in Gudavarthy, 2012a) 
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‘bureaucratic elite’ who design programmes and the ‘vernacular’ lower level 
functionaries who implement them, often reinterpreting them beyond recognition.                  
 
Amongst the proponents of this culturalist explanation Chatterjee’s concept of political 
society, has been quite influential9 but it has also raised much debate. A key debate 
focuses on political society’s potential for transformative politics with Gudavarthy and 
Vijay (2007) and Sarkar (2012) arguing that the concept only describes emerging 
conditions in a post colonial democracy and is not normative whereas for Corbridge et 
al., (2005) political society is also a potential site for the development of civil society. 
But the central focus of the debate has been on the dichotomy set up between civil and 
political society. Scholars argue that this binary is too overdrawn. Baviskar and Sundar 
(2008), Corbridge et al. (2005), Gudavarthy (2012b), Menon (2010) and Sundar and 
Sundar (2012) draw attention to the rights based political struggles of the so called 
inhabitants of political society as well as the ‘uncivil’ actions and illegality of those 
classified as civil society.  
 
3. The Imagined State 
 
The third strand of academic work on the socially embedded Indian state regards the 
elusive and yet salient boundary differentiating the state from society as an effect of 
everyday routinized bureaucratic practices. In this Foucauldian approach, the problem 
of social embeddedness is redefined from that of the state’s inability to deal impartially 
with social groups to one in which the state is constituted as a bureaucratic effect in the 
exercise of social relations and power. In this understanding then, the boundary 
separating the state and society is a line drawn internally within a network of 
institutions to maintain a certain political and social order. 
 
Scholars of the state have written frequently about the difficulty of studying the state 
(Abrams, 1988; Fuller and Harriss, 2001; Hansen and Stepputat, 2001; Mitchell, 1999, 
1991)  referring to it as ‘illusory’, ‘ghostly’ and ‘a myth’.   A key difficulty identified by 
many is that of distinguishing the state from society in practice. All definitions of the 
state depend on determining such a separation but empirically, the ‘edges of the state 
are uncertain; societal elements seem to penetrate it on all sides, and the resulting 
boundary between state and society is difficult to determine’ (Mitchell, 1991, p. 88). Yet 																																																								9 Besides India, scholars in Africa, Latin America (Gudavarthy, 2012b) and Taiwan (Chen, 2003) have 
used Chatterjee’s concept of ‘Political Society’ to frame issues of power and politics in post colonial 
contexts. 
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the state remains ‘pivotal in our very imagination of what a society is. . . . central to all 
that is not state’ (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001, p. 2). 
 
Mitchell (1999, 1991) identifies two key responses by American political science to the 
elusiveness and salience of the state – the systems approach and the statist approach. 
The systems approach sought to replace the concept of the state with the political 
system, thereby officially including other aspects of the political process such as the 
activities of various political groupings and social collectives (Easton, 1953; Almond 
1960 in Mitchell, 1991). However, this only served to complicate the problem as the 
political system was found to be even more difficult to distinguish from society and 
contrarily tended to incorporate almost all of society. While the systems theorists 
discarded the concept of ‘state’ because of its elusiveness, the state-centred theorists 
sought ‘to bring the state back in’ because of its salience. They conceived of the state 
as a unified, coherent and autonomous entity, distinct from society and not influenced 
in any way by its forces (Evans et al., 1985; Krasner, 1978; Skocpol, 1979) and were 
critiqued for the resurrection of the state as an a priori, discrete social fact.  
 
In response, Abrams (1988) and Mitchell advocate an approach that takes on both the 
elusiveness and salience of the state, not as a fundamental incompatibility but rather 
as essential features of the same phenomenon.  Abrams builds on Miliband's (1969) 
concept of the ‘state-system’ – a cluster of institutions of political and executive control 
and their key personnel – and proposes the complementary concept of the ‘state-idea’. 
While the state-system includes institutions of economic and political domination, these 
do not encompass the ideological aspect of the state, which legitimates subjection, a 
gap addressed by the ‘state-idea’. For Abrams, the state-system generates the state-
idea as an autonomous, unified and integrated expression of common interest to mask 
the actualities of class power and domination. Taking a similar approach, Mitchell 
claims that the boundary separating the state and society appears both real and 
illusory because it is a construction, an effect of everyday routinized social practices 
reflective of relations of power and social control. Once the state society boundary itself 
is understood as an effect of power, the state is then conceptualised within the other 
institutional forms -family, economy, civil society- through which social relations are 
lived (Sharma and Gupta, 2006). The state is then no longer seen at the apex of 
society and as the central locus of power rather the focus shifts to understanding how 
the state assumes a position of authority over all the other institutional forms that social 
relations take (Sharma and Gupta, 2006).  
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Gupta (2012, 1995; Sharma and Gupta, 2006) taking an anthropological approach 
elaborates the role of everyday, routinized and banal bureaucratic practices and 
representations in producing the primacy, superiority and authority of the state. These 
include common procedures such as applying for a license and/or identity 
card/passport, paying taxes, registering a birth/death or marriage as well as 
representations such as seals, letterheads, organizational charts, designations and 
uniforms. For Gupta, these mundane bureaucratic procedures enable the political tasks 
of state formation, and governance while at the same time revealing how the state is 
imagined and encountered by its citizens – how power is exercised and inequalities 
instituted. Such exercise of power is however not always unchallenged, it is also 
resisted and subverted through the same everyday practices that constitute it - 
bureaucratic proceduralism is also performative (Butler, 1990). The repetitive re-
enactments of everyday bureaucratic practices not only reflect the coherence and unity 
of the state but they are constitutive of it and can consequently also destabilise it. 
Moreover, such constructions of a unitary state may also take numerous forms based 
on the group asserting hegemony/making claims and the audience/constituency to 
which the performance is targeted. Further, even within hegemonic blocs there might 
be contestation on what constitutes the imaginary of the state. Consequently, all such 
imaginary/representation/understanding of the state is likely to be multiple and partial. 
Gupta questions whether the state is at all knowable in all its fullness, with its contours 
clear and materiality beyond doubt given that it is translocal and pluricentred, 
ubiquitous and yet reified. Trouillot (2001) argues that as the state has no institutional 
fixity, state effects maybe studied in any location where governmental practices are 
enacted and not just in government or national institutions.  
 
Much literature on the state as effect has focused on the diverse ways in which citizens 
engage with state practices and evoke state imaginaries to reaffirm or challenge 
political relations and power. Gupta (1995) in a seminal contribution highlights that the 
ubiquity of talk about state corruption in the daily conversations of villagers in North 
India enables them to construct the state symbolically and to define themselves as 
rights bearing citizens.  According to Gupta, as corruption refers to violations of norms 
and standards, outrage over it conversely symbolises the acceptance of those norms 
and standards which in this case includes the demarcation of public office and private 
interest, notions of citizenship and public accountability. In an industrial town in central 
India, Parry (2000) also finds that, pervasive talk about corruption signals the 
increasing acceptance of universalistic bureaucratic norms.  
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At the level of practice however, Anjaria (2011) and Anand (2011) discover that 
‘corrupt’ transactions instead of representing a violation of citizenship rights, enable the 
making of citizenship claims on the state.  In his ethnography Anjaria found that 
Mumbai street hawkers made regular but unofficial payments to lower level municipal 
authorities and the police for illegally using public space, a steady arrangement that 
opened up avenues for the negotiation and legitimation of their spatial claims. The 
power inherent in state practices was not only experienced by the hawkers but 
dynamically inhabited by them to forward their own claims.  Similarly, Anand (2011) in 
his ethnography in Mumbai found that settlors acquired incremental and differentiated 
citizenship by making personal, political and material claims on the city infrastructure, 
in particular water supply. He defines such ‘hydraulic citizenship’ as being entitled to a 
reliable supply of water pressure from municipal pipes for which settlors pressured the 
water system through their votes as political citizens, their relations of patronage and 
their money. In related research, Shah (2009) demonstrates how in tribal Jharkhand 
the non-tribal elite used the imaginary of a ‘corrupt’ state as well as localised state 
practices to prevent tribals from accessing the state and thus maintained the socio-
political status quo. The moral economy of corrupt practices interacted with the local 
political economy such that non-tribals reinforced tribal wariness of the state, born of a 
colonial and post-colonial history of exclusion and exploitation, to corner state 
resources for themselves. These ethnographies highlight that the state-society 
boundary is not transgressed or violated rather than it is established and re-established 
through negotiations of state practices based on socio-political relations and power. 
 
Besides citizen imaginaries and engagements, state practices have been studied to 
understand how the state ‘sees’ populations (Scott, 1998), how it performs its 
‘stateness’ (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001) and  how the state is spatialized. But in 
much of this work, state practices are taken to be ‘authorless strategies’, not directed 
or devised by anyone and yet a means of reproducing state, exercising power and 
instituting inequality (Sharma and Gupta, 2006). The role of state functionaries in the 
everyday enactment of bureaucratic procedures has not been adequately addressed. 
Blundo (2014) calls for making the state itself legible by studying the concrete practices 
of its workers while Bernstein and Mertz (2011) call for recognising bureaucratic 
administration as yet another site for social life and political action rather than just 
mechanistic functioning that obviates human agency. In this thesis, I address this gap. I 
study the role of ICDS functionaries in the performance of everyday state practices.  
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I open up the ‘black box’ of bureaucracy to examine the practices through which ICDS 
functionaries implement the everyday programme. I study how daily services are 
delivered at the anganwadi centre, how children are weighed and provided 
supplementary nutrition, pre-school sessions conducted and records prepared; who 
attends the anganwadi centre and which localities are visited by the anganwadi worker.  
While I consider what happens at the anganwadi centre, I focus much more on the 
programmatic processes that determine what happens in the anganwadi centre. I look 
at how anganwadi workers are recruited and Supervisors selected, transferred and 
posted, how beat meetings and supervisory visits are conducted and how records are 
assimilated at various levels of the programme administration and reported upwards in 
the programme hierarchy. I observe the practices of recruitment, supervision, reporting 
and administration and understand how these are contingently and relationally 
negotiated, constructed and performed by ICDS functionaries in the everyday. 
 
The socially embedded state functionary 
 
Lower level state functionaries or frontline public service workers have been studied in-
depth, especially in high income, Western country contexts as street-level bureaucrats 
(Lipsky, 1980). These studies emphasise the agency of these bureaucrats in shaping 
public policy (Kosar, 2011; Rowe, 2012). They describe, how these officials working in 
conditions of financial constraint, with conflicting and ambiguous goals and uncertain 
performance measures, use their discretion to implement policies in ways that don’t 
always conform to the policy intent (Kosar, 2011, p. 300). Street level bureaucrats are 
torn between acting as agents of the state and of citizens and through their coping 
mechanisms and value judgements, shape policy as it is finally experienced by people 
(Rowe, 2012, p. 12). Some studies have examined how bureaucratic ideology can 
shape implementation, providing evidence that both political ideology and local political 
constituencies influence welfare policy outcomes. Kaufman (1959) in his famous study 
of the US Forest Service argued that to achieve uniform implementation of national 
policy, it is necessary to disrupt any links between community and bureaucratic values. 
Finally, much literature focuses on how informal factors such as organisational norms 
and employee attitudes have a strong effect on the work of street level bureaucrats 
(Stensota, 2011).     
 
However, most of this work is based on a Weberian ideal of the state – as a unitary 
institution discrete from society, with complete sovereignty over its spheres of 
jurisdiction. In this conceptualisation, politicians are involved in determining policy but 
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not in its implementation. In the Indian context, however, as Berenschot (2010) put it 
based on ethnographic work in Gujarat, ‘…the implementation of state laws and 
policies . . . . is often mediated by ‘street-level politicians’ not bureaucrats.’   
 
Lower level state functionaries in India work in a context in which political mediation is 
entrenched in the everyday delivery of public services (Berenschot, 2010) and social 
groups compete with each other for government benefits and resources (Corbridge et 
al., 2005),. State and local politicians and their brokers extend patronage to profit 
supporters, trading government benefits for votes (Corbridge et al., 2005) and 
campaign finance (Witsoe, 2012a). State functionaries either remain indifferent to such 
mediation or are actively complicit.  Baviskar (2004) finds that the administrative 
imperatives of meeting programme deadlines and demonstrating results preclude any 
attempts by state officials to challenge the local political order whereas Corbridge et al. 
(2005) find that state officials are simply not inclined to do the same. Berenschot 
(2010) argues that when states do not have independent means to verify the 
credentials of the many applicants for scare resources, they rely on elected 
representatives, which in turn provides such representatives an incentive to limit state 
capacity. Harriss-White (2003), Jeffrey, (2000) and Robbins (2000) elaborate that state 
officials are often a part of the local political order and invested in maintaining and 
enhancing their social position. They highlight the mechanisms through which the 
dominant and elite form alliances with local state officials to gain privileged access to 
state resources. These include colonising the local state with kin and establishing 
connections with state officials based on caste, class and gender solidarity. Whether 
indifferent or complicit, Gupta (2012) and Mathur (2016) conclude that lower level state 
functionaries tend to get blamed for the gaps between development programme design 
and implementation. This criticism ‘…ubiquitous in the discourse of many middle-class, 
urban Indians, reproduces both a colonial complaint of the incompetence of the natives 
and a class bias towards subalterns in the bureaucracy (Gupta, 2012, p. 25).’ And 
although Corbridge et al., (2005) describe state functionaries as facing competing 
pressures from local social groups as well as the departments or agencies they work 
for, there is little research on how such pressures are managed and negotiated through 
state practices.  I examine how ICDS workers engage with structures of local power. I 
ask how the local political order influences the practices of ICDS functionaries and the 
ways in which they shape it, in turn.   
 
The everyday enactment of bureaucratic procedures by state workers is being 
increasingly studied in the expanding sub-field of anthropology of bureaucracy. This 
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emerging scholarship underscores not only the constructed nature of much 
bureaucratic practice but also that such improvisation by state functionaries working in 
conditions of constraint and pressure, often traverses the boundaries of 
formality/informality and legality/illegality. Jauregui (2014) details how structurally 
disempowered police in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh, working with meagre 
salaries and inadequate resources, improvise practices that while technically illegal are 
collectively legitimised for enabling them to perform their roles. In the context of 
refugee resettlement in Kampala, Sandvik (2011) finds that informal and illegal 
bureaucratic practices are co-constituted along with the regularisation of transnational 
humanitarian soft-law. Conversely, Mathur, (2016) finds that when the transparency 
clauses of a newly introduced employment guarantee programme impeded 
longstanding informal practices of the local developmental state, the programme failed 
to take off. Building on this analysis, I examine the informal practices devised by 
functionaries within an ICDS project to perform their roles.  I ask why ICDS workers 
make these improvisations and what are the inherent logics that sustain them. 
 
Bear and Mathur (2015) call for a new anthropology of bureaucracy that studies the 
effects of the ‘new public goods’ of ‘fiscal austerity, marketization, consensus, 
transparency and decentralization’ underlying bureaucratic reform, often externally 
imposed, in different parts of the world. They argue that such measures do not simply 
result in an economization of the political, their effects vary widely across, sector, level 
and branch of state and produce conflicts and contestations within specific 
bureaucracies that are not adequately captured by existing literature, such as that on 
audit or governmentality. As an example, Mathur highlights the fragmented governance 
that emerged as a result of the introduction of new contractual arrangements in the 
local developmental state in a remote Himalayan region. ‘Young professionals’ were 
recruited on short-term contracts for fiscal prudence as part of the implementation of an 
ambitious employment generation programme instead of being added to the ‘bloated’ 
permanent bureaucracy. The new recruits were expected to work in tandem with 
permanent staff but the difference in contract also engendered differences in attitudes 
and aspirations leading to the emergence of new fault lines over state labour and 
practices and a break down of working relations in several instances. New 
arrangements informed by ‘new public goods’ for greater efficiency resulted in the 
production of new inefficiencies. Similarly, Qureshi (2015) finds that ‘flexible 
bureaucracy’ created for the efficient and entrepreneurial governance of an HIV/AIDS 
prevention programme for ‘high-risk’ groups in Pakistan generated new networks of 
collusion and accumulation between state bureaucrats and private sector contractors. 
		
47 
In the interests of efficiency, service delivery was outsourced to NGOs and private 
sector organisations through contracts that emphasised outputs and outcomes rather 
than traditional bureaucratic proceduralism. The ambiguity of the new bureaucratic 
field, enabled newer forms of accumulation by private and state actors, ultimately 
dispossessing the purported beneficiaries. I contribute to this growing literature on 
bureaucratic engagement with reform initiatives based on the new orienting values of 
New Public Management. I ask how ICDS functionaries working at the implementation 
level experience these initiatives and whether they engender new subjectivities and 
rationalities. 
 
In sum, state functionaries in India are known to work in a context of the political 
mediation of everyday public services. State and local politicians use state 
programmes to extend patronage and generate campaign finance. However, the 
engagement of state functionaries with such local politics has not been adequately 
studied. Similarly the growing field of the anthropology of bureaucracy highlights that 
state workers often improvise to perform their roles traversing legal/illegal boundaries, 
as well as contest bureaucratic reform initiatives. I build on and contribute to this 
expanding literature by studying how ICDS functionaries at the sub-district level 
engage with local politics, improvise informal practices and negotiate with bureaucratic 
reform to implement the ICDS and produce gaps and variations from ICDS policy.  
 
Shaping everyday state practices  
 
In this section, I review existing literature on the themes of ‘local political relations’, 
‘informal financial practices’ and ‘bureaucratic reform’, in the Indian context to detail 
and explicate a frame for the study of ICDS functionaries and their practices. The 
political mediation of the Indian state has been linked to the politicisation of caste. 
Accordingly, in the sub-section on ‘local political relations’, I examine literature on the 
links between caste and state in terms of ‘hierarchical’, ‘political’ and ‘performative’ 
caste and build on the political and performative nature of caste to study the practices 
of ICDS functionaries. The sub-section on ‘informal financial practices’ reviews different 
approaches to the study of informality. I argue for an anthropological approach that 
eschews moral framings and uses legal pluralism to understand informal practices. The 
third sub-section traces initiatives of state reform in the Indian context that started with 
economic liberalisation and were informed by transnational discourses of neoliberalism 
and ‘good governance’. I build on the argument that such initiatives do not easily 
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produce the economisation of the political and seek to study the conflicts and 
contestations that result from bureaucratic and state reform.   
 
1. Local Political relations 
 
In the Weberian ideal of the state, politicians are involved in making policy but not in its 
implementation. But much research in the Indian context has established that the 
everyday functioning of the government machinery is determined, not as much by 
impartial bureaucrats as the compulsions of local politics. Witsoe (2012a) links the 
political mediation of the state, especially the local everyday state to the politicisation of 
caste in India. 
 
Caste remains a significant political, social and cultural identity in the Indian context 
with much scholarship devoted to understanding the relations between castes, caste 
politics and caste-based mobilisation. This scholarship largely emphasises three main 
perspectives on the institution of caste (1) hierarchical caste which upholds the 
Brahmanical-textual view of caste (Gupta, 2000) as a rigid, hierarchy founded on the 
religiously sanctioned binary opposition of purity-pollution (Dumont, 1970) (2) political 
caste which traces the ways in which the caste structure has been continuously 
shaped and reformulated by state formations and relations of power and is therefore a 
historical and political construction (Bayly, 1999a; Dirks, 1992; Inden, 1986), and (3) 
performative caste which examines the everyday reproduction and reconstitution of 
caste through social monitoring and sanctions, protest, resistance and assertion 
(Gorringe, 2016; Gorringe and Rafanell, 2007).  
 
For Gupta (2004, 2000), the hierarchical understanding of caste as the division of 
endogamous, occupationally specialised, rigidly segregated jatis into the four unequal 
varnas vertically ordered by their relative ritual purity, has dominated both academic 
writing on caste as well as public perception. However he argues that this textual 
conceptualisation has little empirical basis, with few if any of the so called ‘lower 
castes’ accepting either their inferior status, or their base or polluting bodies or their 
poor karma as responsible for their subjugation.  Instead, he finds that most castes 
take pride in their identity, value themselves highly and privilege their own ideologies 
and hierarchies rather than accept the Brahmin led one.  
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According to Bayly (1999b), Dirks (1992) and Inden (1986), the notion of a Brahmin 
centric caste order gained prominence during the colonial period as priests, 
missionaries, orientalists and colonial administrators relied on Brahmin informants and 
religious texts to understand Indian society. Subsequently, as this view of caste began 
to inform colonial administrative practices, caste division and hierarchy started to 
crystallise along Brahmin centric lines with a hardening of the pollution barrier beyond 
which the so-called ‘untouchables’ were placed (Bayly, 1999b; Dirks, 1992). 
Ethnographic surveys and census exercises, which sought to standardise Indian caste 
names and formalise the caste hierarchy served to further politicise caste with caste 
associations springing up to contest assigned positions and educate members on 
answering survey questions (Dirks, 1992). A standardised and ranked caste list was 
thus an effect of census processes rather than a representation of social reality. 
However, Bayly (1999a) argues that colonial intervention in caste should not be 
interpreted to mean that the caste system as such was a colonial creation, rather 
colonial policies served to consolidate a caste like social order (caste norms were in 
the formative stage and there was no clear hierarchy) that had begun to emerge in the 
political uncertainty of the post Mughal pre-colonial era. Yet colonial consolidation does 
imply that the caste system described in ‘village studies’ ethnographies of the 1950s 
and 60s, which informed Dumont's (1991) influential treatise on caste, was not 
something ancient surviving unchanged across centuries, but a product of political 
processes, particularly colonial political processes (Fuller, 1996). 
 
In the hierarchical conception of caste, the religious principle underlying its structure is 
paramount such that the ritually pure Brahmin who represents the religious domain is 
considered superior to the materially powerful King who represents the political domain 
(Dirks, 1992).  However Srinivas (1959) in his village ethnography found that 
dominance at the local level was based not as much on ritual purity as a combination 
of numerical preponderance and economic and political power. He described a 
peasant caste, belonging to the Shudra varna, the Vokkaligas, who were decisively 
dominant as they were the most numerous group, owned a majority of the land, were 
the biggest moneylenders and patrons, had more literate and educated members and 
occupied traditional and elected leadership positions. Resultantly, they were respected 
by all castes, including the Brahmins, and presided over the resolution of almost all 
conflicts, amongst and between different caste groups in the village. While the 
Vokkaligas possessed almost all elements of dominance, Srinivas argued, that a caste 
with some of the elements, especially numerical strength, was often able to acquire 
others, except for the Scheduled Castes whose low ritual rank was a barrier to social 
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mobility. Additionally, when the dominance of a caste group extended over a few 
villages or districts, it often translated into regional dominance.  
 
Kothari (1970), on the other hand, distinguishes ‘entrenched’ castes from ‘dominant’ 
castes based on numerical strength. According to Kothari (1970) and Rao (1989) an 
‘entrenched’ caste is economically and politically powerful, of a high ritual status but 
numerically small such as Thakur or Rajput zamindars in northern India. For Gupta, 
(2005) Jodhka (2012) and Shah (2002), therefore, caste power is rooted not as much 
in ritual status or numerical strength but in land ownership. Castes that owned a 
majority of the land were economically powerful and were patrons or jajmans for 
landless, labouring and artisan castes who owed them their service under the jajmani 
system. These vertical patron-client inter caste ties along with numerical dominance 
(where applicable) were the basis of the political power of landowning castes (Bayly, 
1999a).  
 
With universal adult franchise in independent India, both entrenched and dominant 
castes used their numerical strength based on caste solidarity and inter-caste ties to 
translate territorial domination into electoral representation. Palshikar (2006) identifies 
70 of 288 Maharashtra state legislative assembly constituencies where a candidate of 
the same caste has been elected since 1978. Similarly, he notes that politics in most 
states since the mid-50s has been centred around one or two regionally dominant 
castes such as the Vokkaligas and Lingayats in Karnataka (Manor, 1989) the Reddys 
and Kammas in Andhra Pradesh (Reddy, 1989), the Marathas in Maharashtra (Lele, 
1990), the Patidars and Kshatriyas in Gujarat (Kothari and Maru, 2002) and the Jats 
and Rajputs in  Rajasthan. 
 
However, just as the Brahmin centric caste order was a result of historical and political 
processes, similarly the dominance of particular castes is also a political and historical 
construct and contested by other politically aspirant and socially mobile castes through 
mobilisation based on caste consciousness and alliances. For instance in Karnataka 
the regionally dominant Vokkaliga caste was formed by the coming together of six 
peasant jatis of a similar social status that first allied with each other to gain 
advantages from the colonial government and continued to operate with solidarity to 
contest the dominance of the Lingayats, another regional jati cluster.  Manor (2010) 
notes that during the period when both clusters dominated Karnataka politics (1947-
72), there was increased friction between the jatis within each cluster as each jati 
aspired for greater political influence and benefits. But these tensions reduced when 
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the competition between clusters heightened or when both clusters were challenged by 
other social groups. In other cases, castes have allied with ritually lower and 
economically poorer jatis to improve their political bargaining power.  In Gujarat, post 
independence, the numerically smaller Rajputs, having lost political power as rulers 
and facing loss of land under land reform legislation allied with the low ranked and 
landless Bariyas, Bhils and other jatis under the Kshatriya banner to challenge the 
political dominance of the Patidars. The process of assimilation involved accepting 
entire castes and caste-groups back into the Kshatriya fold and expanding traditional 
identities by setting aside details of ritual separation and symbols of pollution (Kothari 
and Maru, 2002; Shah, 2002).  
 
Several of these alliances and associations were built upon solidarity against the 
domination of upper castes (usually Brahmins and Kayasthas and Thakurs in the 
north). Significant examples for the mid-level castes are the non-Brahmin movements 
that took place in Maharashtra and the South in the first half of the twentieth century. In 
Tamil Nadu, the non-Brahmin movement brought together peasant, trading and artisan 
castes under the Dravidian identity (Shah, 2002) to contest the dominance of the 
Brahmins who were over-represented in the political bodies, public services and 
education system of the erstwhile Madras presidency and demand reservations as 
‘Backward Castes’ (Beteille, 2010).  The non-Brahmin movement did not always 
include the so called ‘untouchable castes’ but its critique of caste hierarchy and 
Brahmanical social and cultural systems created the space for the emergence of Dalit 
movements, especially in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu (Jodhka, 2012). 
 
For many of these alliances built through caste consciousness rooted in religious 
symbols, history, legends and myths, the alliance promoted a new and more inclusive 
identity, which was then deployed in the service of exercising or contesting dominance. 
Political identity was thus flexible and shifted by territorial level – jati at the local level, 
jati cluster or alliance at the sub-regional and regional level and linguistic at the 
national level. While most of these identities were either formed in response to state 
policy such as the Vokkaligas in Karnataka or to wrest benefits from the state and/or 
acquire state power such as the Non-Brahmins in Tamil Nadu and the Kshatriyas in 
Gujarat, others were a direct creation of state policy such as the Scheduled Castes 
(SC) and Other Backward Castes (OBC). 
 
The colonial government clubbed the different so called ‘untouchable’ jatis that suffered 
ritual exclusion and stigmatisation together into an administrative category, initially 
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calling them ‘Depressed Classes’ and subsequently the Scheduled Castes in the first 
constitution of colonial India, the Government of India Act of 1935 (Jodhka, 2012; Rao, 
2010). According to Rao (2010), such a categorisation was a result of  the colonial 
government’s mapping of constituency onto religious identity in their implementation of 
the political technology of franchise and representative government. However, it served 
to facilitate the Scheduled Castes’ self identification as a discriminated community 
under the leadership of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who also popularised the identity ‘Dalit’ for 
them. Given their small numbers at the local level, Ambedkar attempted to mobilise 
Dalits at the national level to contest upper caste dominance, through the 
establishment of initially the Scheduled Castes Federation and subsequently the 
Republican Party of India (Palshikar, 2006). While this mobilisation was able to secure 
a range of protective, enabling and empowering measures from the state (both colonial 
and independent India) to address the marginalisation of Dalits (Jodhka, 2012), in 
terms of electoral politics, they remained fragmented at the state level and co-opted by 
the dominant castes until the 1980s when another political party of Dalits was formed in 
Uttar Pradesh, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) (Jodhka, 2012; Palshikar, 2006). The 
BSP, rooted in the Ambedakarite tradition was the first Dalit political party (with a 
caste-based membership and pro Dalit agenda), to be elected to government in Uttar 
Pradesh however, in alliance with other castes and political parties. It has since then 
spread to other states and also contested and won seats in the national elections, in its 
bid to unify Dalits across the country to contest upper caste dominance (Palshikar, 
2006).      
 
The term ‘Other Backward Classes’, according to Jaffrelot (2006), has its roots in 
‘Backward Classes’, another administrative category devised by the British 
government, in response to the Tamilian non-Brahmin movement. ‘Backward classes’ 
initially grouped the Shudra and so called ‘Untouchable’ castes together for the 
purposes of positive discrimination but the ‘Depressed Classes’ or the Scheduled 
Castes were subsequently removed and this category came to be referred as ‘Other 
Backward Classes (OBCs)’ in the constitution of independent India. However the 
positive discrimination policies instituted by the British and by the princely states for the 
OBCs, namely caste based reservation in civil service positions, were continued by the 
southern states of independent India but resisted by the populous northern states and 
consequently the Congress led national government for several decades despite the 
recommendations of at least two national level Backward Classes Commissions. The 
northern resistance was rooted in upper caste dominance, which, based on population 
numbers and the zamindari pattern of landownership was more prominent in the Hindi 
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speaking states than the southern and western states. When a non-Congress 
government in 1989 finally approved affirmative action for OBCs in government jobs 
and educational institutions, there were large-scale protests. This upper caste 
resistance, in turn, produced the political consolidation of the OBCs giving rise to new 
political parties such as the Samajwadi Janata Party (SJP). Since the 1990s, OBC 
castes have deployed their considerable numerical strength in the populous northern 
states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar to win electoral battles and establish their 
political dominance. Jaffrelot (2006) notes that although the OBCs are not a 
homogenous social category, the agitation for affirmative action produced them as a 
political category, enabling them to mobilise together, challenge existing clientelistic 
networks and seek political power.       
 
For Kothari (2010), the interaction of caste and democratic politics in the Indian context 
follows a general pattern. The dominance of a particular caste at a regional or state 
level produces a response in the form of an ascendant caste/s, which then competes 
for dominance giving rise to a bilateral or multilateral structure of caste politics. 
Subsequent factions and cleavages within the entrenched/dominant and ascendant 
demand an expansion of the political support base, which in turn leads to co-optation of 
other castes through economic patronage, patron-client loyalties, bond groups and 
organisational forms such as caste associations and federations. Over time, the co-
opted acquire a caste consciousness based on their numbers, economic independence 
and leadership and emerge as a political class to seek power for themselves. 
 
In sum, caste in India has always been political and structured by state power. 
According to Gupta (2005) castes have historically competed for power and the caste 
order has been enforced by political power rather than religious ideology. In the pre-
colonial period, caste hierarchies were contested and renegotiated during episodes of 
military and social upheaval. Under British rule, the state influenced caste initially by 
enabling the consolidation of a Brahmin centric hierarchy and subsequently through its 
policies of enumeration, political representation and reservation that facilitated ‘lower 
castes’ to mobilise and challenge upper caste dominance.  Democracy in independent 
India rendered castes legally equal and over time produced a ‘horizontalisation’ of 
castes (Sheth, 2002). Such horizontalisation was facilitated by state policies such as 
the abolition of untouchability, introduction of land reforms, expansion of affirmative 
action and implementation of development programmes (Jodhka, 2012); and caste as 
system or hierarchy transitioned to caste as identity (Gupta, 2005) . 
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According to Witsoe (2012a) this politicisation of caste manifests in the everyday as the 
political mediation of the local state. He finds, in the context of Bihar, that the political 
mediation of the dominant Rajput caste was rooted in the ‘limited Raj’ of the colonial 
government, which operated primarily through its alliances with the local elite. Often 
the same families that served as intermediaries in the erstwhile zamindari system 
became political brokers of the postcolonial developmental state to maintain their 
dominance through connections with the police and bureaucrats. With the rise of the 
OBCs, particularly the Yadav caste, to political power in the state post the 1990s 
reservation agitation; Witsoe notes a democratisation of political mediation and the 
emergence of the Yadavs, the most populous caste as the new dominant caste. 
However, he highlights that in the case of Bihar the transfer of power to the OBCs and 
the Yadav caste was not attained through the capture of state institutions as these 
were still dominated by the upper castes but by dramatically increasing politician and 
broker influence within state institutions. Under Yadav rule in Bihar, political mediation, 
which had enabled the upper castes to reinforce their dominance, became the 
instrument to displace this dominance.  Similarly, Jeffrey (2001, 2000) demonstrates 
how dominant castes use political power to wrest benefits from the state, colonise a 
local state institution with kin and manipulate it to isolate, exploit and abuse other, 
mostly poorer sections and castes. He traces the political rise of the Jats, a socially 
and economically powerful agricultural caste in western Uttar Pradesh and examines 
the strategies employed by them to colonise the police as a preferred means of 
occupational diversification. Primary amongst these were bribes. Some rich Jats also 
used contacts within the Police department to lobby for their candidates or act as 
mediators in the recruitment process. Rich Jats with more political clout and contacts 
were more likely to be successful at such lobbying than poorer ones.  Additionally, Jats 
established and maintained informal political networks with local state officials, police 
and politicians based on caste identity, regional fraternity and masculinity to assert and 
enhance their social power. These included regular ‘chicken and whiskey’ parties 
organised at their homes, cultivating brokers linked to powerful politicians and/or senior 
police officials and extending social power through marriage alliances with rich and 
politically influential families. Jats used their consequent political clout to ensure that 
civil and criminal disputes were settled in their favour, which in turn allowed them to 
break the law with impunity, subdue opposition, grab land as well as steal crops.     
 
For Ganguly (2000) and Gorringe and Rafanell (2007) the everyday practice of caste is 
performative – it is through the everyday enactment of caste rules of association and 
separation, purity and pollution that caste is upheld, but it is these everyday practices 
		
55 
and performances that also become the sites for protest, resistance and the 
reconstitution of caste identities. Gorringe and Rafanell (2007) note the embodiment of 
Scheduled Caste or Dalit identity in rural Tamil Nadu. The separation and subservience 
of the polluting Dalit body is produced through attire, posture, speech, work, food, drink 
and dwelling. Dalits live away from the main village, visit it only when called and cannot 
cycle or wear shoes through it. They stand apart from the dominant higher castes, eat 
and drink in separate receptacles, cannot spit in the main village or use common wells, 
ponds and public seating. While interacting with higher castes, they are required to 
hunch and lean forward and not make eye contact. They do not enter upper caste 
homes and if required call the householder from the backdoor using distinct forms of 
address. Marriage and friendship across the pollution barrier is prohibited such that 
even in child play the unclean Dalit body is not allowed to perch atop a higher caste 
one. However, Gorringe and Rafanell (2007) argue that it is these practices of 
embodiment that become the sites for protest, resistance and the reconstitution of 
caste identities. There were instances of Dalit men marrying high caste women, Dalit 
children using the village water tap or the common tumbler in school and Dalit young 
men who are members of the Dalit Panthers – an anti caste, Dalit movement –walking 
tall with raised chests and if required, raised fists. These transgressions also invited 
sanctions but for Gorringe and Rafanell (2007) such enforcement only served to 
underscore the performative nature of caste, that it maybe reconstituted through self-
reflexive acts of defiance. 
 
I build on the performative nature of caste and state to explore the links between the 
politicisation of caste and the political mediation of the everyday local state in the 
context of the ICDS programme in Maharashtra. I examine the strategies by which the 
dominant Maratha caste uses a state programme, the ICDS, to reproduce and perform 
socio-political and ritual dominance as well as Dalit attempts to confront Maratha 
domination using the idea of the state. In the process, I highlight the ways in which the 
politics of caste shapes the everyday practices of local state functionaries and how 
these practices, in turn, serve as sites for the reconstitution of this politics. 
  
2. Informal financial practices 
 
Formal/informal, legal/illegal and public/private are key dichotomies through which 
state-society relations have been understood such that transgressions of these 
binaries have been typically studied as ‘corruption’. Such corruption is considered to be 
at the root of much of the Indian state’s failure to deliver welfare and development in 
		
56 
popular discourse (Mathur, 2016). The perception of state corruption is so widespread 
and ‘corruption talk’ (Lazar, 2005) so prevalent that both Parry (2000) and Gupta 
(1995) studying widely different contexts of a central Indian industrial town and a north 
Indian village respectively found that talk about the state invariably centred on its 
corruption. In 2011 the pervasiveness of talk about state corruption fuelled public anger 
and a popular anti-corruption uprising in Delhi led by the social activist, Anna Hazare. 
Enormous crowds gathered to protest corruption and were enthusiastically and 
favourably covered by the news media as representatives of a new social movement. 
This movement subsequently produced a new political party, the Aam Aadmi Party 
(AAP) which contested and won two elections in the state of Delhi on a platform of 
bringing about a political revolution and expunging the ‘biggest evil’ facing India – 
corruption (Gupta, 2017; Sharma, 2018). 
 
While anger and protest against state corruption may drive electoral change, there is 
little consensus, even amongst activists and protestors on what counts as corruption. 
In her study of the anti-corruption movement and AAP, Sharma (2018) finds that 
corruption is a messy social practice that eludes clear definition and explanation. 
Identifying corrupt practices as well as victims and perpetrators is tricky while there is 
no clarity about whether corruption emerges from the state and infects society or 
conversely is a cultural malaise reflected in state institutions  
 
The issue of corruption has received much academic attention since the 1990s when 
the NGO, Transparency International, and the World Bank framed it as central to 
poverty reduction and called for a global coalition against corruption (Anders and 
Nuijten, 2007). Over the last three decades, there has been a ‘veritable boom’ of social 
science literature, particularly from the disciplines of economics and political science, 
on corruption (Anders and Nuijten, 2007; Torsello and Venard, 2016). 
 
The economic approach to the study of corruption is based primarily on the key 
concepts of the ‘principal-agent relationship’ and the ‘public-private divide’. Corruption 
occurs when agents (often a public official) take actions that are against the interests 
and goals of their principals (who maybe bureaucratic superiors/politically appointed 
ministers/general public) for their private benefit, usually monetary (Rose-Ackerman, 
2006). The economic study of such corrupt transactions has focused on understanding 
the market for bribes and whether bribery improves state efficiency and furthers market 
development or raises uncertainty and arbitrariness deterring business investment 
(Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016). It has explored the links between corruption and 
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economic growth at the national level – whether high levels of corruption cause low 
rates of growth in poor countries or whether it is facilitative in countries with both high 
levels of economic growth and corruption (Lambsdorff, 2006). Further, economists 
have studied the role of institutions in furthering, restraining and/or mitigating corruption 
and its effects (Rose-Ackerman, 2006; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016). 
 
The political study of corruption centres on the public-private divide rather than 
pathologies of the principal-agent relationship (Philp and David-Barrett, 2015). 
Definitions of political corruption emphasise the public sphere in which political actors 
operate (Heywood, 1997) and revolve around the concepts of ‘public office’ ( as in the 
definition by Nye, 1967) and ‘public interest’ (as in the definition by Friedrich, 1966). 
Broadly, political corruption occurs when the public interest or common good is 
subverted by private gain.  However, the political theorist Philp (1997) highlights that 
since debating and determining public interest is also within the domain of the political, 
political corruption can only be understood in the context of the characteristics of 
political rule. He contends that a political relation is one in which a citizen concedes a 
right to rule based on the justification of resolving conflicts within the polity. Politics, 
then, is a response to potential disorder - it has the potential to turn conflict into order 
and corruption is that which undercuts the ability of politics to provide such a solution.  
 
In contrast, the anthropological study of corruption challenges the Weberian 
dichotomies between private and public and eschews the search for a universal 
definition, focusing instead on issues of meaning and representation (Anders and 
Nuijten, 2007; Shore and Haller, 2005; Torsello and Venard, 2016). Anthropologists 
have even traditionally avoided using the term ‘corruption’ as in much economic and 
political research ‘corruption’ has been regarded as a systemic and endemic 
characteristic of the ‘South and East’, ‘developing’, ‘third-world’, poor and weak states 
giving it moralistic, evolutionary and Orientalist undertones. So although social 
phenomena related to corruption such as patronage, brokerage and bribery have been 
studied extensively in anthropology in the 1960s and 70s, the term itself is of recent 
usage (since the late 1990s) in the discipline prompted in part by the ubiquity of talk 
about corruption in field sites fuelled by the global corruption discourse and in part by 
anthropological research on the state (Anders and Nuijten, 2007).         
 
Going beyond binaries, anthropology uses the phenomena of corruption to gain 
insights into the multitude of rules, laws, codes, conventions, norms and practices that 
govern action. The legality of a practice is not necessarily the only standard against 
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which it is judged. Behaviour that is considered morally justifiable may not always be 
legal and illegal actions may not always be regarded as morally or socially 
unacceptable. Different normative systems maybe at work such that what is corrupt in 
one system may not be corrupt by another. Moreover, since laws are politically 
determined, understandings of what is corrupt and what is legal are reflective of 
political relations and are subject to change over time. Anthropology therefore uses 
legal pluralism to understand the interplay of norms and practices that underlie 
‘corruption’ (Anders and Nuijten, 2007; Shore and Haller, 2005).  
 
As per existing literature, a significant practice driving much state corruption in India is 
political mediation (Berenschot, 2010; Witsoe, 2012a). Besides extending patronage to 
their voters and supporters, politicians influence state functioning through systems of 
vertical and horizontal corruption to generate campaign finance. Vertical or retail 
corruption refers to the petty informal payments needed to get routine services from the 
government while horizontal corruption is large scale or ‘grand’ corruption involving big 
deals and large sums of money. According to Wade (1985, 1982) the system of vertical 
corruption aggregates numerous small informal payments at lower levels of 
bureaucracy to create a substantial pool of funds at higher levels which enriches 
bureaucrats as well as enables politicians to fund their election expenses. In vertical 
corruption, the money collected is shared across levels of state functionaries with each 
level receiving a percentage. Further the potential for informal incomes creates a 
market for public office with bureaucrats vying and paying for transfers to posts with 
greater potential and politicians extending patronage to their supporters by appointing 
them to lucrative posts.  For Gupta (2017) vertical corruption was the primary mode of 
political financing in India till the economic reforms of the 1990s accelerated economic 
growth rates and increased the scale and scope of horizontal corruption. India now 
has, according to him, a mixed system of vertical and horizontal corruption. 
 
I study the implementation of the ICDS programme through the informal practices of 
state functionaries, especially those relating to informal incomes and payments, given 
their significance in academic and popular discourse in India. I explore the contexts 
within which ICDS functionaries engage in these practices and how these are justified 
and legitimised. Finally, I examine the links between everyday informality at the level of 
the local state and larger systems of power and politics.   
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3. Reforming the Indian Developmental State 
 
Much economic and political scholarship on the Indian state identifies the early 1990s 
as a period when critical reforms to the developmental state were initiated. The bulk of 
these reforms related to economic policy but also involved reforms of state and 
governance to enable the implementation of economic liberalisation (Joseph, 2007). 
The major economic reforms implemented addressed the areas of investment, trade 
and finance and included the dismantling of the license raj, ending public monopolies, 
enabling greater flows of foreign direct investment and consumer goods, and the 
opening up of many core sectors such as education, health care, telecommunications, 
transport, financial services, infrastructure etc to private enterprise (Chatterjee, 2008; 
Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan, 2011). The accompanying 
internal reforms of state institutions included re-organisation of public enterprises along 
business lines to generate incomes and profits by reducing subsidies, introducing 
market based financing, cutting costs, reducing the permanent workforce, increasing 
casualization of labour, contracting out and public-private partnerships (Joseph, 2007, 
2001). Bear (2011) ethnographically traces these changes and their effects on the 
Kolkata Port Trust in West Bengal while Subramanian (2014) charts the travails of ITI, 
a large public sector telecommunications equipment manufacturer and Strumpell 
(2014) the restructuring of the first public sector steel plant in Rourkela, Odisha. 
 
There is little consensus amongst scholars regarding when economic reforms began, 
how and why they were initiated and what form they took. Many research and policy 
documents identify 1991 as the ‘critical tipping point’ when liberalisation and 
marketization was initiated in response to a fiscal crisis but Sachs et al. (1999), Shastri 
(1997) and Pedersen (2000) highlight that liberalisation initiatives were first taken in 
1985 under the Rajiv Gandhi led Congress government whereas Nayar (2009) and 
Kohli (1989) push the date back even further to 1980 contending that they were begun 
by Indira Gandhi, on her return to power. Neveling (2014) locates the seeds of 
neoliberal economic practice in the mixed economy of the Nehruvian postcolonial state 
through his analysis of the establishment and workings of the Kandla Free Trade Zone 
in Western India.  
 
Bhaduri and Nayyar (1996) and Patnaik (2000) emphasise the role of international 
financial institutions, international financial capital, external pressures and loan 
conditionality in the adoption of liberalisation policies by India, Corbridge and Harriss 
(2000) highlight the role of the urban, industrial and financial elites in pushing for 
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economic reforms as the previous development model which served their interests had 
run its course while Shastri (1997) draws attention to the ideas and convictions of 
national level bureaucrats, especially those who entered the bureaucracy laterally. For  
Pedersen (2000) each of these explanations has validity but for different aspects of the 
reform process although he, Mooij (2001) and Nayar (2009) question the influence of 
any external pressure. 
 
Liberalisation of the Indian economy and state was concurrent to another major internal 
transformation of the state, the acceleration and consolidation of the processes of 
decentralisation through which power was devolved to regional state governments and 
local elected bodies (Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan, 2011). The increased ability of 
regional governments to raise their own tax revenues and control their own 
expenditures, led to increased competition between them for domestic and foreign 
capitalist investment.  According to Chatterjee (2008) this led to an unprecedented 
involvement of regional political parties with the interests of national and international 
corporate capital and thereby the dominance of the capitalist class in the state 
structure as a whole. These changes in the structure of the Indian state were in 
articulation with transnational discourses on neoliberalism and good governance. Neo-
liberalism is commonly understood as an ensemble of economic policies to facilitate 
the functioning of free markets and to extend the model of the market to heretofore 
noneconomic domains, activities and subjects based on both economic (efficiency) and 
ethical (self-responsibility) claims (Brown, 2015; Ong, 2006). The ‘good governance’ 
agenda with its focus on participation, accountability, transparency, decentralisation 
and democratisation, according to Corbridge et al. (2005) emerged as a techno-
managerial counterpart to support ‘free’ or ‘freer’ markets. The objective was to enable 
the informed consumer-citizen to ‘participate in, negotiate with, influence, control and 
hold accountable institutions that affect. . . lives’ (Harriss, 2007, p. 2717). 
 
The effects of state reform on the social sector have varied by phase. In the initial 
phase of reforms in the 1990s, Corbridge and Harriss (2000) note stagnation in the 
percentage of national government revenue spending on social services including 
education, health, social security and the welfare of scheduled communities while 
regional governments reduced spending on social services. Public investment in 
agriculture also declined to below 2 percent of agriculture GDP in 2002-03 from 5 
percent in the 1980s. The Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-12) of the Government of 
India accepted that despite impressive economic growth rates, inequalities had been 
exacerbated post economic reforms with the rate of decline in poverty not keeping 
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pace with GDP growth and little change in poverty incidence amongst certain 
marginalised groups such as the Scheduled Tribes. These weaknesses gave rise to an 
agenda of ‘inclusive growth’ under which a range of social sector schemes were 
launched to reverse the effects of primitive accumulation according to Chatterjee 
(2008) and ‘pacify the dangerous classes’ as per Corbridge and Shah (2013). Although 
increasing social sector expenditure in a context of liberal reform has been regarded as 
‘exceptional’, a constraint of democratic politics and even anachronistic, Mathur (2016)  
in her analysis of one such scheme argues that its design was influenced by neo-liberal 
thinking involving a combination of techniques of transparency, accountability, 
participation and empowerment. For programme implementation new contractual 
arrangements were introduced in the local state to ensure fiscal prudence and 
efficiency. However these only served to produce new inefficiencies and fragmented 
governance (Bear and Mathur, 2015). Based on her findings, Mathur cautions against 
assuming that initiatives of reform produce new subjectivities and rationalities and calls 
for understanding the conflicts and contestations that ensue. I build on this approach to 
ask how ICDS functionaries working at the implementation level make sense of 
initiatives of bureaucratic reform and examine the influence on practices, relations, and 
subjectivities. 
 
Summing Up 
 
In this thesis, I grapple with the vexedness of implementation, with understanding why 
development programme implementation does not always adhere to its plan or design. 
Much literature locates the answers in the social embeddedness of the Indian 
developmental state, which I argue has been largely understood through the three 
frames of the ‘dominated’, the ‘modern’, and the ‘imagined’ state. The first 
characterises the Indian state as captured by the interests of a coalition of classes both 
at the macro and the local level (Harriss-White, 2003). The second argues that the idea 
of the postcolonial Indian state espoused in the Constitution was too modern for a 
majority of the population who could only engage with the state in social groups, 
through mediators and brokers and not through universal, undifferentiated citizenship 
(Chatterjee, 2004). The third redefines the problem of social embeddedness from that 
of the state’s inability to work impartially with social groups to one in which the state-
society boundary is understood as a construction, an effect of everyday bureaucratic 
practices reflective of relations of power and social control (Sharma and Gupta, 2006). 
For my thesis, I build upon this focus on everyday state practices to understand 
development programme implementation. I select the frame of the ‘imagined state’ 
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because only a disaggregation of the developmental state into the minutiae of the 
everyday reveals the processes through which policies and plans are realised and 
gaps and variations produced.   
 
Bureaucratic practices have been studied anthropologically to understand how people 
imagine the state, what they expect of it (Gupta, 2006; Lazar, 2005; Parry, 2000) and 
how they engage with it (Anand, 2011; Anjaria, 2011; Corbridge et al., 2005; Jeffrey, 
2000). They have been analysed to identify how the state ‘sees’ populations (Scott, 
1998), how it performs its ‘stateness’ (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001) and how the state 
is spatialised (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002).  However the role of state functionaries has 
not been adequately addressed. In much of this work, state practices have been 
studied as ‘authorless strategies’ leading Blundo (2014) to call for making the state 
itself legible by understanding the practices of its workers and Bernstein and Mertz 
(2011) to highlight bureaucratic administration as a site for social and political action. In 
this thesis, I address this gap. I study the implementation of the ICDS through the 
everyday practices of its functionaries. I analyse how ICDS functionaries working at the 
implementation or sub-district level construct, negotiate and perform ICDS practices. In 
these improvisations and performances, I locate explanations for variations between 
programme policy and its implementation. 
 
Lower level state functionaries in India work in a context of political mediation of 
everyday public services (Berenschot, 2010) and have been found to be either 
indifferent (Baviskar, 2004) or, as part of the local political order, actively complicit in 
such mediation (Harriss-White, 2003; Jeffrey, 2000, 2001, 2002; Witsoe, 2012a). 
Although existing research acknowledges that state functionaries face competing 
pressures from local social groups as well as their departments of work (Corbridge et 
al., 2005), their management of these pressures has not been adequately researched. 
In this thesis, I study the engagement of ICDS functionaries with structures of local 
power. The political mediation of the state in India has been linked to the politicisation 
of caste  (Witsoe, 2012b, 2012a, 2011) which remains a significant political, social and 
cultural identity. Based on a review of literature, I argue that caste in India has been 
structured by state power. The caste order has been shaped by colonial and 
postcolonial state policies, castes have historically competed for state power and have 
used state benefits and resources to enhance their social and economic position.  
Political mediation is then about struggles over dominance and subordination in local 
sites (Witsoe, 2012a).  In this thesis, I thus study how the politics of caste shapes the 
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everyday practices of local state functionaries and how these practices, in turn, 
reconstitute this politics. 
 
Emerging scholarship from the anthropology of bureaucracy highlights not only the 
constructed nature of much bureaucratic practice but also that such improvisation, 
under conditions of constraint and pressure often traverses the boundaries of 
formality/informality and legality/illegality. Such transgressions have been typically 
studied as ‘corruption’ in political and economic literature, and in popular discourse 
such corruption is considered to be at the root of the Indian state’s failure to deliver 
welfare and development.  However, anthropology eschews the moral undertones that 
characterise all such framings and instead employs legal pluralism to understand the 
multitude of rules, norms and practices that underlie ‘corruption.’ Research on state 
corruption in India reveals it to be driven by political mediation to generate election 
finance and identifies two main kinds – vertical or retail and horizontal corruption. The 
former refers to a system of aggregation of small, numerous informal payments at 
lower levels of the administration to create substantial pools for bureaucrats and 
politicians at higher levels whereas the latter refers to large deals and big corporates.  
In this thesis, I study the informal practices of ICDS functionaries, especially those 
relating to informal payments and incomes. I explore the contexts that generate these 
practices and their links to larger systems of power and politics. 
 
Reforms to the Indian developmental state were initiated in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
majority of these reforms related to economic liberalisation but also included reforms of 
state and governance to facilitate the changed relationship between economy and 
state. Public enterprises and institutions were re-organised along business lines to 
generate profits through reduction of subsidies and costs, increasing casualization of 
labour, contracting out and public-private partnerships.  Economic reforms were 
concurrent to another major internal transformation of Indian state - decentralisation of 
power to regional and local governments. Liberalisation and decentralisation of the 
Indian state unfolded against a transnational context of neoliberalism and good 
governance. These changes influenced the social sector first through the stagnation of 
expenditure and then subsequently through a roll out of schemes such as the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act to address the dissatisfaction produced by growing 
inequality. While such programmes were regarded as opposed to neoliberalism, 
Mathur (2016) finds their design and implementation influenced by neoliberal thinking. 
Accordingly, Bear and Mathur, (2015)  call for studying the impact of the ‘new public 
goods’ of ‘fiscal austerity, marketization, consensus, transparency and decentralization’ 
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on bureaucratic functioning. Against this backdrop, I study bureaucratic engagement 
with reform. I ask how ICDS functionaries make sense of reform initiatives and the 
ways in which they influence practices, relations and subjectivities. 
 
Thus, I study the state as an ensemble of practices constructed, negotiated and 
performed by its functionaries. I analyse how ICDS workers engage with the local 
politics of caste, vertical systems of ‘corruption’ as well as reform initiatives to 
implement ICDS, perform state and thereby produce variations from programme 
design.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Performing Caste, Performing State: Maratha Dominance & Dalit 
Assertion in the ICDS 
 
Ten years before I joined the ICDS as an anganwadi worker, my cousin mother-in-law 
used to work here. At that time, the division of the village population between 
anganwadi workers was such that lower caste households were served by my mother-
in-law whereas only the higher caste households were served by Savita More, the 
Maratha worker, as per her own rule….so… my mother-in-law’s field area was 
scattered around the periphery of the village. Then when I joined, Savita More said that 
just like my mother-in-law I should be given the lower caste communities. I refused…. I 
said give me any part of the village but I want half and I want it along a continuous line 
then only will I be able to work. This led to a fight, which continued for several days. 
 
Meera Kale 
Dalit Anganwadi worker  
 
Meera Kale is a young anganwadi worker of the Integrated Child Development 
Services (ICDS) programme in Mangaon village of Sundar block, Aurangabad district, 
Maharashtra. She is one of 3 anganwadi workers in the village and joined the 
programme in 2011. The other two anganwadi workers were recruited in the late 80s 
when the ICDS programme began in the block. Meera Kale is a Dalit, whereas Savita 
More, is from the dominant Maratha caste. In the interview extract quoted, she shares 
that because she is a Dalit, the existing anganwadi worker from the dominant caste 
refused to allocate higher caste households to her and insisted that she work only with 
the lower caste households.  
 
In this chapter, I explore how the performative politics of caste shapes the everyday 
practices of ICDS functionaries and how they negotiate with this politics to determine 
the implementation of the ICDS programme. Supplementing existing scholarship on the 
links between the politicisation of caste (Jeffrey, 2002, 2001, 2000; Witsoe, 2012a, 
2012b, 2011) and the political mediation of the everyday local state (Baviskar, 2004; 
Berenschot, 2014, 2010; Corbridge et al., 2005; Harriss-White, 2003), I find that the 
dominant Maratha caste uses kinship, caste and political networks to colonise 
anganwadi worker positions and capture state benefits and resources. I contribute to 
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existing research by ethnographically detailing the workings of these networks and the 
effects of such Maratha capture on anganwadi centre functioning. I discuss how 
dominant caste anganwadi workers resist accountability to programme beneficiaries 
and use everyday programme/state practices to perform ritual superiority, producing 
Dalits as ‘polluted’, ‘untouchable’ subjects. Maratha anganwadi worker practices lead 
to the exclusion of marginalised, vulnerable communities that the ICDS is designed to 
benefit subverting developmental programme objectives and producing gaps in 
implementation. 
 
However, in a departure from much writing on the politically mediated state, I present 
two case studies of Dalit resistance to Maratha domination in the ICDS. Such 
resistance is led by Dalit state functionaries, a group that has historically played an 
important role in powering Dalit political mobilisation. Dalit state functionaries in the 
ICDS confront Maratha attempts to control their labour and reproduce the material and 
cultural basis of Maratha caste power, by invoking the rules and structures of Weberian 
bureaucracy. Maratha attempts to reproduce caste power as state power are 
challenged by Dalits through recourse to the idea of an impersonal and rational state.   
 
My focus on state functionaries and their practices, thus reveals that (1) state 
functionaries use state practices to perform caste, exercising dominance and 
contesting subordination (2) such contestations are based on competing imaginaries of 
state, and (3) intersections of state practices with the local political order do not only 
produce gaps in the implementation of development programmes but can also serve as 
sites for challenging social inequalities. 
 
The chapter begins with a review of literature on Maratha dominance in Maharashtra 
and I locate my field area – Sundar Block, the two Supervisory beats that I studied, 
Laldera and Rajegaon; and the two villages where I observed anganwadi centre 
working, Shanwadi and Mangaon – in this literature. The next section presents the 
ethnographic evidence on Maratha domination of the ICDS, particularly the working of 
kinship, caste and political networks to produce the ‘Maratha-isation’ of anganwadi 
centres and its effects on programme implementation. The third section then reviews 
the history of Dalit protest and resistance in Maharashtra, which I highlight is marked 
by Dalit belief in the power of the state to correct historic wrongs followed by the two 
case studies on Dalit state functionaries challenging and resisting Maratha power. I 
conclude by reflecting on the implications of these case studies for the interactions of 
caste and state.   
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Maratha dominance in Maharashtra 
 
Marathas have historically been decisively dominant in Maharashtra based on a 
combination of numerical preponderance, landholding patterns, economic and political 
control and a historically nurtured self-image as rulers and leaders (Dahiwale, 1995; 
Deshpande and Palshikar, 2017; Vora, 2009; Waghmore, 2013). As per available 
estimates, they constitute almost 31 percent of the state population (Lele, 1990) and 40 
percent of the Western Maharashtra, Marathwada and Vidarbha regional population 
(Anderson et al., 2015). In Sundar block, in the two villages Shanwadi and Mangaon, 
where I studied anganwadi functioning, Marathas comprised almost 44-49 percent10 of 
the population. A majority of Maratha families in these villages, 70-80 percent, were 
part of one kinship network and shared the same surname. Resultantly, Maratha 
households in the village had close ties with each other and formed a cohesive social 
group. 
 
The term, ‘Maratha’ in these estimates refers not only to the specific Maratha caste but 
also an allied peasant caste – the Kunbis. In the western Maharashtra and 
Marathwada regions, the Kunbis were absorbed in the lower ranks of the Marathas 
through marriage based on landowning patterns and close interactions over time 
whereas in the Konkan and Vidarbha regions, the Kunbi identity remained distinct 
(Dahiwale, 1995; Deshpande, 2004; Palshikar and Deshpande, 1999; Waghmore, 
2013). The Maratha-Kunbi caste cluster emerged as unified political entity during the 
non-brahmin movement and consolidated through the initial years of Congress rule in 
Maharashtra, which encouraged the caste combination for its numerical strength 
(Deshpande and Palshikar, 2017).   
 
In the post-independence period, the Marathas emerged as the biggest landowners 
(Dahiwale, 1995) and building on their leadership of the non-Brahmin movement 
(Deshpande and Palshikar, 2017) gained political control across all levels of 
government. In Western Maharashtra, Marathwada and Vidarbha, Marathas occupy 60 
percent of the non-reserved Sarpanch positions at the village level, 80 percent of 
positions in villages where they own most of the land and surprisingly 67 percent of 
positions in villages where they are a minority (Anderson et al., 2015). They have 
historically accounted for a majority of Zilla Parishad (district level government) 
members in Western Maharashtra and Marathwada (Palshikar, 2002) whereas in the 																																																								10 Based on the survey data of anganwadi workers of Shanwadi and Mangaon villages 
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state legislature, an average 47 percent of all MLAs from 1967 to 2004 and 45 percent 
in 2009 have been from the Maratha caste cluster (Datar and Ghotale, 2013; 
Deshpande and Palshikar, 2017; Vora, 2009). In 54 of the 288 assembly 
constituencies in the state only Marathas have ever been elected (Palshikar and 
Birmal, 2007). Maratha dominance in the legislature is mirrored in the executive with an 
average 51 percent of cabinet ministers from 16 cabinets across 1960-2010 belonging 
to the Maratha caste as well as 10 of 16 chief ministers (Datar and Ghotale, 2013). 
 
Of the 15 village panchayats in the two beats that I studied, Laldera and Rajegaon, an 
overwhelming 80 percent had Maratha sarpanchs or elected village heads. Both 
Shanwadi and Mangaon, had always had Maratha Sarpanchs except when the position 
was reserved for other castes. On such occasions, Maratha political leaders identified 
a person from the required reserved castes to ‘rubber stamp’ their continued rule. 
Further, the Sundar block legislative assembly seat had always been represented by 
Marathas, albeit from different political parties- 1960s to 1990s by the Indian National 
Congress and its factions, 1990-2009 by the Shiv Sena, 2009-2014 by the Nationalist 
Congress Party and 2014 onwards again by the Shiv Sena. The same Maratha MLA 
from the Shiv Sena had represented Sundar block for 4 terms. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Political dominance enabled the Marathas to expand their economic base beyond 
agriculture through state supported co-operative institutions in agro-industries such as 
sugar, dairy, cotton and oil and allied sectors such as banking and credit (Dahiwale, 
1995) State supported cooperative institutions in Maharashtra grew phenomenally 
between 1961 and 2001 accounting for nearly 6 percent of the state’s planned 
expenditure in the 4th plan (1969-1974) (Commissioner for Co-operation & Registrar of 
Co-operative Societies, 2005) and 12.5 percent of total employment in the state by 
1981 (Dahiwale, 1995). Controlled by the Marathas, cooperative institutions became an 
important route to and source of state political power with many Chairmen and 
Directors of the Board, especially of sugar co-operatives elected as state and national 
legislators, which in turn facilitated their nomination to the Boards of other cooperatives 
especially cooperative banks.  Resources from cooperative institutions including funds, 
people and vehicles were routinely deployed to win elections to the zilla parishad, 
assembly and parliament (Baviskar, 2007, 1980, 1968). In the early 1980s, a Maratha 
led and dominated state government shifted the right to grant permissions for setting 
up private colleges from universities to itself and several Maratha leaders became 
education entrepreneurs setting up private educational institutions which in turn 
employed a majority of Marathas (Dahiwale, 1995). In a revealing summary of Maratha 
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economic and political dominance Palshikar and Birmal (2007) highlight that Marathas 
own 75-90 percent of land in the state, control 71 percent of cooperative institutions – 
chairing 23 district co-operative banks, heading 86 of 105 sugar factories and owning 
or controlling all milk cooperatives and cotton mills – and 54 percent of educational 
institutions. Even Universities are dominated by them with 60-75 percent of University 
management belonging to the Maratha community.  
 
In addition to their economic and political power, Marathas possess a self-image as 
rulers and leaders building on their Kshatriya claims, caste pride in the Maratha warrior 
king Shivaji, leadership of the non-Brahmin movement during which they claimed to 
speak not just for themselves but all other backward castes in the region and 
subsequent political leadership in the Indian National Congress party which ruled the 
state of Maharashtra for three decades from 1960 to the 1990s except briefly in the late 
1970s (Deshpande and Palshikar, 2017). For Waghmore (2013) this is the most 
significant and the key in understanding Maratha aggression towards Dalits. 
Waghmore (2013) builds on Dumont (1980) and Quigley (2003) to argue that the 
Marathas as dominant castes reproduce the royal function at the village level playing 
out their sexual and political dominance in imagined village kingdoms – many Marathas 
in Marathwada even refer to themselves as raje (King). The violation of caste 
boundaries and roles, especially by the Scheduled Castes or Dalits threaten Maratha 
kingly pride and honour and they respond with violence against Dalits. Marathwada 
has a long history of Maratha violence against Dalits, the most notable being that 
during the Namantar (re-naming) movement – the Dalit demand for renaming 
Marathwada University as Dr. Ambedkar University. The Namantar political violence 
lasted 15 years and resulted in much loss of life and property for Dalits. Maratha 
aggression during this period was aimed at desecrating symbols of Dalit assertion and 
change especially photos and statues of Dr. Ambedkar. However Maratha violence 
against Dalits is not limited to specific events such as Namantar but takes everyday 
forms including public humiliation, threats, beatings and sexual intimidation and 
violence (Waghmore, 2013).  
 
Since the 1990s, the dominance of the Maratha community has been on the wane. The 
two main reasons for this decline, that emerge from much writing on this subject, are 
increased political competition and aggressive economic liberalisation (Deshpande and 
Palshikar, 2017; Palshikar and Deshpande, 1999). Marathas dominated the agrarian 
economy but in the 1990s, capitalist development became skewed towards the 
secondary and tertiary sectors and the carefully crafted Maratha nexus between 
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political and material interests unravelled. Additionally the 1990s were characterised by 
enhanced political competition with the rise of the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) as 
a political force post Mandal and decentralisation through local government institutions 
as a result of the 73rd and 74th amendments to the constitution. These developments 
led to politics becoming more dispersed, local and competitive. Marathas had to share 
limited political power with OBCs and Dalits and became increasingly frustrated. 
According to Deshpande (2006, 2004) and Hansen (1996), these frustrations found an 
outlet in the identity politics of Hindutva groups such as the Shiv Sena, a Hindu 
nationalist political party, which successfully appropriated symbols of caste pride as 
religious pride, particularly the Maratha warrior king Shivaji, to inflame communal 
sentiments in the region. A political party of the Marathas, the Nationalist Congress 
Party (NCP) emerged in the late 1990s, which also encouraged the rhetoric of Maratha 
caste pride. Additionally, several Maratha caste associations came up, notably the 
Sambhaji Brigade and the Chava Sanghatana which engaged in violent contestation 
over cultural symbols of caste pride. One of the key demands of this dispersed political 
and cultural mobilisation is reservation for Marathas in public sector jobs and 
educational institutions, as a backward caste. 
 
Dominating the ICDS: Of political patronage and mediation 
 
In the Sundar Block ICDS project, Aurangabad District, I found that Marathas were 
most dominant at the anganwadi level. They controlled several aspects of anganwadi 
functioning including where it was located and who was selected as the anganwadi 
worker and helper. Consequently, they influenced crucial programme outcomes such 
as who was able to access and avail of ICDS programme services and who was 
excluded. Maratha control over anganwadi functioning was exerted through their 
complete dominance over village social and political life, the latter reinforced by their 
control over the panchayat samiti or block level government and representation to the 
state legislature or the MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly) seat as well. 
 
Marathas were over-represented in Anganwadi worker positions in the ICDS 
programme despite the recruitment process favouring candidates from the reserved 
categories. Eligible applicants11 from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as 																																																								11 To be successfully considered for the anganwadi worker position applicants need to have at least 
cleared the 10th standard exam, be residents of the hamlet/village where the anganwadi is located, fall 
within a specific age group and have only two children. For the anganwadi helper position, all the same 
conditions apply except the minimum educational qualification is 7th standard pass.  The conditions on 
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well as Other Backward Castes for anganwadi worker and helper positions received 
additional points for their caste during the recruitment process. Despite this advantage, 
in the Laldera and Rajegaon beats, Marathas constituted 53 and 67 percent of 
anganwadi workers, respectively.  This Maratha capture was a function of the working 
of kinship, caste and political networks. The village Sarpanch, existing anganwadi 
workers and the local MLA were the patrons and brokers of these networks. Political 
patrons, brokers and fixers typically determine people’s access to information on public 
services and programmes, their participation and benefits and can even subvert 
programme objectives, sometimes defeating them altogether (Berenschot, 2010; 
Corbridge et al., 2005; Sharma, 2011; Witsoe, 2012a) 
 
Sarpanchs of villages, for which anganwadi workers needed to be recruited, were 
officially notified of the recruitment process by the ICDS programme. They were 
required to certify that interested applicants were bonafide residents of the 
village/hamlet where the anganwadi centre was located. A ‘proof of residence’ 
certificate duly signed by the Sarpanch was an essential criterion of eligibility for the 
anganwadi position. The official notification and the ‘proof of residence’ requirement 
placed the Sarpanch in an ideal position to influence applications for the post.  
 
Four of the five Anganwadi workers of Shanwadi and Mangaon villages were recruited 
to their position, through the patronage of the Maratha Sarpanch holding office at the 
time.  Of these, two of the three Maratha anganwadi workers were not actual residents 
of the villages in which they worked but lived in Sundar block town and commuted daily 
to the village for their service. However they had little difficulty in obtaining information 
about the advertised positions or procuring residence certificates from the village 
Sarpanch as they were part of the same kinship/caste network.  
 
Mangala Narke, the Maratha anganwadi worker of Shanwadi village for 27 years, had 
never lived in the village. She lived in Sundar block town and commuted daily to 																																																																																																																																																																		
age, the number of children as well as educational qualifications for helpers were introduced more recently 
and were not part of the 1989 process. The age condition in the 2011 recruitment process was between 
21-35 years. Along with the completed forms, applicants need to submit a range of supporting documents 
such as marksheets and/or certificates for every educational qualification that they have attained starting 
from the 7th standard exam and including the school leaving certificate, proof of identity and residence as 
well as a pledge that they currently have only two offspring and will continue to do so in the future. 
Candidates from the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Castes are required to 
attach copies of their caste certificate and those applicants who are widowed or orphaned need to produce 
relevant certificates as well. Candidates with prior experience also need to attach relevant certificates 
attesting their experience.  
 
		
72 
Shanwadi to operate her anganwadi. Her husband’s family had been the Patils 
(leaders) of a village near Shanwadi and had owned almost 40 acres of land. This land 
was acquired by the government for a dam project in return for a small amount of 
money, a few acres in Shanwadi village and a plot in Sundar Block town. The resultant 
loss of income and social status led to Mangala’s husband becoming an alcoholic and 
the family fell into dire financial straits. Mangala had studied till the 11th standard and 
so when the first round of recruitment for the ICDS in Sundar Block was announced, 
the Sarpanch of Shanwadi, Mangala’s relative by marriage suggested that she apply 
for the position. He gave her a residence certificate. Hers was the only application 
received from Shanwadi village and she got the position.  
 
Similarly, Savita More was not a resident of Mangaon village when she applied for the 
anganwadi worker position there. She belonged to a neighbouring village where the 
daughter in law of the Sarpanch had taken the only anganwadi worker position 
available. She therefore approached the Mangaon Sarpanch for a residence certificate 
based on the Maratha caste network and got the job as the sole applicant from the 
village. 
 
The first round of anganwadi worker recruitment was conducted when the ICDS project 
had just begun in Sundar block, not much was known about the functioning of 
anganwadi centres or the role of anganwadi workers and the honorarium was a 
meagre Rs.275 per month. Several senior Maratha anganwadi workers shared that 
they had to be persuaded by village leaders and the Gram Sevak to apply and that 
they were the sole applicants from their village.  Not many Maratha women with the 
required schooling were willing to take up the job because of patriarchal strictures 
against their mobility in the public sphere (see Omvedt, 1977). Women from other 
communities were not widely approached. The first round of anganwadi worker 
recruitment in Sundar block was led by the Block Development Officer (BDO), who had 
additional charge as the Child Development Project Officer (CDPO) and she used her 
network of Gram Sevaks and Sarpanchs to create awareness about the recruitment 
notification. As most Sarpanchs were Maratha, information about the anganwadi 
worker position was largely retained within Maratha circles and suitable candidates 
identified from within caste and kin networks. Here ‘suitability’ was understood 
informally in terms of economic need, rather than the few formal conditions identified 
by the programme regarding residence and education. A majority of those recruited in 
the 1989 process, in Laldera and Rajegaon beats, were Maratha and many were 
related to each other. Within the Maratha community as well, it was women with 
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political access and patronage who were able to get the position. However, as 
anganwadi centres started functioning across the project and recruitment into the ICDS 
became more desirable and competitive, Sarpanchs were no longer able to completely 
control information about recruitment. They increasingly relied on the residence proof 
requirement to influence application. Sarpanchs used anganwadi recruitment to not 
only extend patronage to members of their kinship and caste networks but also wider 
political networks. Shanwadi village consisted of the main village and a Dhangar vasti 
(hamlet) for which an anganwadi worker, resident in the hamlet, needed to be recruited 
in 2015. The Dhangar vasti had two political factions competing for the position but 
only one of the factions supported the Maratha Sarpanch. As both candidates were 
almost equally matched, the Sarpanch ensured a win for his supporters by wording the 
residence proof of the other candidate in such a way that she was disqualified. 
   
With increasing honorariums, greater awareness about the opportunities and resources 
represented by the ICDS and more competition for anganwadi worker positions, 
existing anganwadi workers became brokers of information and access to advantage 
their caste and kin networks in recruitment processes. From their privileged position as 
insiders to the programme, they were able to provide interested family and caste 
members with information about available opportunities and accurate guidance for a 
successful application, especially the various supporting documents needed.  The 
significance of such ‘application readiness’ was highlighted by the experience of Mira 
Admane, a landless and poor woman I met in Mangaon village. She had an alcoholic 
husband and made ends meet by working as a domestic help in the village. When she 
heard about the recruitment notice of the ICDS programme, she was keen to apply for 
the post of anganwadi helper. She had the minimum educational qualification required 
and belonged to the Dhobi caste, which as part of the OBC category would ensure 
additional points in the selection process. Mira called her brother from her native village 
to help fill out the application form and obtain documents such as a residence 
certificate from the Sarpanch. However, despite all her efforts, Mira’s application could 
not be completed within the fortnight provided for application. It lacked the essential 
caste certificate which takes months to procure, as well as her marksheets, which she 
couldn’t obtain as the schools were shut for the summer vacation. Her application was 
rejected during the marking process.   
 
In contrast, several Maratha anganwadi workers of Laldera and Rajegaon beats had 
over the years exploited their insider advantage to support their younger relatives, 
including daughters and daughters in law, to become anganwadi workers, with some 
		
74 
joining the same beat and others the same village. Additionally, they were also able to 
misdirect and keep ‘unwanted’ castes and communities away from the programme. In 
Shanwadi village, the post of an anganwadi helper was vacant but the existing Maratha 
workers did not want the post to be taken by anyone from the Scheduled castes or the 
Muslim community so they inflated the eligibility requirements for the position while 
responding to interested queries from members of these communities.  
 
After 1989, as the ICDS programme spread across the block, the formal recruitment 
process was also expanded to involve elected members of the block government, the 
panchayat samiti, and the District Guardian Minister. However, in actual practice 
anganwadi worker recruitment became the domain of the local MLA. The chairperson 
of the selection committee as well as the panchayat samiti member were typically his 
nominees and would manipulate the interview scores to favour a pre-determined set of 
candidates based on patronage as well as informal payments. Mangala Narke, the 
senior anganwadi worker of Shanwadi village was able to facilitate the recruitment of 
her daughter in the urban ICDS programme through the patronage of the then MLA as 
her son was active in the same political party, the Shiv Sena. She approached the MLA 
with the help of her son and the day before the interview process, the MLA’s men came 
to her house and filled up the daughter’s application form. The next day the daughter 
attended the interview and was selected. 
 
With the MLA taking on the decisive role in anganwadi recruitment, Sarpanchs, the ‘big 
men’ or patrons of their village, became brokers facilitating the selection of their 
candidates. Ranjana Wakde, the young Maratha anganwadi worker from Shanwadi 
village applied thrice for the anganwadi worker position but was successful only when a 
member of her kinship network became the Sarpanch and he in turn belonged to the 
same political party as the MLA, the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) and was able to 
broker her selection.   For Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) the Sarpanch as both patron 
and broker is part of the organisational hierarchy of exchange relations between 
electoral clients, a pyramid of various levels of brokers and the patron at the top. 
Berenschot (2014), on the other hand distinguishes between two types of political 
fixers based on their terms of exchange with politicians. These are the ‘social worker’ 
and the ‘party worker’. The social worker or ‘naya neta’ (Krishna, 2007) is a 
neighbourhood or community leader who trades votes in return for access to state 
resources and will align with politicians based on their capacity and reputation to 
deliver. If the supported politician fails to deliver, the social worker along with his ‘votes’ 
could switch loyalties and change sides. Party workers on the other hand, facilitate 
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access to state resources by performing organisational services for politicians and 
thereby becoming close to them.  Mangala Narke’s son, in this sense, was a party 
worker but most other political fixers fall between these two ideal types. 
 
While Sarpanchs used anganwadi recruitment to strengthen their status as patrons at 
the village level, the MLA also used such appointments to collect informal payments 
and generate campaign finance, a practice also noted for the irrigation department and 
the police by Wade (1985) and Jeffrey (2000), respectively. In a recruitment process 
conducted in 2014 that was ultimately cancelled, the MLA’s representative was said to 
have canvassed all the villages involved to collect payments of about Rs.40-50,000 for 
each post. For most senior anganwadi workers and Supervisors, payments for 
anganwadi recruitment was a new phenomenon not prevalent at the time of their 
selection when the patronage of political leaders was the primary means of securing 
the anganwadi worker position. They attributed this change to the increased 
honorarium of anganwadi workers and thereby greater competition for the position.  
 
Besides funds, anganwadi recruitment was also an important source of political power 
for the MLA. The newly elected MLA of Sundar Block allowed an anganwadi 
recruitment process, begun under the previous MLA and almost completed, to lapse so 
that he could accommodate his supporters through fresh recruitment. The selection 
committee of the cancelled process had delayed holding interviews for the recruitment 
and then rushed through them just as the campaign period for the state elections drew 
to a close. However, the final list of selected applicants could not be announced before 
the elections. Once the results of the state election had been declared and a new MLA 
elected, the Chair of the selection committee approached the ICDS project office to 
announce the list of selected applicants. At the same time, the new MLA instructed 
them not to. The CDPO at the Sundar block project office felt that she had no choice 
but to cooperate with the winning MLA. The previous CDPO had been almost 
transferred for merely following the official procedure of handing the final list of 
selected applicants to the Chair of the selection committee rather than the MLA’s 
agent. The selection committee Chair then filed a complaint with the district 
administration against the ICDS project office for not releasing the list despite 
completing the process. The district administration held that since it was the Chair’s 
responsibility to release the list, the project office was not responsible.  Finally, a fresh 
recruitment process was conducted in 2015. 
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The use of anganwadi recruitment for clientelistic exchanges has led to at least three 
processes being cancelled in Sundar block. The ICDS Commissionerate at the state 
level issued a new Government Resolution or GR on anganwadi recruitment in 2015 to 
counter such political bargaining as well as delays and cancellations in the recruitment 
process. The GR scrapped the interview component of the recruitment process and 
thereby the formal involvement of political leaders. Anganwadi workers were to be 
recruited based on only the merit list shortlisted by an internal committee of the ICDS 
project office headed by the CDPO. However this policy change did little to counter the 
political control of anganwadi recruitment. Sarpanchs continued to manipulate 
application and the CDPO was still required to submit the final list to the MLA.  
    
The political dominance of the Marathas, across different levels of government in 
Sundar Block, enabled them to occupy a majority of anganwadi worker and thereby 
ICDS positions at the block level. Such political mediation created a Maratha-isation of 
the ICDS akin to the Yadavisation of the Police in Uttar Pradesh referred to by Jeffrey 
(2000). Maratha Sarpanchs and the Maratha MLA enabled members of their caste, 
kinship and political networks to corner scarce government resources, in this case a 
monthly income from a government programme, for themselves.   Additionally, Maratha 
anganwadi workers attempted to shape the programme in their terms by influencing 
which communities were able to apply for recruitment and thereby become their 
colleagues and co-workers and which were not.  
 
The capture of anganwadi worker positions by Marathas through kinship, caste and 
political networks not only served to strengthen their social and political power in the 
village and block but also influenced the delivery and uptake of anganwadi services. In 
Shanwadi, the Anganwadi centre was located as per the convenience of the Maratha 
worker rather than ease of access, especially of marginalised communities such as the 
Dalits who lived outside the village. Resultantly, the anganwadi centre was poorly 
attended by Dalit children. In Mangaon, the Maratha anganwadi worker refused to even 
survey the Dalit households allocated to her. They were not enumerated in the ‘total 
population’ that she served in her records and hence were entirely excluded from the 
ICDS. In both Shanwadi and Mangaon villages Maratha anganwadi workers rarely 
visited Dalit localities and were not familiar with the children or their families. In 
Shanwadi, the Maratha anganwadi worker had falsely recorded a Dalit child as having 
migrated with her parents for the sugarcane-cutting season, when she had in fact 
stayed back in the village with her grandmother. Additionally the Maratha anganwadi 
worker did not like to touch Dalit children. When a Dalit family visited the anganwadi 
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centre at Shanwadi for weighing their baby, the worker who had placed all other 
children in the weighing scale harness asked the family to pick up the child and put him 
in the harness. Maratha anganwadi workers in Shanwadi asked all children to bring 
their own vessels to eat the meal served in the anganwadi so as to avoid having to 
wash up utensils used by Dalit children.  
 
Maratha political mediation of the ICDS thus reproduced their socio-political and ritual 
dominance as well as the caste exclusion of Dalits. Dominance was performed by 
colonising a programme of the developmental state and using its everyday practices to 
enforce the hierarchical caste order, specifically the ‘untouchable’ status of Dalits. 
State practices served as sites for the reproduction of state power as Maratha power 
thereby excluding the vulnerable communities that the ICDS was designed to address 
and producing implementation gaps. 
 
Contesting dominance: Dalit assertion and mobilisation 
 
The Dalit challenge to upper caste domination in Maharashtra has historically spanned 
social, cultural and political spheres. The social mobilisation of Dalits has largely 
revolved around socio-religious change, which has ranged from the reform of Hinduism 
to its repudiation through conversion. Their cultural assertion has involved establishing 
independent cultural institutions that proclaim pride in a re-imagined and re-valued 
Dalit identity whereas their political struggle has been both about exercising equal 
rights as citizens, special privileges as the historically oppressed as well as acquiring 
political power through competitive electoral politics. For Waghmore (2013), these 
political and non-political processes do not operate independently but grow in 
interaction. 
 
In Maharashtra, the social mobilisation of Dalits was rooted within non-Brahmin politics 
and the ideology of Phule, which advocated modern education and cultural-religious 
protest against Brahmin centric rituals and practices. However, with the Marathas 
dominating the alliance between the Shudras and the ex-untouchables and using the 
Kshatriya identity crafted by Phule to claim higher social status for themselves, 
untouchable protests were forced to evolve as a counter current to this politics 
(Waghmore, 2013). These counter currents initially took the form of participation in 
caste Hindu reform initiatives such as the Prarthana Samaj, creating Dalit institutions 
within Hinduism through deification of Dalit saints and sanskritisation or emulation of 
upper caste practices – abstaining from meat and alcohol and other sources of 
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pollution and ‘purification of thought, speech and behaviour’. Subsequently, more 
vigorous efforts to claim equal religious rights were made through lengthy protests to 
gain temple entry. However, with the failure of these efforts, Dalits under the leadership 
of Ambedkar, increasingly shifted towards western education and political power as the 
means for their emancipation (Jaffrelot, 2004; Zelliot, 1970). Finally, in 1956 a section 
of Dalits led by Ambedkar converted to Buddhism in a public ceremony refusing to 
remain a part of Hinduism till it was completely reformed (Jodhka, 2012).  
 
Conversion to Buddhism provided Dalits with a new religious identity, freeing them of 
the humiliation and degradation of Hinduism and enabling them to craft a new public 
culture with new rituals, symbols and festivals (Wankhede, 2008). Ambedkar also 
rooted the new identity in an alternate history, which portrayed the Dalits as the 
original, pre-Aryan inhabitants of India subjugated by Brahmin outsiders thereby 
challenging Hindu claim to antiquity and Indian tradition (Jaffrelot, 2004). After his 
death, Ambedkar himself became the central icon of Dalit protest and politics and the 
symbol of their assertion (Waghmore, 2013).  Dalit public culture was built around the 
iconography of Ambedkar and the Buddha with photographs, posters, busts, statues 
and Buddha vihars proliferating in several parts of the country.  This symbology was 
supplemented by commemorative political performances such as public processions 
on the birth and death anniversary of Ambedkar as well as the production of popular 
Buddhist and Ambedkarite literature – revolutionary songs, plays, poems and 
autobiographies (Wankhede, 2008). 
 
Dalit socio-cultural mobilisation enabled their political movement, which for Ambedkar 
was the central instrument of the Untouchables’ emancipation. At the All India 
Depressed Classes Congress (1932) in Nagpur, he proclaimed, “It is very necessary 
that the political reins should come in the hands of untouchables. For that, all of us 
should unite and secure a political status. Untouchability in India will not be eradicated 
so long as the untouchables do not control the political strings” (Wankhede, 2008). The 
Dalit struggle for political power, under the leadership of Ambedkar began in the 
colonial period where it was largely concerned with gaining direct representation in 
colonial institutions of governance. Ambedkar believed that a caste Hindu could not 
know the mind of an Untouchable and hence could not lead or represent him. He 
therefore argued for separate electorates for Untouchables in the provincial assemblies 
of the British India government, which led to the now famous confrontation with Gandhi 
and the Poona Pact that provided instead for reservation of seats. Political 
representation was essential for the promulgation of laws that protected, enabled and 
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empowered Dalits from the marginalisation and oppression of the caste system. The 
triple prongs of a Scheduled Caste political movement, an Indian elite willing to 
address historical injustice and a British government open to low risk social reform 
produced considerable favourable legislation (Zelliot, 1970). With Independence, such 
legislation was significantly strengthened by the constitution drafted under the 
leadership of Ambedkar. However, political power continued to remain the central goal 
– ‘the key to all social progress’. Post independence, Ambedkar established his third 
political party, the Republican Party of India (RPI) as an alliance of all the 
‘dispossessed – the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the Backward 
Classes based on the realisation that the Dalits lacked the numbers to gain political 
power on their own. However, with his death soon after, this vision was never realised 
and instead the RPI came to be dominated by the Mahars, the caste to which 
Ambedkar belonged, split into factions and co-opted by the Congress.  
 
The fragmentation of the RPI began soon after its formation in 1957 and by 2008 there 
were as many as 11 factions, each led by the Mahars. Some of these factions built 
paternalistic alliances with the Congress for political power and increasingly became a 
negligible force in the politics of the state (Waghmore, 2013; Wankhede, 2008).  
Disillusionment with the opportunistic leadership of the RPI and party politics led to the 
emergence of two non-party Ambedkarite movements in the 1970s – BAMCEF and the 
Dalit Panthers (Jaoul, 2007). The Dalit Panthers were set up by urban, educated Dalit 
youth inspired by the Black Panther movement in the United States. It was a radical, 
intellectual movement that generated a large amount of revolutionary literature 
attacking Brahmanic cultural hegemony and raising class issues. It was also a 
movement that openly advocated retaliation of caste violence with violence. The Dalit 
Panthers were instrumental in the Namantar agitation– the renaming of Marathwada 
University as the Dr. Ambedkar University, which led to large-scale political violence 
against Dalits led by the Marathas. The Dalit Panthers popularised the term ‘Dalit’, 
garnered national attention towards the official neglect of Ambedkar’s memory, 
institutionalised the public performance of Dalit anger/violence in response to caste 
atrocities and/or stigmatised exclusion and raised revolutionary consciousness 
amongst Dalits. However this movement too was beset by factionalism with some 
factions choosing to pursue electoral politics and lost momentum over time (Jaoul, 
2007; Waghmore, 2013; Wankhede, 2008).  
 
BAMCEF or the Bahujan and Minority Community Employees Federation was founded 
by Kanshi Ram in Maharashtra so that members of the emerging Dalit middle class – 
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SC, ST and OBC government employees could use their resources, time and 
knowledge to ‘payback’ to the deprived communities that they came from. It was 
necessarily a non-political, non-religious and non-agitational organisation, as 
government employees are technically not allowed to engage in political action. 
Although initially established in Maharashtra, it was soon joined by government 
employees from other parts of the country and overtly engaged in spreading the 
Ambekarite ideology and raising consciousness. However, subsequently, its network 
and support was used to launch an agitational wing, the Dalit Shohsit Samaj 
Sangharsh Samiti (DS4) and a political party in 1984 – the Bahujan Samaj Party 
(BSP).  Both the DS4 and the BSP were built on a critique of existing Dalit political 
processes and party politics. The DS4 distinguished itself from the Dalit Panthers 
through its approach to violent confrontation, which it considered reactionary and 
harmful with little long-term impact. The BSP was founded on a critique of RPI leaders 
whom Kanshi Ram scathingly referred to as ‘stooges’ serving the interests of dominant 
upper caste political parties, most notably the Congress (Jaoul, 2007; Waghmore, 
2013).  
 
The BSP revived the Ambedkarite focus on political power as the ‘master key’ for 
social justice for Dalits. As per the stated ideology of the BSP, a new social order could 
only be achieved by using state power for social engineering from ‘above’ that is 
through state led developmental and welfare programmes rather than revolution based 
on mobilisation from ‘below’. The state was the main instrument through which social 
justice was to be attained. Pai (2002) categorises the BSP ideology as (1) conservative 
and statist since it did not seek to create an egalitarian society, (2) retributive as it 
aimed to correct historic wrongs, and (3) exclusive as it focused solely on the Dalits as 
the most oppressed and exploited section of Indian society.  While the BSP was quite 
successful in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh where Dalits constitute nearly 21 
percent of the population, in Maharashtra where they are only 10.2 percent of the 
population and involved in electoral politics through the RPI, it has not been able to win 
a single seat either in the state legislative assembly or the national Parliament. 
However, it has emerged as the single largest party of Dalits in the state, with the 
largest vote share in the 2004 and 2009 national elections (Waghmore, 2013). 
 
Several scholars consider Dalit politics in Maharashtra to be at an impasse. Gokhale, 
(1986) attributes the impasse to the Buddhist conversions of the Mahars, which instead 
of collectivising the Dalits, separated the Mahars from the other Dalit castes of 
Maharashtra namely, the Mangs and the Chambhars. In a similar vein, Palshikar 
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(2007) highlights the political competition between the Mahars and the non-Mahars as 
responsible for the ineffectiveness of Dalit politics. The Mahars at 9 percent of the 
population are the most numerous of the Dalit castes followed by the much smaller 
Mangs at 1.8 percent and Chambhars at 1.3 percent. Under the leadership of 
Ambedkar, also a Mahar, the Mahars were the first to become politicised and came to 
dominate Ambedkarite party politics, namely the RPI, as the natural heirs of his legacy. 
This dominance extended to the BSP as well, which does however attempt to mobilise 
the Mangs and the Chambhars. But the Mangs have also independently mobilised and 
politicised, though they do not completely reject the Dalit identity or Ambedkarite 
politics. However the Chambhars, who consider themselves ritually purer and of higher 
status remain entirely outside the purview of Dalit politics and have instead been 
mobilised by the Shiv Sena to counter the rise of the BSP.     
 
Waghmore (2013) however argues against a pessimistic view of Dalit politics in 
Maharashtra and draws attention away from stalled party politics to dynamic non-party 
political processes, in particular campaigns for human rights and land rights for Dalits 
in Marathwada. These campaigns not only address specific issues such as temple 
entry, bonded labour and securing cultivable land for landless Dalits but also help 
Dalits negotiate the everyday contestation of caste. According to caste based rules and 
restrictions, the separation and subservience of the polluting Dalit body is embodied 
through attire, posture, speech, work, food, drink and dwelling (Gorringe and Rafanell 
2007). Dalits are expected to live away from the main village, have different entrances 
to the village, eat and drink in separate receptacles that they themselves clean, wear 
old, discarded clothes, be humble and docile, labour on upper caste fields in return for 
food or meagre payment and perform caste roles in religious rituals- for instance, 
Mangs are expected to beat the halagi drum in religious processions. These embodied 
practices then become the sites for the everyday contestation of caste. Waghmore 
(2013) notes that in Marathwada with changing labour practices and affirmative action 
in education and government jobs, Dalits are no longer dependent on the upper castes, 
particularly the Marathas for labour and tend to be economically better off than before. 
Moreover, politicised Dalits no longer accept their marginalisation in village public 
spaces such as roads, temples, panchayat building or village squares. Rather, they 
engage in politically assertive performances such as loud and pompous celebrations of 
the anniversaries of Dalit icons particularly Ambedkar. Such aggressive claiming of 
public spaces and thereby equality is usually seen as violation of caste boundaries or 
deviance by Marathas and often leads to retributive violence. Dalits, once again, rely 
on state mechanisms to challenge such violence against them in particular the 
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Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe Prevention of Atrocities Act. Waghmore (2013) 
notes that the Aurangabad division recorded the highest number of atrocities against 
Dalits between 1998 and 2004 in the state. Such violence had an unusually high 
proportion of Maratha involvement but Maratha political and economic dominance 
implied that securing justice for Dalits was usually difficult. However, Waghmore (2013)   
highlights that Dalits while counteracting atrocities also deployed social and political 
networks from their marginal locations to take on Maratha influence. Waghmore (2013) 
interprets Dalit attempts to claim village public spaces, the retributive violence it 
provokes and their subsequent quest for justice as part of an overall effort to assert 
equal citizenship and demand a society based on civic rather than caste relations.  
 
Such performative Dalit politics is energised by the promise of equal citizenship in the 
Constitution of India which according to Mahar-Moller (1958) has been interpreted by 
Dalits as Ambedkar’s law replacing the Hindu law of Manu on which caste is based. 
Jaoul (2007) studied the symbolic politics behind the proliferation of Ambedkar statues, 
wearing a three piece suit and holding a copy of the Constitution, in Uttar Pradesh, and 
found that the establishment of these statues in Dalit localities of villages and towns 
constituted not only political acts of mobilisation and assertion of the Dalit identity but 
also represented the consciousness of constitutional rights amongst the marginalised.   
 
Re-constituting Caste, Re-imagining State: Dalits in the ICDS 
 
Maratha dominance in the ICDS is not entirely unchallenged. Just as Dalit state 
functionaries have powered the wider political mobilisation of Dalits through BAMCEF, 
in the ICDS they use bureaucratic and political means to contest Maratha caste power. 
In the following section, I detail two case studies of Dalit ICDS workers, an anganwadi 
worker, Meera Kale and a Supervisor Usha Thorat, confronting caste within the ICDS. 
In each case, Dalit workers question and resist their caste based subordination within 
the programme by upholding the rules and imaginary of a Weberian state.  
 
Using bureaucratic means: Meera Kale – the Dalit Anganwadi Worker  
 
Meera Kale, the young anganwadi worker of Mangaon village, referred to in the 
interview abstract at the beginning of the chapter, joined the ICDS programme in 2011. 
Kale Madam, as I called her, was a member of the small but emerging Dalit middle 
class, which is typically a first or second-generation beneficiary of the state’s 
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affirmative action policies, economically secure and yet politically conscious and 
strongly connected to the communities of their origin (Jaffrelot, 2008; Jodhka and 
Prakash, 2016; Naudet, 2008). Meera Kale’s father was an engineer in the 
Aurangabad District Irrigation Department and she grew up in an urban environment, 
Sundar Block town and Aurangabad city, in a home with many amenities including 
domestic servants, cars and air-conditioning. Kale Madam recounted that while she did 
avail of caste-based facilities – scholarships and reservation in college admission, she 
was not conscious of caste in her social interactions while living in Aurangabad city. 
Her friend circle was a mixed group and her family had easy, commensal relations with 
their Brahmin neighbours. She first experienced caste-based discrimination in her 
marital village, where she started residing after joining the ICDS. A similar difference in 
the experience of untouchability in urban and rural contexts has also been reported by 
Gorringe and Rafanell (2007), while Nisbett (2007) finds easy camaraderie, including 
the sharing of food, drink and cigarettes, in both private and public, between scheduled 
caste and caste Hindu young male friends in urban Bangalore. In contrast, several 
scholars have underscored the casteism experienced by Dalits in urban areas. Jodhka 
(2010) and Prakash (2015) highlight how Dalit entrepreneurs are discriminated against 
in urban markets, Jodhka and Newman (2007) find that caste is a consideration during 
recruitment interviews of corporates while Vithayathil and Singh, (2012) reveal that 
residential spaces, even in major metropolitan cities, are largely organised by caste. 
Given these contradictory findings, Dickey (2011) emphasises  the interactions 
between class and caste for a plausible explanation. She finds that upwardly mobile 
lower castes, including Dalits, often counteract discrimination by flaunting the symbolic 
markers of their class status.  
 
An important feature of the Dalit middle class is their emphasis on education. Kale 
madam was the eldest of three siblings and was the only one besides her mother who 
was not professionally qualified in her family. While her father had trained as an 
engineer and her sister a medical doctor. Kale Madam had also almost completed two 
years of a Bachelors in Computer Science degree but was not able to finish as she got 
married and then pregnant. She married by her own choice, a match her parents only 
reluctantly supported as her husband belonged to a family of limited means and was 
self-employed with no regular income. Her husband’s parents lived in Mangaon village 
where they owned a small plot of agricultural land, while he had a photography 
business in Sundar block town and also worked as a freelance journalist reporting for   
well known Marathi newspapers such as Sakaal, Loksatta etc. Even after her marriage, 
Kale madam lived for many years in Sundar Block town where her parents supported 
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her to maintain a middle class lifestyle by providing a house and a car. It was her 
educational ambition for her elder daughter that prompted her decision to move to her 
marital village and work in the ICDS. She admitted her elder daughter to a prestigious 
private school in Aurangabad city and began to need money on a regular basis to pay 
the monthly fees. 
 
Once the anganwadi worker recruitment notification for Mangaon village was posted, it 
was not a big challenge for Kale madam to secure the position. Kale Madam belonged 
to the Chambhar/Charmakar/Chamar caste amongst Dalits. While the Chamars of 
Uttar Pradesh are very much a part of Ambedkarite politics - the Bahujan Samaj Party 
Supremo, Mayawati is a Chamar - Chambhars in Maharashtra consider themselves 
socially superior to the Mahars and Mangs. They largely ally with mainstream political 
parties such as the Congress and more recently the Shiv Sena as Hindu Dalits, against 
the RPI and BSP which are seen predominantly as Mahar political parties (Waghmare, 
2009; Waghmore, 2013). Kale madam’s journalist husband had links with the local Shiv 
Sena leaders and was able to secure the support of both the Shiv Sena Sarpanch in 
Mangaon village as well as the Shiv Sena MLA for her appointment. The Mangaon 
Sarpanch provided her with a residence certificate as her in-laws resided in the village, 
even though she did not at the time of the recruitment and the MLA forced the Sundar 
Block project office to accept her application for the post even after the submission 
deadline had passed. As Kale Madam’s husband explained, the Chambhars did not 
have the numbers to emerge as a political force, they therefore had no choice but to 
ally with a mainstream political party. However, as a journalist, he also enjoyed the 
additional leverage of a large network of contacts and the discretion to print news 
about them. The role of political journalism in shaping and being shaped by patronage 
networks has been noted by Rao (2012) who found that reporters and editors received 
favours in exchange for positive coverage, a trend that has intensified with the 
regionalisation and localisation of the press.        
 
Meera Kale’s recruitment as anganwadi worker caused much resentment amongst the 
Marathas of Mangaon village. There were three main reasons for this. First, the other 
contender for this position was a Maratha woman who though less qualified than 
Meera was seen as more needy as her husband owned no land and ran a couple of 
petty businesses to make ends meet. Second, a senior anganwadi worker in the village 
Savita More, also a Maratha, had attempted to broker the selection of this Maratha 
candidate to the position and Meera’s appointment caused her to lose face as well as 
potential income. Third, the appointment represented an inversion of the traditional 
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socioeconomic order – an urban, more educated and richer scheduled caste took away 
a position that many in the village believed should have gone to a poor, needy 
Maratha. According to Waghmore (2013) such deviance often incites Maratha anger 
and caste violence. Mangaon village already had a history of Maratha- Dalit violence 
with two incidents of Marathas attacking the Dalit locality and burning homes. The 
resultant political mobilisation of Dalits meant that in this instance Maratha resentment 
was channelled into ensuring that the next ICDS vacancy was secured by one of theirs. 
As an angry Maratha told me, ‘Last time they took the position, this time it must come 
to us.’ 
 
Much of this resentment was spearheaded by Savita More, an anganwadi worker in the 
village for the past 25 years, who exemplified Maratha dominance in the ICDS. 
Recruited because of her caste and kin network, Savita was not a resident of Mangaon 
and commuted from Sundar block town to operate her anganwadi.  She was not very 
regular and did not deliver most of the services mandated in the ICDS programme. For 
the month that I stayed in Mangaon village, she was absent for 10-11 days and even 
when present did not weigh the children or conduct any pre-school activities. She 
would bring about half a kilo of cooked rice with her, when most anganwadis prepared 
nearly 1.5 to 2 kilos of raw rice for 25-30 children, and distribute it to a few homes that 
she visited.  However, no complaints were raised against her from the village. A young 
Maratha parent shared that while she was aware of the gaps in Savita’s work, 
complaining about her was not an option as she was one of them. 
 
As the only Maratha anganwadi worker, Savita had over the years positioned herself 
as a broker of the ICDS, building links with the rich and powerful in the village by 
sending programme resources such as foodgrains and take home ration packets to 
their homes irrespective of their eligibility. With the other ICDS functionaries, especially 
Dalit functionaries, she acted as a patron appropriating their labour for the fulfilment of 
her responsibilities and negotiating their administrative dealing with the Sundar block 
project office. Two retired Dalit anganwadi helpers of Mangaon who were illiterate 
relied completely on Savita More for information and action and would travel to her 
home in Sundar block rather than directly approach the ICDS project office for their 
retiral benefits. To bolster her positioning and power, Savita claimed to be politically 
connected, through her husband, to the local Shiv Sena MLA.  
 
When Meera Kale joined the ICDS in Mangaon village, Savita attempted to re-establish 
the local relations of power, disturbed by her selection,  by controlling her area of work, 
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place of work and time. Through her regulation of Meera Kale’s labour, Savita More 
sought to reproduce and perform the material and cultural basis of Maratha power. 
Meera contested this dominance by invoking the rules of Weberian bureaucracy. She 
began by challenging Savita’s practice of allocating village localities to anganwadis by 
caste as referred to in the interview excerpt quoted at the beginning of the chapter.  
 
When Meera joined the ICDS programme in 2011, there were two anganwadis in the 
village, one run by Savita More and the other by Shabana Syed, a Muslim. Savita’s 
field area consisted of high caste Maratha and Brahmin households while Shabana 
was expected to serve all other communities. With Meera’s recruitment, Savita decided 
that Shabana would focus on the more distant localities of the Muslim colony and the 
homes near the fields and the bus stand, Meera would serve the lower castes living on 
the periphery of the village while she attended to the Maratha households at the centre 
of the village. Thus, each functionary would serve her own caste. Although Shabana 
was resigned, Meera protested this design on both practical grounds as well as in 
terms of the underlying principle. Practically such a division implied that her area was 
scattered around the village periphery making it difficult to survey and serve. 
Principally, it upheld a purity-pollution ranked social order in which castes did not mix; 
scheduled caste bodies were too polluted and inferior to either receive child 
development services from higher caste workers or provide such services to higher 
caste children, and; a Maratha worker as her social superior had the cultural power to 
determine her field area. Meera’s fundamental objection, based on the Weberian 
principle of impersonality, was that caste could not be the basis for determining the 
field area of a state functionary. She demanded that a more secular practice of using 
the ‘natural’ demarcation created by village roads be used such that a contiguous fifty 
per cent of the village could be marked as her area irrespective of caste. This led to an 
impasse and Meera was not allocated her area for nearly half the year till she 
approached the Supervisor for help. The Supervisor upheld Meera’s contention that the 
village area should be divided on the basis of ease of work rather than caste and 
Savita was compelled to handover half her survey area to Meera as well as include 
scheduled caste households in her own field area. 
 
The conflict over field area was accompanied by other conflicts over labour and time as 
Savita More attempted to assert traditional authority and ritual claim over Meera and 
her helper, Lakshmi Shirke, also from the Scheduled Castes. Soon after their 
recruitment in April 2011, Meera and Lakshmi were required to observe and assist the 
working of Savita’s anganwadi as they did not yet have either a separate anganwadi 
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centre or field area. The summer break, when the anganwadi worker and helper, each 
get a 15 day vacation in turns, occurred during this ‘internship’ and Savita decided that 
since Meera and Lakshmi were the new recruits, they were not eligible for the May 
holidays and would have to take on the entire responsibility of running the anganwadi 
during the break while she and her helper enjoyed a 30 day holiday each. Meera 
protested this diktat by claiming equality of status as an anganwadi worker and 
highlighting that programme rules were equally applicable to all anganwadi workers. 
This clash was also escalated to the Supervisor, who again ruled in Meera’s favour.  
 
A few months after Meera had been allocated her field area and had successfully set  
up her separate anganwadi in the village community hall, she went on pregnancy 
leave. In the meanwhile Savita’s helper retired and her anganwadi was also shifted into 
the village community hall. She, then, started appropriating the labour and time of 
Lakshmi, Meera’s helper for her anganwadi. Lakshmi was expected to take care of 
both anganwadis and some days even bear the costs of the hot cooked meal for 
Savita’s pre-schoolers, while she remained absent or spent time chatting with her 
friends in the village. Such appropriation escalated after Meera’s return - Savita started 
taking Lakshmi with her into the village for an election related survey during anganwadi 
hours leaving Meera minding the pre-schoolers of both anganwadis. Once more Meera 
complained to the Supervisor who clarified that election related work should only be 
taken up after anganwadi hours.  
 
This low level conflict intensified when Meera began to need a relaxation of rules to 
breastfeed her baby during anganwadi hours. She started to take a one hour break in 
the morning to go home and feed her infant. Although Meera claimed that she had 
received permission from the parents of pre-schoolers for this practice, Savita 
complained to the Supervisor about her breaks as ‘absenteeism’. In response, Meera 
started bringing her baby to the anganwadi centre more often for breastfeeding. One 
morning while she was breastfeeding her baby, an old scheduled caste man from 
Meera’s area whose grandchild was no longer eligible for Take Home Ration packets 
as he had crossed the age of 3 years, demanded Take Home Ration packets. Meera 
tried to explain his ineligibility but the old man insisted. Meera then decided to give her 
son’s Take Home Ration packets for which he was eligible as a 6 month to 3 year old 
baby in the village, to the old man as she herself did not use them. However her house 
and her son were part of Savita More’s changed field area. She therefore requested 
Savita More to give her son’s Take Home Ration packets to the old man. Savita More 
agreed but insisted that Meera would have to sign for it before she released the 
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packets, as per the rules. Meera was still breastfeeding and could not get up 
immediately while Savita More and the old man refused to wait. The argument 
escalated to a crisis, Savita More used harsh, abusive language, Meera signed the 
register in tears and once the old man had left with the packets, Savita rushed at her 
violently shouting ‘… you demand half of my survey, you tell me what to do….. its gone 
to your head, you should never have been recruited, stop this, working by the 
rules…..you Chambhar, what did you think just because you move with the 
Marathas….’ 
 
Meera filed a case against Savita under The Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Prevention 
of Atrocities) Act of 1989. However, Meera had to subsequently withdraw the case as 
Savita threatened to file a case of sexual harassment against her husband.  
 
This case study of a continuous simmering conflict between a Dalit and Maratha 
worker of a state programme is significant at two levels. First, it is important for what it 
reveals about how local political relations are performed and contested in an everyday 
context. Much research has established that dominant castes use their social and 
patronage networks to acquire state positions and then use the resultant state power to 
enhance their social status. This case study unfolds the intricacies of how dominant 
caste state functionaries perform social power within state institutions to mould state 
practices and influence development programme outcomes. The Maratha functionary 
used caste power to make traditional claims on the labour of Dalit colleagues and 
subordinates, shirk work and alter modern accountability relations between herself and 
programme beneficiaries.  The Dalit functionary contested this dominance by invoking 
the Weberian state – universal, formal, impersonal and rule bound where the only 
relevant hierarchy was the programme structure of the ICDS and not the caste order. 
By confronting caste power with state power, she built upon a history of Dalit use of 
state mechanisms to demand interactions based on civic rather than caste relations. 
The informal practice of caste based allocation of field area between anganwadis in 
Mangaon village for nearly 25 years was a conscious affirmation of Maratha 
dominance by every anganwadi worker, Supervisor and CDPO who did not challenge 
it. However, once the practice had been openly challenged, such tacit approval had to 
be withdrawn to maintain the legitimacy of the state. Amongst the many Dalit 
functionaries who suffered Maratha dominance in the village, Meera Kale’s sole voice 
of protest drew strength from the economic and cultural capital acquired by her family 
through enabling state policies such as affirmative action as well as her husband’s role 
in the democratic institution of the media. The state thus served as the basis of both 
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dominant caste power as well as Dalit assertion. However the performance of Dalit 
resistance also served to reconstitute caste. 
 
Second, the case study demonstrates how specific practices are used to construct a 
particular state effect or imaginary of state. Savita More’s practices of caste based 
allocation and extra-bureaucratic appropriation of the labour of Dalit functionaries 
created the effect of blurred boundaries between state and society, of a state  captured 
and colonised by the dominant castes such that state power was synonymous with 
caste power. Meera Kale’s protest served to create the effect of a distinct boundary 
between state and society, setting the state apart from society such that although caste 
was the basis of relations within society, it was not an acceptable means of governing 
labour within an institution of the state. 
 
Using political means: Usha Thorat – the Dalit Supervisor           
 
Usha Thorat was one of four newly appointed Supervisors at the Sundar Block Project 
Office and only one of two Dalit Supervisors in the project. She was promoted to the 
Supervisor position in 2010 after serving four years as an anganwadi worker and 11 
years as an anganwadi helper. She recounted that in her rise through the ranks of the 
ICDS, her first year as a Supervisor was the most challenging and difficult. 
 
The main difficulty, according to her, was that the CDPO, other Supervisors and 
administrative staff at the project office had all assumed, based on her caste and 
reservation based promotion, that she did not know how to work and did not deserve to 
be promoted to this government job with all its perks and benefits. Corroborating this 
understanding, a senior Supervisor had whispered to me the misleading rumour that 
Thorat madam did not have the requisite experience needed to be eligible for a 
promotion and had used political clout to become a Supervisor. Patel (2008) in her 
research in urban north India also finds a stigma attached to Dalit achievements 
acquired through the facility of reservation in traditional non-Dalit strongholds such as 
senior public sector positions or seats in prestigious educational institutions. Dalit 
achievers from the ‘reserved quota’ whether government servants, doctors or 
engineers are regarded as incompetent and inefficient, undeserving candidates who 
attained their position through politics rather than merit. Deshpande (2005) highlights 
that such resentment is usually directed at Dalits who occupy high paying desirable 
positions rather than those who occupy menial positions such as cleaners and 
sweepers etc.  
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When Usha Thorat and the other Dalit Supervisor joined the project office, they 
encountered a hostile and unfriendly atmosphere. One of the main tasks of an ICDS 
Supervisor is to prepare the Monthly Progress Report (MPR) of her beat of 20-25 
anganwadi centres. Each anganwadi worker from the beat prepares a similar report 
based on data from her field area, which is then compiled by the Supervisor. Although, 
Thorat Madam as an anganwadi worker had experience of preparing the anganwadi 
level MPR, she was uncertain and nervous about the unfamiliar task and the onerous 
responsibility of preparing the beat level MPR. However, she found that her new 
colleagues were unwilling to help her find her feet, not only did they refuse to help her 
to prepare her MPR, they did not even allow her to see their work. Supervisors would 
cover their data tables with their scarves to prevent Thorat Madam from getting a 
glimpse of their work. Confronted with such hostility, Thorat Madam learnt to prepare 
the beat level MPR on her own by studying older MPRs already submitted to the office.   
 
According to Thorat madam, the office atmosphere intimidated her so much that she 
did not initially have the confidence to speak in the office and share her views. She 
would sit silently, including during meetings prompting the CDPO to publicly declare for 
both the Dalit Supervisors, ‘Why have they sent us these ‘mati che gole’ (balls of clay), 
these ‘nandi baille’ (bulls), these women are of no use to us, we don’t need 
Supervisors like this!’  
 
Overwhelmed and daunted, in that first year, Thorat Madam did not even even write 
her reports in her own hand. She was terrified that the CDPO would humiliate her for 
her handwriting. She would prepare everything but get her husband to write up the final 
version in his hand. She followed this practice for leave applications as well. She would 
carry extra copies of leave applications written by her husband, in case she urgently 
needed one. This continued for nearly a year till the CDPO called her out for it asking 
her whether she was at all literate and knew how to write. She recounted that for her 
that was a moment of change, from that day onwards she decided to use her own hand 
to do her work, telling the CDPO that she knew both how to write and how to work, 
otherwise she would not have made it so far in the programme.  
 
Along with the challenging atmosphere at work, Usha Thorat was also confronted with 
a caste-based challenge in her beat. A senior Maratha anganwadi worker, Madhu 
Barve, refused to accept her authority as a Supervisor. She had positioned herself as a 
self-styled Supervisor for the anganwadi workers of her beat and did not allow Thorat 
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Madam to discipline any anganwadi worker for absenteeism or poor quality of work. 
She would not operate her anganwadi centre regularly and expected Thorat Madam to 
visit her at home to check her records. She was also high-handed and disruptive during 
meetings. She complained to local politicians about the regularity of Thorat madam’s 
visits and the strong language she used to reprimand anganwadi workers and even 
visited the Project Office to complain about her. 
 
Usha Thorat considered three options in dealing with Madhu Barve. The first was to 
register a complaint under The Scheduled Castes and Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) 
Act of 1989. The second was to approach Madhu Barve’s village Sarpanch and 
complain about her and the third was to approach local Dalit politicians and leaders. As 
the first would have drawn too much public attention towards her and her caste identity 
at a time when she was still settling into her new role and the second option was not 
very effective, she finally chose the third. She narrated her troubles to local Dalit 
leaders in Madhu Barve’s village who visited Madhu Barve at her house in the evening 
and threatened to expose her many rule violations in retaliation for her harassment of 
one of their own. They specifically threatened to expose the fact that she was not 
actually a resident of the village when she applied for and was appointed as an 
anganwadi worker (an essential condition for recruitment) along with her regular 
pilfering of ICDS resources meant for vulnerable women and children. That very night, 
Madhu Barve’s son visited Usha Thorat’s home and apologised on behalf of his 
mother.  
 
In this case, Usha Thorat experienced both covert and overt forms of caste based 
discrimination, the former in the office and the latter in the field. Covert casteism in the 
office, according to Patel (2008) based on Goffman (1973) is stigma gone ‘backstage’. 
It is shadowy and insidious, can significantly impact careers and reputations, and yet is 
difficult to directly confront.  At the same time, the covert nature of this casteism in the 
context of a state institution acknowledges its illegitimacy in a formal setting, creating 
the effect of a boundary between state and society.   
 
Further, while much has been written about the use of state power to enhance caste 
power, this case significantly highlights the use of caste power to strengthen the 
bureaucratic state. A Dalit Supervisor employed uncivil/unruly means to contest a caste 
based challenge to bureaucratic authority underlining the criticality of the liberal and 
Weberian state idea for Dalits. It is only in the context of the liberal state idea that 
Dalits are able to claim equal citizenship and hence they invest an enormous amount 
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of cultural and political work to uphold the imaginary of a liberal state and 
undifferentiated citizenship.      
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I discuss how the dominant Maratha caste in Sundar block deployed 
kinship, caste and political networks to colonise the local ICDS, corner state resources 
for themselves and use state power to exclude the historically marginalised Dalits, 
thereby producing gaps in implementation. Maratha Sarpanchs, MLAs and anganwadi 
workers functioned as patrons and brokers to control information about ICDS 
recruitment processes and privilege the application and selection of their family, caste 
members and political clients as anganwadi workers. Resultantly Marathas were 
overrepresented in anganwadi worker positions and used ICDS programme sites, such 
as the anganwadi centre, as well as practices of service delivery to reproduce their 
ritual superiority and the ‘untouchable’ status of Dalit localities, communities and 
bodies. Maratha anganwadi centres remained physically distant from Dalit communities 
with Maratha anganwadi workers avoiding Dalit localities and the touch of ‘polluted’ 
Dalit children as well as resisting accountability to beneficiaries. The dominant caste 
capture of anganwadi worker positions and anganwadi centre functioning in Sundar 
block thus subverted ICDS programme objectives ultimately affecting development 
programme outcomes. These findings add to much existing literature on the political 
mediation of the everyday Indian state and the politicisation of caste. 
 
However, my focus on state functionaries yields fresh insights into how Maratha 
dominance is challenged and resisted within the ICDS by Dalit functionaries. Dalit state 
functionaries have historically leveraged their position and access to resources to 
energise the wider political mobilisation of Dalits. I present two case studies of Dalit 
state functionaries, one an anganwadi worker and the other a Supervisor, who 
confronted Maratha attempts to control their labour and thereby reproduce social and 
caste power within the ICDS.  In each case, Dalit workers resisted such domination by 
invoking the rules and structures of Weberian bureaucracy and demanding 
engagement based on secular rather than caste relations. The Dalit anganwadi worker 
invoked formal rules of programme and state to question the informal practice of caste 
based allocation of field area and demand equal working conditions for herself. The 
Dalit Supervisor even resorted to uncivil/informal means to fend off a caste-based 
challenge to her bureaucratic authority and uphold the formal state. Dalit functionaries 
thus reconfigured state practices to reconstitute caste relations based on the imaginary 
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of a liberal state and undifferentiated citizenship. Such Dalit resistance did not always 
employ liberal means but was energised by the liberal ideal.  
 
Sharma and Gupta (2006) write that state practices are a means to exercise power and 
institute inequality. In this chapter, I provide detailed ethnographic evidence on the use 
of state practices to perform caste power, produce exclusion as well as resist 
domination. I also highlight that state practices are used to produce competing 
imaginaries of state and that they serve as sites for the negotiation of the state 
imaginary. For Kaviraj such contestation was between the modern bureaucratic elite 
and vernacular lower level state officials. I demonstrate, based on ethnographic 
evidence, that such contestations are very much a part of the everyday life of 
vernacular lower level state officials and are used to negotiate power relations between 
them.  For several scholars intersections of local power structures with everyday state 
practices challenge the idea of the impersonal, rational and rule bound Weberian state, 
I demonstrate that such intersections can also uphold the Weberian state idea.  
Politically mediated state practices do not always only subvert developmental 
objectives, they also serve to challenge inequalities especially when the politics of 
affirmative action interacts with the politics of welfare. In the next chapter I consider the 
intersection of political mediation with informal financial practices of the local level 
state. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Percentages & Promotions: Informal Incomes  & Payments in the ICDS 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the implementation of the ICDS by state 
functionaries is enmeshed in the dynamics of the local political order but that such 
interactions also create spaces for challenging social inequalities and reconstituting 
local politics. In this chapter, I examine the links between the political mediation of the 
every day state and the informal financial practices of state functionaries and make 
three related points. First, given the ethical and methodological concerns in directly 
observing the informal and the illegal (Shore and Haller, 2005), many scholars (e.g. 
Mathur, 2016; Parry, 2000) argue that the talk about such practices far exceeds its 
reality. In contrast, based on direct observation of ICDS functionaries and interviews, I 
contend that informal financial transactions are indeed a regular aspect of everyday 
welfare implementation and that corruption talk is not always disjunct from its practice. 
However, in the context of the ICDS, I also find that such transactions are limited to 
state functionaries and while this informality influences the quality of services received 
by beneficiaries, the latter are not actually required to pay for services – that is 
beneficiary access is not limited by demands for informal payments. Second, existing 
research on bureaucratic systems of informal incomes and payments in India, 
emphasises the central role of political mediation in the working of these systems. 
Politicians drive vertical systems of corruption to distribute patronage and generate 
election finance (Anand, 2011; Berenschot, 2010; Jauregui, 2014; Wade, 1982; 
Witsoe, 2012a). In my ethnography of the ICDS, I find that informal systems develop in 
the context of the un-implementability of formal bureaucratic rules and serve to 
facilitate programme implementation. Political demands did not drive these informal 
financial processes, rather political involvement was infrequent, opportunistic and even 
ineffective. The formal and informal were co-constituted (Sandvik, 2011) such that the 
informal was an integral aspect of the un-implementable formal (Anand, 2011; Mathur, 
2016). Finally, instead of creating a ‘…choking atmosphere of distrust, (and) social 
control…’ (Anders, 2009), informality at the local levels of the ICDS was performatively 
and relationally produced through continuous negotiations of power and authority 
across bureaucratic levels.  
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The chapter consists of two main sections – the first details the takkewari system of the 
Supplementary Nutrition Programme – one of the key components of the ICDS and the 
second, systems of promotion, transfers and postings. In the first section, I elaborate 
anganwadi worker practices relating to supplementary nutrition provision highlighting 
the many adjustments they make to earn an income as well as Supervisory and CDPO 
practices of collecting takkewari or commissions. In this section, I also describe the 
sub-systems that work to maintain the takkewari system including a system of 
sanctions devised to keep anganwadi workers in check, its excesses and the role of 
political mediation. The second section describes a confusing arena of political brokers 
and bureaucratic agents and the many attempts of anganwadi workers and 
Supervisors to navigate these in their search for promotions and transfers and postings 
of choice. In the conclusion, I highlight the links between percentages and promotions 
as well as the performativity of informal practices. Throughout the chapter, I bring out 
the contexts and methods by which informal practices were directly observed, 
discussed and understood.     
 
The takkewari system  
 
The Supplementary Nutrition Programme (SNP) is one of six services that the ICDS is 
designed to provide to three categories of beneficiaries: pregnant women, nursing 
mothers and children in the 0-6 year age group. The objective of the SNP is to address 
the additional nutritional requirements of pregnancy, lactation and early childhood 
development by supplementing home meals. During my fieldwork from November 2014 
to July 2015, such supplementation took the form of Take Home Ration (THR) packets 
for pregnant women, nursing mothers and children in the 6-36 month age group and a 
snack and hot cooked meal for the 3-6 year old pre-schoolers enrolled in the 
anganwadi. As per programme guidelines, pregnant women and nursing mothers were 
to receive daily nutritional supplementation of 600 calories and 18-20 gms of protein, 6-
72 month olds were to receive 500 calories and 12-15 gms of protein while severely 
underweight 6-72 month olds were to be given 800 calories and 20-25 gms of protein 
by the anganwadi centre. There were 2 recipes for the THR packets for pregnant 
women and nursing mothers and for the 6 to 36 month olds. These were: 
 
 
 
 
 
		
96 
Table 1: Contents of THR packets provided in the ICDS 
THR Packets 
for Pregnant 
Women and 
Nursing 
Mothers 
Recipe 1 Recipe 2 
A micronutrient fortified 
blended premix made with 
wheat, soya nuggets, roasted 
gram and jaggery 
 
Total weight: 2145 gms 
Daily recommended intake: 
165 gms/day for 13 days 
A micronutrient fortified 
blended premix made with 
wheat, soya nuggets, 
peanuts and sugar 
 
Total weight: 1920 gms 
Daily recommended intake: 
160 gms/day for 12 days 
THR Packets 
for 6 month-36 
month olds 
A micronutrient fortified 
blended premix made with 
wheat, roasted gram and 
sugar 
 
Total weight: 1820 gms 
Daily recommended intake: 
140 gms/day for 13 days 
A micronutrient fortified 
blended premix made with 
wheat, soya nuggets, 
peanuts and jaggery 
 
Total weight: 1680 gms 
Daily recommended intake: 
140 gms/day for 12 days 
 
The THR was expected to be consumed after mixing with hot milk or hot water. Each of 
these three categories of beneficiaries were to be given two THR packets per month 
while severely undernourished 6-36 month olds were to receive an extra THR packet.   
 
Pre-schoolers (3-6 year olds) enrolled at the anganwadi were to be given a snack as 
soon as the anganwadi opened at 9:00 am and then a hot meal before it shut at 12 
noon. Each beat decided its own weekly menu from a set of options available in the 
programme guidelines. In the two beats that I studied, Rajegaon and Laldera, the 
weekly menu was as follows: 
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Table 2: Weekly Pre-school Menus in Laldera and Rajegaon beats 
Laldera beat 
Day Morning Snack 
(50 gm/day/child) 
Hot Meal 
(70 gm/day/child) 
Description 
Monday Ladoo:  
a sweet ball made 
either with roasted 
peanuts and 
jaggery or a mix of 
wheatflour and 
gramflour, clarified 
butter and sugar 
OR 
Chivda: 
a crispy savoury 
snack made with 
puffed rice and 
nuts 
Varan 
chakule/Varan phal 
Wheat flour dumplings 
in a lentil soup 
Tuesday Lapshi Sweet broken wheat 
porridge 
Wednesday Khichdi A mix of rice and split 
lentils/pulses cooked 
with some vegetables 
Thursday Palak Parathe/ 
Dhapate  
Shallow fried flat, thick 
unleavened bread made 
of wheatflour and 
spinach leaves 
(Parathe) or a mix of 
whole wheat flour, 
sorghum flour and 
gramflour with spinach 
leaves (Dhapate) 
Friday Khichdi A mix of rice and split 
lentils/pulses cooked 
with some vegetables 
Saturday Varan Bhat Steamed rice and split 
lentil/pulse soup 
Rajegaon Beat 
Monday Roasted peanut & 
jaggery ladoo 
Khichdi Same as above 
Tuesday Roasted amaranth 
& jaggery/sugar 
ladoo 
Sheera A sweet preparation of 
semolina 
Wednesday Roasted peanut & 
jaggery ladoo 
Khichdi Same as above 
Thursday Roasted amaranth 
& jaggery/sugar 
ladoo 
Dhapate Same as above 
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Friday Roasted peanut & 
jaggery ladoo 
Khichdi Same as above 
Saturday Roasted amaranth 
& jaggery/sugar 
ladoo 
Varan Bhat Same as above 
 
In the Sundar block ICDS project, THR packets were produced by a self-help group 
based in Sundar town whereas the freshly cooked hot food at the anganwadi centres 
was either produced by a village based self-help group (SHG) or by the anganwadi 
worker. For this chapter, I focus on the food served in the anganwadis prepared by the 
anganwadi worker or the self-help group. The programme policy was to give 
preference to self-help groups in anganwadi food production, anganwadi workers were 
only contracted where no SHGs were willing to undertake the work.  In Laldera beat 
only 2 of 33 anganwadi centres were served by self-help groups whereas for 
Rajegaon, the number was 14 of 30. At the end of every month, the contracted 
anganwadi worker or the self-help group would raise a bill for the supply of cooked 
food to the anganwadi. These bills were submitted to the Supervisor who would check 
each bill and countersign and then collate the details for her entire beat and submit to 
the Project Office for payment. The clerk at the Project Office would collate all the bills 
for the cooked meals across the 8 beats, obtain the CDPO’s signature for these as well 
as the THR bills and based on the budget available in the Project Office forward to the 
Zilla Kaksha for approval. Once the Deputy CEO at the Zilla Kaksha had approved the 
bills, the CDPO would instruct the bank to release the billed and approved amounts 
into the bank accounts of self-help groups and anganwadi workers, as specified.    
 
My first exposure to the supplementary nutrition programme payment process was 
while I was observing the work of the Supervisor of Laldera beat, Lata Shinde. I had 
started visiting anganwadis with Shinde Madam from November 2014 and after four 
days attended an ‘MPR’ beat meeting with her, held at the Laldera Primary Heath 
Centre. Every month a Supervisor was required to have two meetings with her beat, 
one in the middle of the month referred to as the ‘madhli meeting’ while the second 
was usually held towards the end of the month and called the ‘MPR meeting’ as during 
this meeting MPRs or Monthly Progress Reports and supplementary nutrition bills were 
collected from anganwadi workers (anganwadi workers also brought bills submitted by 
self-help groups, wherever applicable). During the meeting, before collecting the 
supplementary nutrition bills, Shinde Madam reminded the anganwadi workers to 
ensure that they had accounted for the Sundays and holidays of that month in their bills 
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and not charged for non-working days. The next day, I found Shinde Madam at home 
working on the bills submitted and at my request was allowed to participate in the 
process. I found that each bill consisted of a set of 5 papers. These were (1) a credit 
bill which listed by date the quantity and type of snack and meal served throughout the 
month along with the number of 3-6 year olds who partook of the food each day, 
signed by the anganwadi worker and stamped and signed by the self-help group, if 
applicable; (2) a certificate signed by the anganwadi worker certifying that the number 
of children mentioned in the bill was accurate and corresponded to the data in her 
attendance register and that the food items mentioned in the bill were accurate and 
were served to the children in the anganwadi; (3) a questionnaire on the type, quantity 
and quality of food served in the anganwadi during the month, answered and signed by 
4-5 members of the Mother’s Committee; (4) a summary sheet totalling the number of 
pre-schoolers fed at the anganwadi across the month, the number of days in the month 
when supplementary nutrition was distributed, the budgetary allocation per child and 
the total amount spent on pre-school supplementary nutrition signed by the anganwadi 
worker and countersigned by the Supervisor, and; (5) three copies of a covering form 
(yellow coloured for the Project Office, pink coloured for the anganwadi worker and 
white for the self-help group, if applicable) addressed to the CDPO, signed by the 
anganwadi worker and countersigned by the Supervisor submitting that X number of 
beneficiaries were served hygienic and good supplementary nutrition at the anganwadi 
amounting to a total of Y rupees. Shinde Madam had instructed her beat members to 
fill in all the details and sign off at the relevant places but leave the totals to her as she 
was concerned that they would make mistakes. She had been busy totalling the data 
when I arrived and happily passed on the task to me. She instructed me to again check 
the credit bill and ensure that all the Sundays and holidays were accounted for in each. 
I noticed that a few anganwadi workers had failed to account for some of these and 
had overwritten in their bills when reminded in the MPR meeting. While adding the 
numbers, I noticed that in several bills the number of children reported as having 
attended pre-school and received supplementary nutrition throughout the month was 
the same, while in others the number varied. However the variation was not random 
but had a distinct pattern - usually involving the same number reported as attending for 
continuous days and a gradual increase in the number across the month. Moreover the 
range of the variation was small, usually 3 to 4 points with one or two cases going upto 
5 and 7 points. When I asked Shinde Madam about these patterns, she weakly 
attempted to defend the numbers and then dismissed them as not her responsibility. 
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As I accompanied Shinde Madam on her supervisory visits around the beat, the 
following month, I realised that although the number of children reported as attending 
preschool and receiving supplementary nutrition in the bills for November had ranged 
from a high of 53 to a low of 28 across anganwadis, the actual attendance during our 
visits was much less with most anganwadis attended by upto 10 pre-schoolers and a 
few by 15-18 pre-schoolers only. For the month of December as well, I helped Shinde 
Madam to calculate the totals for the bills and on cross checking children’s attendance 
in my notes and photographs with the figures reported in the bills found that anganwadi 
workers had grossly inflated the number of children reported as attending pre-school 
and receiving supplementary nutrition across the beat.  This discrepancy was found in 
18 of the 33 anganwadi centres of the beat which were visited in December and for 
which I examined the supplementary nutrition bills for the same month, as summarised 
in Table 3 below: 
 
Table 3: Observed and Reported Pre-school Attendance in Laldera Beat 
 
S. 
No. 
Date of Visit Village Anganwadi 
Number 
Observed 
attendance 
of children 
Reported 
attendance 
of children 
In SNP bill 
1 December 5, 2014 Manewadi 1 7 38 
   2 13 40 
2 December 9, 2014 Laldera 1 Shut 49 
   2 11 38 
   3 5 38 
   5 0 45 
3 December 11, 2014 Nanegaon 1 4 39 
   2 9 40 
4 December 13, 2014 Badera 1 14 39 
5 December 17, 2014 Rajgaon 1 4 32 
   2 8 39 
6 December 18, 2014 Danwadi 1 7 40 
   3 Shut 34 
   5 12 33 
   6 13 30 
   7 3 26 
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7 December 20, 2014 Panpur 1 18 55 
   2 0 51 
 
The routine inflation of pre-school attendance by anganwadi workers was further 
confirmed by my close observation of the daily working of two anganwadis in Shanwadi 
village run by Mangala Narke and Ranjana Wakde respectively. Narke and Wakde 
madam’s anganwadis were well attended by pre-schoolers but not as much as was 
marked in the attendance register and subsequently reported in the SNP bill. Table 2 
presents a comparison between observed and reported pre-school attendance for 16 
days in January and February 2015. Mangala Narke’s anganwadi reported an 
attendance of 37-39 students throughout January 2015 in the anganwadi attendance 
register whereas for February the attendance was a consistent 40 students. Similarly 
attendance in Rajana Wakde’s anganwadi, as reported in the attendance register was 
a consistent 31 for the month of January and 30 for the month of February. While 
observed attendance in both anganwadis ranged from lows of 12 and 7 to highs of 27 
and 16 respectively but rarely more.  
 
Table 4: Observed and Reported Pre-school Attendance in Shanwadi village 
 
S. 
No. 
Date Anganwadi 
worker 
Observed 
Pre-school 
attendance 
Reported Pre-
school attendance 
in Register 
1 January 16, 2015 Mangala Narke 16 37 
2 January 17, 2015 Mangala Narke 012  0 
Ranjana Wakde 31 
3 January 18, 2015 Sunday 
4 January 19, 2015 Mangala Narke+ 
Ranjana Wakde13 25 37 + 31 
5 January 20, 2015 Mangala Narke+ 
Ranjana Wakde14  25-2715  37 + 31 
6 January 28, 2015 Mangala Narke 20 37 
7 January 29, 2015 Mangala Narke 21 37 
																																																								12 Because of a religious programme in the village 13 Both anganwadis conducted together as Ranjana was expecting guests that day 14 Both anganwadis conducted together as Mangala was not feeling well 15 A couple of children kept walking in and out. 
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8 January 31, 2015 Mangala Narke 15 37 
9  February 1, 2015 Sunday 
10 February 2, 2015 Mangala Narke 20 40 
11 February 3, 2015 Mangala Narke + 
Ranjana Wakde16  12 + 11 40+30 
12 February 4, 2015 Mangala Narke 15 40 
Ranjana Wakde 12 30 
13 February 5, 2015 Beat Meeting 
14 February 6, 2015 Mangala Narke 19 40 
Ranjana Wakde 16 30 
15 February 7, 2015 Ranjana Wakde 7 30 
16 February 8, 2015 Sunday 
17 February 9, 2015 Mangala Narke 27 40 
18 February 10, 2015 Ranjana Wakde 10 30 
19 February 11, 2015 Anganwadi Worker Strike 
20 February 12, 2015 Mangala Narke 12 40 
Ranjana Wakde 13 30 
 
 
Besides inflating attendance numbers and thereby supplementary nutrition bills, many 
anganwadi workers in Laldera beat did not serve food as per the pre-determined 
weekly menu. In 24 of the 26 anganwadis that I visited in Laldera beat, no snack was 
served to the children in the morning. Some children brought tiffins from home to eat in 
the anganwadi in the morning while those who didn’t went without. Further, as detailed 
in Table 5, 15 of the 26 visited anganwadis did not serve the hot cooked meal as per 
the menu of the beat. Almost all the anganwadis barring two were observed to have 
prepared khichdi, a mix of rice and split lentils/pulses cooked with some vegetables. As 
khichdi was on the menu twice a week, anganwadis appeared to be complying with the 
menu on those days and not on the rest. 
  
 
 
 
 																																																								16 Joint session conducted because of Immunisation Day in the village and Mangala’s anganwadi helper 
being on leave. 
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Table 5: Planned and Observed Pre-school Menus in Laldera Beat 
 
S. 
No 
Day of Visit Village Anganwadi 
No. 
SNP as per menu Actual SNP 
served 
    Snack Meal Snack Meal 
1 Friday Shanwadi 1 Laddoo Khichdi No Khichdi 
   2 Laddoo Khichdi No Khichdi 
2 Friday Tupkheda 1 Laddoo Khichdi No Khichdi 
3 Friday Manewadi 1 Laddoo Khichdi No Khichdi 
   2 Laddoo Khichdi No Khichdi 
  Rangwadi 1 Laddoo Khichdi No Khichdi 
4 Tuesday Kadera 1 Laddoo Lapshi No Khichdi 
  Laldera 1 Laddoo Lapshi No Khichdi 
   2 Laddoo Lapshi No Khichdi 
   3 Laddoo Lapshi No Khichdi 
   5 Laddoo Lapshi No Khichdi 
5 Thursday Phangaon 1 Laddoo Dhapate Yes Dhapate 
   2 Laddoo Dhapate No Khichdi 
  Dokheda 1 Laddoo Dhapate No Khichdi 
   2 Laddoo Dhapate No Khichdi 
6 Saturday Badera 1 Laddoo Varan 
Bhat 
No Varan 
Bhat 
7 Wednesday Rajgaon 1 Laddoo Khichdi No Khichdi 
   2 Laddoo Khichdi No Khichdi 
   3 Laddoo Khichdi No Khichdi 
8 Thursday Danwadi 1 Laddoo Dhapate No Khichdi 
   3 Laddoo Dhapate No Khichdi 
   5 Laddoo Dhapate No Khichdi 
   6 Laddoo Dhapate No Khichdi 
   7 Laddoo Dhapate No Khichdi 
9 Saturday Panpur 1 Laddoo Varan 
Bhat 
Yes Khichdi 
   2 Laddoo Varan 
Bhat 
No Khichdi 
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In Shanwadi, Ranjana Wakde only served Khichdi at her anganwadi for the entire 6 
weeks that I was there. No snacks were provided. Mangala Narke, on the other hand, 
did provide 3 of the 4 items on the weekly menu as well as a savoury snack of salted 
puffed rice.  In Mangaon, Shabana Syed also attempted to serve as per the menu 
including snacks whereas Meera Kale served only boiled rice with some seasoning 
everyday. Anganwadi workers claimed that they served khichdi as the children liked it 
and it was filling. Others argued that as the post of anganwadi helper was vacant in 
their anganwadi and they had to bring the cooked food with them by 9:00 am, khichdi 
was all that was possible. Serving khichdi was also the most economical option for 
anganwadi workers. They procured rice cheaply from the public distribution system 
(even the above poverty line rate was only Rs.8-10 per kilo) and needed to cook only 
1-1.5 kilos per day (as rice swells up nearly 3 times) with some 250 gms of split pulses 
(although the usual rice pulses ratio is 2:1), oil and condiments to feed 30-40 pre-
schoolers. The ICDS programme paid for supplementary nutrition in the anganwadi at 
the rate of Rs.4.92 per child for an average 25 days per month. By billing for 35-50 
children per day for an average of 20-25 days in the month and economising on the 
ingredients, anganwadi workers earned an informal income equivalent to or a little less 
than their monthly honorarium, which ranged from Rs.3988 to 4113.   
 
The potential for such profit implied that most anganwadi workers were quite keen to 
keep the contract for the provision of daily supplementary nutrition to the anganwadi 
with themselves rather than a self-help group. However, the programme policy was to 
give preference to self-help groups, if any were available and willing. If such a self-help 
group, approved by the village gram panchayat came forward, the contract shifted from 
the anganwadi worker to the self-help group. This is what happened in Rangwadi. In 
the beginning of December, the CDPO Deepa Pardeshi instructed Shinde Madam to 
visit Rangwadi as a self-help group from the village had approached the office for the 
supplementary nutrition contract for the village anganwadi. She said that she had 
accepted the contract, which also had the resolution of the gram panchayat, selecting 
the self-help group for this purpose, attached. Moreover, she had also received a call 
from the MLA’s Secretary asking her to ensure that the transition took place. Shinde 
Madam was expected to visit Rangwadi to smoothen this transition. There was no 
direct road to Rangwadi, it could only be approached through Manewadi. A senior 
anganwadi worker from Manewadi Gayabai Wagh accompanied us to Rangwadi and 
both Wagh Madam and Shinde Madam counselled the distressed anganwadi worker in 
Rangwadi on how to manage the situation. They advised her to ask the SHG members 
to provide supplementary nutrition as per the menu and give the actual attendance of 
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children for preparing the bill. This, they assured her, would render the contract 
uneconomical for the SHG and they would drop out. Wagh madam advised her to 
introduce these changes gradually using expected visits by block and district officials 
as an excuse to allay suspicion. Shinde madam suggested that the anganwadi worker 
request one of the SHG members to come and serve the food to the children in the 
anganwadi and sign off against the number of children present. Further, Wagh madam 
recommended that the anganwadi worker not appear aggrieved by the loss of the 
contract but rather thank the self-help group for taking away an onerous, unprofitable 
burden. Wagh madam assured me that with these strategies, the contract would be 
restored to the anganwadi worker, over the next few months, within the period of my 
fieldwork. However events did not quite unfold as planned. Towards the end of the 
month when the anganwadi worker gave low attendance figures to the SHG for 
preparing the bill, the members objected and demanded that she show them the 
attendance register. She refused. This led to a fight at the anganwadi. The anganwadi 
worker called Shinde madam in tears saying that she was only following her advice. 
Shinde madam denied ever having given any advice. Pardeshi madam – the CDPO – 
had to visit the village to resolve the fight and soothe the grievances of the SHG 
members and the Sarpanch while the aganwadi worker was given a warning letter for 
poor attendance (three such letters can lead to dismissal).  
 
Before 2005, cooking and providing supplementary foods in the anganwadi was part of 
the job description of the anganwadi worker and helper. For this food grains were 
provided by the ICDS. However in 2005, the responsibility for providing supplementary 
food was contracted out to local self-help groups and a routine task performed by 
programme functionaries acquired a profit-seeking character as self-help groups 
needed to earn an income from the contract. Subsequently in 2009, when Take Home 
Rations were introduced for pregnant and nursing mothers and babies in the 0-3 year 
age group, most SHGs dropped out of the contract as only supplying supplementary 
nutrition for pre-schoolers proved unviable. The responsibility for provision of 
supplementary nutrition reverted to anganwadi workers but now in the form of a 
contract. Besides being the field level functionaries of the ICDS, anganwadi workers 
also became private contractors supplying services to the ICDS.  
 
The SNP contract at the anganwadi level was signed for a period of a year and 
renewed annually. To be eligible for the contract, anganwadi workers had to register 
themselves as a ‘food establishment’ under the Food and Safety Standards Act, 2006 
for a small fee, a registration that also needed to be renewed annually. Having signed 
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the contract, anganwadi workers with helpers usually outsourced the actual cooking to 
them for a nominal fee while they sourced the raw materials and fuel, usually through 
the local fair price or ration shop using social and kinship networks. Mangala Narke for 
many years sourced pulses from a relative in another block who had the contract for 
preparing the mid-day meal at the school in her village and thereby access to school 
food supplies. However, despite these tactics the supplementary nutrition rates offered 
by the programme were not enough to allow anganwadi workers to earn an income 
from the contract based on actual attendance data and strict adherence to the daily 
menu. Resultantly anganwadi workers resorted to inflation of attendance figures and 
compromising the menu. Given that the strategy of ‘outsourcing’ or ‘contracting out’ 
was by design expected to generate an income for the contractees, anganwadi 
workers felt quite justified in their actions blaming instead the low SNP rates 
determined by the programme and the rising food prices in the market. The anganwadi 
worker practice of inflating attendance in SNP bills was known throughout the 
programme. Supervisors also justified it based on the meagre honorarium of 
anganwadi workers and the high cost of living. However the ICDS project office also 
set limits, anganwadi workers were regularly warned to ensure that discrepancies 
between observed and reported attendance and between the attendance figures in the 
bills and the attendance register were not so high as to attract comment and attention 
from the District Office or the Zilla Kaksha. 
 
These practices represent ‘a set of unofficial or clandestine rules’ that according to 
Anders (2009) emerge from the bureaucratic social field to mediate between clashing 
expectations and obligations. For Anders (2009) and de Sardan (1999) writing in the 
context of Africa the contradiction was between official rules and kinship obligations. 
For ICDS anganwadi workers, however, the clash was largely between the form and 
content of the bureaucratic tool used to structure their livelihood, which then led to the 
development of informal rules to redress the resultant contradiction. Jauregui (2014) 
refers to such improvisation as provisional agency or ‘jugaad’, which she finds, when 
used by the less privileged in North India as a means for their survival has wide 
legitimacy. Anand (2011), Mathur (2016) and Sharma and Gupta, (2006) writing in the 
context of India also find that the un-implementability of bureaucratic rules often gives 
rise to practices which may technically be considered ‘corrupt’ but are accepted 
socially. 
 
However, Anganwadi workers’ legitimate and yet informal appropriation of SNP monies 
also made them vulnerable to the unofficial demands of their Supervisors and the 
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CDPO. The SNP bills raised by anganwadi workers and self-help groups were 
corrected and approved by Supervisors and subsequently the CDPO. They each 
charged 5 percent of the SNP bill to sign off on the inflated numbers and falsified 
menu. Most of the anganwadi workers resented having to pay these percentages or 
‘takkewari’ as they were called and considered Supervisor and CDPO claims to their 
meagre incomes illegitimate, especially given the significant disparity between 
Supervisor and CDPO salaries and their honoraria17. Aggrieved by the Supervisor’s 
constant demands for money, an anganwadi worker in Lalgaon beat recorded her on 
her phone as she asked for her percentage. She then came to the Project Office with 
the recording to complain to the CDPO and highlight their vulnerability. The CDPO 
warned the concerned Supervisor, Jaya Rajput, to manage her beat better and not 
allow complaints to escalate to the office. For the Supervisors and CDPO the 
‘takkewari’ represented ‘commissions’ as defined by Blundo and de Sardan (2006) – a 
share in the illicit gain for the service rendered and compensation for the risk involved. 
With all three administrative levels of the ICDS project involved, there was a hierarchy 
of informal incomes and payments related to supplementary nutrition served in the 
anganwadi, much like the hierarchies of percentages elaborated by Wade (1982) in the 
context of canal irrigation in South India.  
 
I observed both Supervisors Lata Shinde and Shailaja Joshi collecting these payments 
for themselves and on behalf of the CDPO during beat meetings, once they were 
confident that I would not report on them. Each Supervisor would sit on a chair at the 
head of the meeting while the anganwadi workers sat on a large durrie or floor mat, 
with a list of the amounts that each anganwadi worker needed to give and collect the 
money. The 10 percent that Shinde madam and Joshi madam collected allowed 
anganwadi workers to inflate preschool attendance in their attendance register and 
supplementary nutrition bills as well as serve children only khichdi made with small 
amounts of split pulses or lentil and almost no vegetables. Having received their 
percentage, these Supervisors not only signed off on falsified attendance registers and 
supplementary nutrition bills but to ensure consistency also inflated children’s 
attendance in their visit reports, which they wrote in the anganwadi visit book. In 
Pitambari beat, when the Supervisor wrote about the violation of the weekly menu in 
the visit book and also charged anganwadi workers an additional Rs.100.0 fine, they 
protested strongly. Anganwadi workers argued that they were paying takkewari in lieu 
of the violation of rules and hence should neither have to pay fines nor be subject to 																																																								17 Such resentment for the ‘bribe taker’ on moral grounds has been noted by Parry (2000) and Ruud 
(2000) as well. 
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any official supervisory action. The CDPO Deepa Pardeshi supported the Pitambari 
Supervisor’s fine, chastising an anganwadi worker who had complained by pointing out 
that the annual SNP contract that she had signed included a clause for deducting 
Rs.50.0 per day for irregular supply and Rs.100.0 per day for poor quality of food. 
However, as per the actual rules of the contract, such monies were to be deducted 
from the monthly bill raised by the anganwadi worker and not collected and pocketed 
by the Supervisor.   
 
In understanding this hierarchical regime of informal incomes and payments, it is also 
important to note that not all Supervisors collected 10 percent takkewari and not all 
supervisors collected takkewari. The Supervisors of Lalgaon and Pitambari beats, were 
known to collect takkewari of 14-15 percent of which they passed only 5 percent to the 
CDPO pocketing the rest for themselves. Whereas one of the 8 Supervisors in the 
project, Hira Mahadeo was not on the take. For her, it was a matter of principle. She 
felt she could not take anganwadi workers’ hard earned money given the wage 
difference between her salary and their honorarium. As a result, she was often isolated 
in the project and ridiculed by her colleagues. When the current CDPO, Deepa 
Pardeshi, took charge of this project in 2014, Mahadeo madam tried to convince her to 
discontinue the practice of takkewari by not taking the CDPO’s share and threatening 
official action against Supervisors who did. However, Pardeshi Madam was not 
convinced that it could be done. She argued that Supervisors in the project had 
become used to extra money and would not give it up. Since Mahadeo madam refused 
to take her share, it was agreed that despite her reservations Mahadeo madam would 
collect the CDPO’s 5 percent from the anganwadi workers in her beat and pass it on to 
Pardeshi madam, for at least a few months until Pardeshi madam became more 
familiar with the beat. However, even a year after her joining, the transition had not 
occurred and more recently Pardeshi madam had insisted that she receive the entire 
10 percent from the beat. She contended that since anganwadi workers across the 
entire project were paying 10 percent, Mahadeo madam’s beat need not be an 
exception. Madadeo madam’s beat had reluctantly started paying 10 percent.  
 
Thus the practice of takkewari was largely controlled by the Supervisors and the 
CDPO. Not all projects had takkewari - the project to which Shinde Madam was 
subsequently transferred to, did not have the practice and neither did the two projects 
where Hira Mahadeo had initially served. Unlike the system of ‘vertical or capillary 
corruption’ (Appadurai, 2016) in which small but numerous informal payments at lower 
levels of the bureaucracy aggregate to enrich higher level bureaucrats and politicians 
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(Gupta, 2017), the ICDS Project Office CDPO was not required to pay a regular 
percentage of the collected takkewari to anyone else in the district or the block. As 
Deepa Pardeshi explained one afternoon, her primary problem was controlling the 
excesses of some of the Supervisors and ensuring that a common percentage was 
applied across the project. She speculated that she might even shut down the practice 
of takkewari entirely as she had recently been allocated the CDPO charge of another 
project and was increasingly coming to the attention of local panchayat samiti leaders 
such as the Chairperson who had begun to hint at a regular share. However, such a 
move was highly unlikely. The Sundar block ICDS project office did not, for most of the 
period of my fieldwork, have an accountant or clerk, the accountant had retired and the 
clerk was on deputation to the Zilla Parishad. The retired accountant worked in the 
office in a voluntary capacity to prepare and submit bills and keep track of the budget. 
He was remunerated through the takkewari. Without his ‘voluntary’ work the Project 
Office would not have been able to operate.  
 
In addition to percentages for actual rule violations, money also needed to be given to 
ensure that officials overlook potential rule violations. This was particularly the case for 
treasury clerks, auditors and visits by state level officials. The bills raised by the 
anganwadi workers and self-help groups for food supply to anganwadi centres were 
sent to the Treasury for payment along with a commission to overlook any mistakes in 
the bill and make quick payments. According to Pardeshi madam, the CDPO, 
takkewari was collected to pay the Treasury but Mahadeo madam refuted this 
explanation arguing that the money needed to pay the Treasury was a small amount 
and could not entirely account for takkewari.  Similarly, auditors needed to be paid 
Rs.5000.0 in advance to ensure that they did not identify any significant mistake and 
rule deviations. However, if the bills had too many mistakes, auditors demanded 
double the amount. All Supervisors contributed towards the payment for auditors with 
some CDPOs demanding contributions even from Supervisors who had been 
transferred from the project, if the years being audited related to them.  The ICDS 
project was also expected to contribute to the pakit (envelope) given to state officials 
visiting the block to ensure that they did not submit an adverse report.  In a Panchayat 
Samiti general body meeting that I attended block officials planned for the visit of high 
ranking state officials by discussing the contribution that each department would make 
to the Rs.20,000.0 pakit (envelope) that needed to be given. ICDS was expected to 
contribute Rs.2000.0 with each Supervisor giving Rs.100.0.  
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In sum, informal incomes from the anganwadi supplementary nutrition programme 
supported a system of commissions or takkewari across the ICDS project office as well 
as a sub-system of payments to accountants, treasury clerks, auditors and visiting 
state officials. The takkewari system was not fuelled by the vertical demands of senior 
politicians and bureaucrats but rather represented a local system that enabled 
supplementary nutrition services to be delivered, albeit of lower quality and all 
concerned to gain informal incomes. In addition, the variability of Supervisory 
commission practices as well as the CDPO’s felt need to impose control on these, 
revealed the takkewari system to be contingent, dynamic and ultimately performative. 
 
Formal Monitoring through Informal Fines 
 
Monitoring the everyday operations of anganwadi centres and the working of aganwadi 
workers of her beat is one of primary responsibilities of a Supervisor (Planning 
Commission, 2011). Accordingly, Supervisors are required to conduct surprise visits to 
each anganwadi centre at least once a month and observe its functioning including the 
status of infrastructure and equipment, cleanliness of anganwadi centre premises, 
attendance of pre-school children, quality and quantity of supplementary food served, 
quality of pre-school education as well as review all other services by checking the 
records. They are expected to sign each record book with the date of their visit as well 
as write a visit report with their observations in the anganwadi centre visit book. 
Supervisors are the main source of in-service training available to anganwadi workers 
and are expected to help anganwadi workers improve the quality of their work. They 
can also discipline anganwadi workers who don’t improve their performance and are 
frequently absent. The two main disciplining mechanisms are docking of pay and 
warning letters. Supervisors who catch anganwadi workers being truant can dock their 
pay for the number of days they were absent as well as issue warning letters to those 
who perform their duties poorly or constantly neglect them. Three such warning letters 
make an anganwadi worker eligible for termination. These practices of surveillance and 
discipline in the ICDS have also been noted by Gupta (2001). 
 
Despite the existence of these well-established monitoring practices some supervisors 
of the Sundar Block project office had informally set up a system of monitoring through 
fines – Lata Shinde of Laldera beat was one such supervisor, In Laldera beat, 
anganwadi workers who did not fill their Monthy Progress Report forms accurately and 
correctly or were regularly absent had to pay the Supervisor a fine of Rs.100-200.0 in 
addition to the takkewari. Most truant workers were usually from anganwadis in interior 
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villages, which were rarely visited by officials from the block and or the district. 
Whereas the poor performers were usually newly recruited anganwadi workers who 
had not yet received any formal training. They were required to be trained by the 
Supervisor or expected to take help from senior anganwadi workers. However rather 
than seeking training, several of the new workers in Laldera beat had an arrangement 
with a senior anganwadi worker in which they paid her to complete their registers and 
Monthly Progress Report forms. Since Shinde madam was aware of this arrangement, 
she charged these workers more. While Shinde madam charged fines for incomplete 
and poorly filled registers and MPR forms as well as absenteeism, the supervisor of 
Lalgaon beat was notorious for charging Rs.100.0 for every small carelessness and 
oversight, for instance if some part of the anganwadi was not clean or some cells in a 
register had been overlooked. These practices of individual Supervisors were not 
known to the CDPO and she only gradually discovered them as anganwadi workers 
complained. 
 
Supervisors and the CDPO did however collaborate on extracting money from 
anganwadi workers by issuing notices for rule violations. From time to time, 
Supervisors would organise surprise visits of the CDPO to anganwadi workers who 
they considered uncooperative either because they did not do their work – were absent 
without notice, had poor attendance, had been complained against by community 
members or because they did not easily pay the takkewari. Usually it was a 
combination of these factors. In these visits, the CDPO and Supervisor would state the 
obvious faults such as poor attendance and scold the anganwadi worker if she was 
present or call her to the anganwadi, if absent, to do so. In the next few days, the 
anganwadi worker would be given a warning letter by the Supervisor and called to the 
Project Office with her written reply. At the office, the CDPO would again scold and 
threaten the anganwadi worker with termination while the anganwadi worker would 
apologise both in writing and in person and promise to do better. I was witness to 
several such incidents while observing the work of the CDPO, Deepa Pardeshi. A copy 
of the notice given to the anganwadi worker is supposed to be added to her file such 
that three such letters make the anganwadi worker eligible for termination. However, as 
the newly assigned Clerk in the project office pointed out, there was no record of the 
letters issued by the office to anganwadi workers. Letters of notice were rarely added 
to anganwadi worker files and termination of anganwadi workers was extremely rare. 
Most anganwadi workers paid the Supervisor and CDPO to let the matter drop while 
politically connected workers called in favours. There was not a single termination 
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during the nine months of my fieldwork and none had ever taken place in the two beats 
that I studied. 
 
Political mediation  
 
Anganwadi workers typically countered such bureaucratic excesses through political 
mediation. Anganwadi workers of Pitambari beat complained about the excessive 
demands of their Supervisor Jaya Rajput to the MLA through a letter. The letter was 
received by the MLA’s Personal Assistant who informed the Supervisor Shailaja Joshi’s 
son, also a member of the Shiv Sena, about it. Shailaja Joshi, concerned about the 
repercussions of the complaint on the Sundar Block Project, then warned Jaya Rajput. 
As Jaya Rajput’s son was also associated the Shiv Sena, she approached the 
Personal Assistant, paid a hefty amount and reminded the MLA about the laxity of 
anganwadi workers. The MLA then chose to ignore the complaint. Although this 
particular threat made through the political connections of anganwadi workers was 
neutralised through the political connections of Supervisors the takkewari system did 
make state functionaries vulnerable to the opportunistic demands of local politicians. A 
few years back, under another CDPO, the then MLA demanded Rs.100,000.0 from the 
entire project and each Supervisor had to contribute Rs.10,000.0 to the total amount. In 
July 2015, the MLA’s Personal Assistant called Pardeshi madam and asked for a 
contribution of Rs.15,000.0 from both the ICDS projects she had charge of, for the 
birthday celebrations of the MLA. Pardeshi madam told all the Supervisors that each 
would have to pay Rs.1000.0. However, Jaya Rajput and another Supervisor argued 
that as they had not received their salaries for the past three months, they should not 
have to pay so much and instead could pay only Rs.500.0. Hira Mahadeo refused to 
contribute entirely claiming that as she did not participate in takkewari, she had no 
need to pay this amount. Pardeshi madam tried to convince the Supervisors and when 
they did not agree refused to negotiate with the MLA’s office on their behalf. Jaya 
Rajput then called the MLA’s office and presented their case. While the MLA’s 
Personal Assistant did not argue with Rajput madam, he subsequently called Pardeshi 
madam and upbraided her for letting her junior respond to his call, questioning her 
management ability. Pardeshi madam was very angry with Jaya Rajput for humiliating 
her and planned to reassert her authority by giving her a memo regarding the poor 
quality of her work.       
 
ICDS programme practices thus appear to emerge relationally and contingently 
through a continuous negotiation of power and authority between the different 
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administrative levels of the Project Office. The takkewari system and its sub-systems 
ensured the continued functioning of the anganwadi supplementary nutrition 
programme although it did give rise to offshoots such as the fine based monitoring 
system. 
 
The informal incomes gained by Supervisors through takkewari constituted about 15 
percent of their monthly salary but enabled them to invest for the economic 
improvement and social mobility of their families. Many of the Supervisors in the project 
had bought and/or built homes for their families, especially the newly appointed 
Supervisors who had taken bank loans and bought homes near Sundar block town. 
They had also used these funds to secure advantageous alliances for their children 
and invested in businesses and jobs for them. Besides investments for family 
advancement, Supervisors used informal incomes to recover the kharch or expenditure 
incurred to acquire their current positions as well as ensure favourable posts during 
transfers, as discussed in the next section.  
 
Promotions, transfers and postings 
 
Anganwadi helpers, workers and Supervisors in the ICDS programme reported 
incurring expenditure or kharch for ensuring their promotions as well as transfers and 
postings of choice.  
 
Promotions: Anganwadi helpers and workers in Sundar block had to pay block and 
district level officials to ensure their promotion to the next level that is from anganwadi 
helper to anganwadi worker and anganwadi worker to Supervisor.  
 
Anganwadi helpers who meet the educational requirement for the anganwadi worker 
position, whether it is the minimum of 10th standard currently or that of 7th standard 
previously, have completed a certain number of years of experience (5 years 
previously and 2 years as per the Government Resolution dated August 13th, 2014) 
and fulfil the residential requirement, are eligible to be promoted to the anganwadi 
worker position as soon as a vacancy becomes available in the village. Such a 
promotion can be effected directly by the CDPO based on the documents submitted 
and does not require an interview. 
 
In June, 2015 while I was observing the work of the CDPO, Deepa Pardeshi we visited 
a large village in the block called Pitambari. One of the Supervisors, who had worked 
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for nearly two decades in Pitambari as an anganwadi worker, had recently retired and 
her former colleagues had organised a felicitation ceremony for her in an anganwadi. 
The entire beat had come together for the ceremony, after which lunch had been 
organised for the guests at an anganwadi worker’s house in the village. I was seated 
next to Pardeshi madam during the meal and while serving her, our host told her that 
an anganwadi helper in the village was keen for a promotion and was willing to pay 
Rs.15,000.0 for it. The CDPO assured the anganwadi workers of the village that if the 
helper met the educational requirement for the position, it would be done. In a similar 
vein, the Supervisor of another beat told me that the CDPO had taken money from one 
of her anganwadi helpers to promote her as an anganwadi worker. Another Supervisor 
shared that when she herself was promoted from anganwadi helper to anganwadi 
worker in another block, her then CDPO had demanded money for her promotion. 
 
Promotions from the anganwadi worker position to the Supervisor’s post are 
determined at the district level. Thirty three percent of Supervisory positions are to be 
filled through promotion. Anganwadi workers who have served for 10 years (7 years 
previously) are eligible for such promotion, however eligible candidates are expected to 
clear a written examination and then appear for an interview conducted at the district 
level. All the anganwadi workers and Supervisors I met shared that this promotion was 
not possible without a hefty payment as the Supervisor is not an honorary worker but a 
government employee. 
 
For two of the three senior anganwadi workers I observed closely in Shanwadi and 
Mangaon villages, Mangala Narke and Shabana Syed, lack of money for the payment 
was cited as the main reason why they did not apply for the position. For Narke 
madam, this was a particularly sore point because she was known as the best 
anganwadi worker in her beat, had won several awards instituted by the programme to 
reward and recognise good anganwadi workers and was a leader in the anganwadi 
worker union. This was the only honour that had remained out of her reach because 
she did not have the funds for it. She introduced me to a contemporary of hers, Leela 
Kulkarni, who had succeeded in becoming a Supervisor, nearly a decade ago in 1997 
when the promotion process was conducted by the Nivad Mandal or the Regional 
Selection Board. She shared that she had paid a sum of Rs.40,000.0 for the promotion. 
However this amount was qualified by Sulabha Wade, the Supervisor of Mandi beat 
who was promoted in the same year and through the same process. She had paid an 
amount of Rs.70,000.0 and shared that most others had incurred costs upwards of 
Rs.60,000.0 that year, however Kulkarni was able to negotiate a lower rate because a 
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close relative was a journalist and he was able to exert his influence or washila on the 
process. Wade madam had applied once before in 1993 as well but was not 
successful. She had paid a sum of Rs.30,000.0 to a broker as well as approached the 
Chief Minister’s office through his Personal Assistant who was a friend of her brother-
in-law based in Mumbai. Her failure convinced her to eschew political brokers and 
instead approach agents connected to the officials in the Nivad Mandal. After the 
results of a competitive recruitment exam were put up in the Nivad Mandal office, 
agents would often approach candidates who had cleared with offers to fix the 
interview in exchange for money. However, most candidates would have already 
entered into an arrangement with an agent or a political broker to ensure their selection 
that is by fixing both the written exam and the interview. Wade madam met her agent 
through her tenant farmer whose brother-in-law had used him to ensure government 
jobs for his entire family – two daughters-in-law as government school teachers and a 
son as a Gram sevak. The agent, a peon in another office, asked her to contact him 
after clearing the exam and successfully fixed her interview.    
 
Another anganwadi worker, Savita More of Mangaon village, also reached a similar 
conclusion about the effectiveness of bureaucratic agents vis-a-vis political brokers 
after four unsuccessful attempts to secure the promotion. More madam shared that 
when the Nivad Mandal was conducting the process, her family had paid an amount of 
Rs.35,000.0 to an official who had assured them that she would be promoted, even at 
this low price, but he did not deliver. Subsequently, the promotion process was 
transferred to the Zilla Parishad. Based on the belief that they needed political 
influence to ensure the promotion, her husband who was active in the Shiv Sena and 
claimed to be an assistant to the MLA, travelled twice to Mumbai during the next 
promotion process in 2001 and approached state level Ministers. Again, he was 
assured that the work would be done but this time too she was not promoted. In her 
third attempt in 2008, More madam passed the exam and appeared for the interview 
but her husband made no effort to pay officials or apply political leverage and she was 
not selected. During her fourth and most recent attempt in 2010, More madam was 
approached by a clerk from the Zilla Kaksha asking her if she wanted to get her work 
done through him but her husband had already paid a Zilla Parishad member 
Rs.200,000.0 for the promotion and she refused. This time she did not even clear the 
exam. Later, it was revealed that the Zilla Parishad member had not passed on the 
money to the district officials and had waited for her to clear the exam. He then 
returned the money in two instalments. More madam was shocked at failing an exam 
that she had found so easy to answer and believed that she had deliberately been 
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failed by the district officials because her money did not reach them. She filed an RTI 
application demanding to see her marked answersheet but did not receive it. District 
officials refused to release it instead sending her the marks received by candidates 
who passed. Despite all these failures More madam was keen on attempting the 
promotion again as the upper age limit for eligibility is 57 years and she still had a little 
more than a decade left. She believed that she had finally understood what was 
needed to achieve the promotion – the CEO’s office was the key but it needed to be 
approached through the ICDS Department. Also it was important to have contacts who 
could recommend your case as had happened with Shailaja Joshi. Her husband had 
retired from the Health Department and was working on a contract basis at the Zilla 
Parishad when she was promoted. According to More madam, he was able to establish 
and maintain contact with key persons in the CEO’s office and the ICDS Department 
and advocate his wife’s case.  
 
Shailaja Joshi, who had indeed joined the ICDS programme as an anganwadi worker 
along with Savita More and Mangala Narke and had succeeded in achieving a 
promotion to Supervisor in 2010, however had a different tale. She was also a much 
recognised and awarded anganwadi worker known throughout the block for her good 
work. She attempted the Supervisory promotion thrice – the first attempt was, like the 
others, when the process was managed by the Nivad Mandal. This attempt was not 
successful because her family did not pay any money although she had contacts in the 
Nivad Mandal, an old classmate. The second attempt was in 2001. They were assured 
by the then Deputy CEO ICDS that she would definitely be selected and that they 
should not approach or pay any politician to make it happen. However, her husband 
who worked in the Health Department consulted a senior official who offered to get the 
work done through the Deputy Chairperson of the Zilla Parishad in exchange of 
Rs.50,000.0 and the deal was struck. Joshi madam topped the exam scoring 85 out of 
100 and was called for the interview. On the day of the interview, a clerk from the ICDS 
Zilla Kaksha contacted her husband and demanded Rs.100,000.0 to ensure the 
promotion. The Joshis did not have that kind of money available especially with the 
impending marriage of their only daughter. Mr. Joshi had to refuse and Joshi madam 
was not selected in the interview despite topping the exam and answering all the 
questions in the interview. She was very aggrieved and threatened to go on hunger 
strike in protest. The CEO called them into his office and showed them that the Deputy 
CEO of ICDS had scored her poorly in the interview and hence she could not be 
selected. After this failed attempt, Joshi madam did not apply in the next promotion 
process conducted in 2008. The then CDPO had informed them that there were only 
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two posts available for which the candidates had already been fixed – one post was to 
go to a relative of a high-ranking state level minister. The third attempt was in 2010. 
Joshi madam applied after being assured by the then Deputy CEO of ICDS that the 
injustice done to her in the previous process would be corrected. She claimed that in 
this third attempt, she was selected without having to pay any money to anyone 
because of the support of the Deputy CEO. However, most others in the project reject 
this claim as implausible. Joshi madam retired in 2015 after only 5 years as a 
Supervisor because of which she was not eligible for a pension. Her family regret not 
paying Rs.100,000.0 in 2001 as that would have ensured that she received a pension, 
however they also acknowledge that they would have had to pay a total Rs.150,000.0 
as the political leader would have also taken credit for the promotion and demanded 
his money. 
 
A Dalit Supervisor, Mala Wankhede from a neighbouring block, who was also 
promoted in 2010 as part of the same process and then posted to Sundar block, 
corroborated Joshi Madam’s narrative of a payment less promotion. However she gave 
credit for this to the then CEO who also belonged to the Scheduled Castes rather than 
the Deputy CEO ICDS, a Maratha who, according to her, had been on the take. She 
shared that on the day of the interview the CEO came twice to where all the candidates 
were waiting and informed them that he had not asked for any money so they should 
not pay any broker any money. He reassured them that they had reached the interview 
based on their ability and should remain confident. However, some women had already 
paid money, including a girl from her village whose family had mortgaged land to raise 
Rs.400,000.0 for the payment. She was promoted with the political broker taking credit 
for the promotion. After clearing the interview, Wankhede Madam was approached by 
the Deputy CEO ICDS who wanted to know who had helped her secure the promotion. 
Wankhede madam had no name to give but the Deputy CEO remained unconvinced. 
She then went with her brother, a political activist with one of the factions of the 
Republican Party of India, to thank the CEO for promoting her without a payment, 
without which she would never have become a Supervisor as she had had no assets or 
money with which to pay. Her brother greeted the CEO with a ‘Jai Bhim’ to which he 
did not respond and only relaxed when Wankhede madam tearfully thanked him for the 
opportunity. As they left, her brother again raised the slogan of ‘Jai Bhim’ to which the 
CEO responded. According to Wankhede madam, this gave the impression to District 
Officials that she was close to the CEO and he had favoured her in the promotion when 
she had actually never met him either before the promotion or in the 5 years since.   
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Parry (2000) in his well-known paper on the ‘crisis of corruption’ in India explores the 
disjunction as well as the links between the talk about and practice of corruption. 
Highlighting the disjunction, he elaborates that although the dominant belief amongst 
recruited candidates as well as aspiring applicants for jobs in a public sector steel plant 
was that brokers and payments were essential for success, several successful 
candidates that he met revealed that they had surprisingly not been required to pay 
anything. For those who had paid and were successful, he points out that since such 
transactions were invariably mediated through brokers, they could not be entirely 
certain that the broker had actually passed on the money and that it was the money 
that had garnered for them their jobs. He therefore speculates that talk about all 
pervasive corruption in India tends to exceed its actual practice and that this optical 
illusion is perpetuated by agents and brokers who use the opacity of recruitment 
processes to claim a role and price for their supposed mediation. Parry concludes that, 
‘functionaries become corrupt because everybody assumes that they are; and 
everybody pays because everybody assumes that they must’ (Parry, 2000, pp. 44–45). 
 
In a similar vein, I also find that anganwadi worker promotion in the ICDS was 
dominated by the understanding that money and brokers were required with senior, 
qualified and eligible anganwadi workers abstaining from the process for lack of funds. 
However, in contrast to Parry’s findings, I found that most candidates promoted from 
anganwadi workers to Supervisors claimed that they had indeed incurred kharch or 
costs, except for those promoted under the leadership of a particular Zilla Parishad 
CEO, who unanimously maintained that no payments were charged highlighting the 
instance as a specific exception. Thus, there was not as much of a disjunct between 
the talk and practice of corruption as postulated by Parry. 
 
Further, in the anganwadi worker promotion process, as in the recruitment process 
described by Parry, candidates struggled to find effective and trustworthy brokers. After 
much trial and error, my informants learnt to distinguish between political brokers and 
bureaucratic agents, but in a departure from much existing literature on the mediated 
local state, which emphasises the role of political brokers, concluded that the latter 
were more effective. This is not to say that brokers in Sundar Block, did not have the 
opportunity to obfuscate and claim undeserved credit and monies. Parry in the context 
of Bhilai describes how a key modus operandi of brokers was to obtain confidential and 
as yet unannounced interview or selection lists and then call the already finalised 
candidates with offers of help in return for money. Such practices might have been in 
operation in Sundar Block as well, were certainly more possible for bureaucratic 
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agents, but the experience of Shailaja Joshi during her failed attempt at a promotion in 
2001 suggests otherwise. Joshi madam had topped the merit list for the written exam 
and had correctly answered all the interview questions, yet her name was not on the 
final list of selected candidates. When she protested and threatened a hunger strike, 
the CEO showed her that it was the Deputy CEO of the ICDS who had scored her 
poorly on the interview. The only explanation was that she had refused to pay the 
amount demanded by the District ICDS Office or Zilla Kaksha clerk on the day of the 
interview. Thus, contrary to Parry, I find that there is not always a disjunct between the 
talk and practice of corruption and some brokers do actually represent decision makers 
such that failure to respond to their demands leads to a failed attempt at promotion. 
 
Transfers and Postings: As ICDS Supervisors and CDPOs are district government 
employees, they can be posted to any block within the district and can subsequently be 
transferred between these posts. Wade (1985, 1982), writing in the context of the 
Irrigation Department, describes a market for public office in which transfer posts are 
ranked and priced based on their access to amenities and possibilities of raising illicit 
revenue. The transfer market has backward and forward linkages such that 
commissions from the informal incomes raised from the selling of posts travel upwards 
through the bureaucratic hierarchy to form part of the political masters’ election finance 
while the funds spent to purchase posts are recovered through commissions on state 
contracts. I find that not much has changed since Wade’s analysis. Such a transfer 
system does operate in the ICDS and while I have little information about the forward 
linkages, the commissions from the takkewari system certainly represent the backward 
linkages of the system. However, given that anganwadi supplementary nutrition 
contracts are inherently small value contracts which do not vary significantly across 
centres (each anganwadi centre is expected to serve a population size within a specific 
range), beats and projects are ranked largely in terms of amenities rather than potential 
for illicit earnings. In this section, I explore the negotiations involved in the purchase of 
posts in the ICDS and the cultural capital required to successfully traverse such 
negotiations.  
 
Most Supervisors in the Sundar Block ICDS project, I found, selected their transfer 
posts for idiosyncratic rather than monetary reasons. Lata Shinde, the Supervisor of 
Laldera beat, had been posted in Sundar block for 11 years by 2015. She was due for 
a transfer but since she was from Sundar block and had a home and family there, was 
not keen to move. A Supervisor can request for a transfer after 5 years at a particular 
posting, known as vinanti badali, and after 10 years is eligible to be transferred by the 
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government, prashaskiya badali. Shinde madam had become eligible for a transfer in 
2014 itself but had managed to delay it for a year by paying Rs.5000.0 to the clerk at 
the Zilla Kaksha. However, no further delays were possible. Shinde madam had to 
choose her next block and beat or she would be assigned the posting that no one else 
wanted. Shinde madam wanted a quiet block and beat, away from the spotlight and 
inspections and visits. One of her daughters was based in Aurangabad city and she 
owned a house there as well, but ICDS projects in Aurangabad block (there were two) 
tended to be very active with several visits by state and central government officials. 
Moreover, the cost of a beat in Aurangabad was very high at Rs.50,000.0. Shinde 
madam consulted other Supervisors in the programme and finally settled on a beat in 
another border block fairly distant from Aurangabad city which cost only Rs.20,000.0 . 
However on joining her new posting, she found that she had been misinformed and 
that her new beat was quite far from the railway station. This was quite inconvenient as 
she planned to commute weekly from Sundar block to her beat to visit anganwadi 
centres. Shinde madam had to again pay her new CDPO to change her beat to one 
closer to the railway station. According to Wade madam, Shinde madam had 
significantly overpaid for the transfer. Hers had been a prashaskiya badali for which the 
rate was only Rs.5000.0, it is the transfer by request or vinanti badali, which 
commands a higher price. For instance, she herself paid only Rs.5000.0 for her 
prashasikiya badali from Sundar block town (her first posting after promotion and 
where she settled down with her family) to another block while she had to pay 
Rs.25,000.0 for her transfer back to Sundar block, a vinanti badali. The clerk at the 
Zilla Kaksha had demanded Rs.50,000.0 for the transfer to Sundar Block but since 
there were no other competing applications, she was able to negotiate the price down.   
 
Beat postings in transfer orders are assigned along with the block and project but can 
be changed by the CDPO after a year. A majority of the 8 supervisors in the Sundar 
block project reported paying the CDPO to change their beat to a more convenient one 
including Hira Mahadeo who wanted a beat that was easily accessible from 
Aurangabad city where she was based, Sulabha Wade who wanted a beat more 
accessible from her home in Sundar block town and Usha Thorat because of a conflict 
with an anganwadi worker.  A CDPO in another project to which Sulabha Wade had 
been transferred had demanded money from her to allow her to retain the beat that she 
had been posted to, threatening to transfer her to another if she did not comply. Wade 
madam argued that technically she could not be transferred before a year while the 
CDPO refused to allow her to take charge without paying up. The impasse was only 
broken when Wade madam complained to the Chairperson of the Panchayat Samiti, a 
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political leader, who was known to dislike the particular CDPO. The Panchayat Samiti 
leader called the CDPO and Wade madam was able to start work. 
 
According to the programme rules, Supervisors were expected to stay at their beat 
headquarter – a prominent revenue village in the beat after which the beat was named. 
Their travel allowance was calculated based on the distance travelled from the beat 
headquarter. However, none of the eight Supervisors in the project did so. All of them 
lived either in major towns of the block or in Aurangabad city. But they submitted to the 
Zilla Kaksha details of the house they rented in the beat headquarter including the 
name of the landlord as well as an undertaking that the information that they were 
providing was correct. Moreover, Supervisors were expected to submit a daily diary to 
the Project Office on the type of work (Monthly Progress Report, village and anganwadi 
centre visits, beat meetings and Project Office meetings) undertaken for each day of 
the month as well as their travel details. Their travel allowance (T.A.) bills were based 
on this daily dairy.  Given that Supervisors did not actually stay at their headquarters, 
much of the daily diary and consequently the TA bill was fabricated and the CDPO 
charged Supervisors 20 percent of the bill amount for approving it. This enabled 
programme rules to be fulfilled while allowing Supervisors to stay in locations more 
suited to their family needs. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I trace the functioning of a regime of informal incomes and payments in 
the ICDS and the ways in which it structures crucial programme processes such as 
anganwadi centre based supplementary nutrition, administrative processes such as 
promotions, transfers and postings as well as the links between the two. I highlight that 
much of this informality is not driven by political demands for election finance but rather 
is rooted in the un-implementability of bureaucratic rules, which leads state 
functionaries to improvise to address the practical realities of programme 
implementation. Poorly paid anganwadi workers contracted to supply hot cooked meals 
and snacks to pre-schoolers at low rates inflated attendance data and compromised 
food variety and quality to earn incomes, paying Supervisors and CDPOs 5 percent 
each of the monthly food bill or takkewari to allow these manipulations. The takkewari 
system enabled supplementary nutrition services to be delivered while simultaneously 
allowing all personnel in the Sundar Block ICDS Project hierarchy to earn an informal 
income. Anganwadi workers, whose informal incomes formed the base of the takkewari 
pyramid regarded these monies are legitimate earnings of private contractors, whereas 
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Supervisors used the funds to recover the money that they spent to acquire their 
promotion as well as pay for desirable posts and beats through transfers. Additionally 
they used the money to invest in property, marriages, businesses and jobs for their 
children. The sub-system of payments for promotions, transfers and postings was thus 
linked to the takkewari sub-system. However, although the former may also have also 
been a part of a vertical system of politically driven corruption, the latter was not. 
Barring occasional payments to opportunistic politicians, there were no regular 
commissions transferred to elected political leaders. In this way the takkewari system 
was entirely local. 
 
In this account of institutionalised sub-systems of informality potentially connected to 
larger political systems of election finance, what stands out are the many attempts by 
individual functionaries to influence the system in either direction – the Supervisors 
who want to charge more commission, the Supervisors who want to charge fines for 
other rule violations, the Supervisor who does not charge a commission, CDPOs of 
other blocks who don’t charge commissions and the District CEO who did not accept 
money for Supervisory promotions. These instances highlight that although 
institutionalised, bureaucratic practices are performatively and relationally produced 
through continuous negotiation of power and authority across bureaucratic levels. 
Institutionalised practices refer to systematised and regulated modes of conduct that 
emerge from specific discursive fields, in this case the informal rules governing the 
takkewari system or promotions in the ICDS. These rules regulate how anganwadi 
workers fill attendance registers or prepare monthly bills or how Supervisors negotiate 
costs for desirable posts during transfers. However the performativity of these rules 
also allows the opportunity to modify and resist them. Bureaucratic social fields, in this 
way are both determining as well as generative of conduct and at the same time 
inflected by conduct/practice itself. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Staging Standards: ISO Certification in the ICDS 
 
 
The first few anganwadi centres that I visited in Aurangabad district, soon after starting 
fieldwork in October 2014 were ISO certified. These were anganwadi centres that had 
been refurbished and decorated by ICDS functionaries, using funds raised from the 
local community and had been certified for quality using the internationally acclaimed 
ISO 9001:2008 process. For district officials, ISO certification of anganwadi centres 
was a unique feature of their district by which state run child development centres had 
been independently verified as meeting international quality standards. Aurangabad 
district had pioneered the ISO certification initiative and it was believed to have 
changed the face of the programme. It was upheld as emblematic of the innovation and 
enterprise of district ICDS programme functionaries, had brought fame and accolades 
to them and had subsequently been replicated across the state.  
 
One of the ISO certified anganwadi centres that I visited was located in a remote block. 
Because of the distances involved, I reached the block town only by mid-morning and 
by the time I found the anganwadi centre, it was 11 am. The anganwadi centre was 
located by the side of the main road and had a small garden enclosed by a compound 
wall and accessed by a small iron gate. The exterior and interior walls of the 
anganwadi were painted with attractive cartoons, the floor was covered by a vinyl sheet 
and the anganwadi centre furnished with a large, low, oval table and brightly coloured 
small chairs for the pre-schoolers. Play material including a plastic slide, rocking horse 
and portable basketball hoops were kept around the anganwadi, which appeared neat 
and clean. However there were no children present.  When I asked the anganwadi 
worker about the children, she nervously told me that she had already distributed the 
supplementary nutrition and let them go. (Pre-school activities were usually expected 
to be conducted till 12 noon). Since there were no children to observe, I proceeded to 
talk to the anganwadi worker about her field area, her work and the ISO certification 
experience. As we talked, the anganwadi worker locked up the anganwadi centre and 
we walked back to her house, where over cups of tea she shared that local political 
leaders had supported her to refurbish the anganwadi centre. The Chairperson of the 
Panchayat Samiti had contributed the compound wall, a woman Zilla Parishad member 
had donated play material and the Sarpanch of the village had built the walkway in the 
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garden. However, bursting into tears, she also revealed that she had to spend nearly 
Rs. 45,000 from her own pocket. The anganwadi worker shared that incurring this 
expenditure had created a lot of pressure on her. She had become the butt of jokes 
amongst the other anganwadi workers in the village who taunted her by pointing out 
that despite spending so much of her own money on the anganwadi centre, she still 
had to do the same work and still earned the same money as them. She was ridiculed 
within her extended family, including by her husband, for spending so much money and 
gaining nothing in return. She said, ‘I feel bad when I hear all this but console myself 
when visitors come to the anganwadi and praise me for the good work that I am doing.’ 
 
This chapter examines the ISO certification initiative of the Sundar Block ICDS as a 
project of local level state reform inspired by the ‘new public goods’ of ‘fiscal austerity, 
marketization, consensus, transparency and decentralization’ (Bear and Mathur, 2015). 
In the previous two chapters, I explored how the everyday practices of ICDS 
functionaries are constructed, negotiated and performed through interactions with local 
political relations and formal rules of the programme. In this chapter I consider the 
engagement of bureaucratic practices with reform initiatives.  
 
Scholarship on standardisation and audit based reform highlights that these processes 
are not neutral legal-rational techniques of quality assurance, competition and 
regulation but rather reshape conditions of work and conditions of thought to produce 
new relations of governance and power (Shore and Wright, 2000). However, Higgins 
and Larner (2010) highlight that techniques do not automatically lead to rationalities, 
such translation is mediated through the politics and problematics of implementation. 
Building on this insight, in this chapter I study the problematics of ISO 9001:2008 
quality management system implementation in the ICDS and its interaction with 
existing bureaucratic practices. 
 
I find that the ISO 9001:2008 quality management system standards were altered to 
suit ICDS programme needs and the redesigned standards implemented through 
existing bureaucratic practices of staging, patronage and investment. For ISO 
certification, anganwadi workers were expected to proactively and innovatively raise 
community contributions and refurbish their anganwadi centres to look like private pre-
schools. Instead, ICDS functionaries staged the audit, MIS records and financial 
receipts to reconcile resource constrained programme realities with programme rules 
and raised funds for ISO certification through their routine reliance on political 
patronage and personal investment. Mathur (2016) reveals that for most state 
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functionaries programmes can never actually be implemented as per the rules but it is 
their job to make it appear as if rules had been followed. Similarly, I find that in the 
context of ISO certification in the Sundar Block ICDS project, ICDS functionaries 
unable to implement the initiative through the expected model of entrepreneurial 
fundraising deployed routine practices to achieve ISO certification and make it appear 
as if subjectivities had been transformed and practices altered. 
 
This chapter consists of four main sections. The first section describes and analyses 
the ISO certification initiative. It details the origins of the initiative, growth, components, 
incentives as well as reviews research on standards and standardisation processes. 
The second section presents the implementation of ISO certification in Sundar Block 
detailing and analysing the three main practices employed by anganwadi workers for 
implementation – staging, patronage and investment. The section on staging 
elaborates the three main aspects of the ISO certification process that were staged – 
the audit, MIS records and financial receipts. The section on investment is followed by 
a section on the anganwadi workers struggle for regularisation which justifies their 
strategy of investment in the ICDS. The third section focuses on the impact of the ISO 
certification initiative followed by the conclusion.     
 
The ISO Certification Initiative 
 
I was introduced to the ISO certification initiative in the ICDS during my first visit to the 
Zilla Kaksha at the Aurangabad Zilla Parishad. After obtaining permission for field work 
from the Deputy CEO, I met the Extension Officer to learn about the ICDS programme 
in Aurangabad district and ISO certification featured heavily in his account. He strongly 
recommended that I visit ISO certified anganwadi centres in the district, of which there 
were nearly 600 by then, especially a few that he termed as ‘model anganwadi 
centres’. This emphasis on ISO certification as the defining feature of the ICDS 
programme in the district was replicated across ICDS Projects as well as Programme 
Officials. Every Project that I visited took me to see their ISO certified anganwadis 
while CDPOs and Supervisors gushed about its benefits. 
 
A supervisor, highly rated and awarded for her ISO Certification work, shared that this 
quality management technique had revitalised the anganwadi centre from a ‘smoke 
filled, grey, rundown place distributing khichdi to one or two dishevelled, runny nosed 
kids amongst dirt and flies to a bright, child-friendly preschool which was now 
competing with private preschools. ISO certified anganwadi centres were usually well 
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ventilated, pucca roofed, newly constructed buildings with a large main room, attached 
toilet, separate kitchen and a covered verandah in front. They were painted in gay, 
bright colours and decorated on the outside with large attractive cartoons whereas the 
inside walls had moral sayings and proverbs, digitally printed boards of fruits, 
vegetables, animals, birds, vehicles, Hindi and English alphabets and numbers, 
photographs of Hindu gods and goddesses and national and regional political leaders. 
Matching curtains were hung on doors and windows, sparkly streamers and bunting 
strung across the roof while the floor was covered with vinyl sheets referred to locally 
as ‘carpet’. ISO certified anganwadi centres were equipped with child friendly furniture- 
low tables and small chairs, a full-length low mirror and a desk and chair for the 
anganwadi worker. They usually had a water filter, an electricity connection and a 
working Indian-style toilet with a low sink although most did not have any running 
water. Some had toys, rocking horses and swings. Finally, children enrolled for pre-
school were given uniforms and identity cards. 
 
Variations in this general pattern included a garden with swings and slides, innovative 
furniture design such as variously shaped table chair combos and better equipment 
such as digital weighing scales and a television. Such variations were largely a function 
of resources. At the steep end of this resource continuum was one of the first ISO 
certified anganwadi centres that I was sent to visit in the district famous as the ‘hi-tech 
anganwadi’. It was known for its air-conditioning, phone connection, projector and 
colour TV and had been visited by senior officials from the state and the district as well 
as the State Minister for the Department of Women and Child Development, which 
administers the ICDS programme. Teams of panchayat members and ICDS workers 
from other districts also regularly visited the anganwadi to gain inspiration and create 
replicas in their villages. The anganwadi was located on a big plot of land, the majority 
of which was dedicated to a garden, which included a turf lawn, a rose garden, a play 
area for children with swings as well as a kitchen garden. The verandah had granite 
steps and vitrified floor tiles and a large steel and wood swing. The furniture inside was 
equally rich with a wooden glass display cabinet, steel and glass coffee table, large 
wooden office desk and an ergonomic swivel chair. The anganwadi had running water 
and the anganwadi worker was planning to install a water filter with a cooler as well as 
a biometric attendance system. More economical variations of ISO certified 
anganwadis included spruced up versions of older anganwadi centre buildings with tin 
roofs and walls painted with pictures of fruits and vegetables etc instead of digitally 
printed picture boards or posters. 
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For Anganwadi workers and Supervisors the central narrative underlying the ISO 
certification initiative was competition with private pre-schools. Several private 
preschools had come up in Sundar Block town and other major towns of the district in 
recent years, although the anganwadi was usually the only pre-school available at the 
village level. Private preschools were attended not only by urban children but also by 
children from nearby villages. Many anganwadi workers and Supervisors had also 
admitted their children and grandchildren to these private preschools rather than their 
anganwadis. According to the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) this shift 
is part of the larger but gradual movement from publicly provided education in 
government schools to private schools, at the primary level (NSSO, 2016). The NSSO 
attributes this change in rural areas primarily to the perception of a ‘better learning 
environment’ in private schools, poor quality in government schools and the desire to 
learn English. For Nambissan (2010) rising private school enrolment is linked to the 
perceived role of English medium private school education in social mobility. She 
traces this link to the colonial period when an english education in a private school 
modelled on the British public school was the route to wealth and power. The elite 
upper middle classes who accessed this education, went on to occupy crucial positions 
in the power structure and set the standards for a ‘good’ education. They were 
emulated in independent India by newly affluent middle castes who used these ‘public 
schools’ to convert economic capital into symbolic and social capital. The middle class 
flight from state schools began in the 1980s followed by the lower middle classes in the 
1990s such that government run schools are currently attended largely by poor 
children belonging to the lower castes and minorities.    
 
ICDS functionaries perceived the future of the ICDS programme to be in early 
childhood education and ISO certification was projected as the means to prepare the 
programme for its future. Anganwadi centres were thus prepped to look similar to 
private pre-schools and ISO certified with the belief that an upgraded look along with 
an internationally acclaimed third party verification of quality would convince parents 
that ICDS centres were not only equal in all ways to private pre-schools but superior in 
that they were also free.   
 
ISO certification is a process of independent verification of products, services and 
systems for quality, safety and efficiency against a set of internationally developed and 
accepted standards. The International Organisation for Standardization or ISO, an 
autonomous, non-governmental membership organisation of national standards bodies 
develops the standards through a system of technical committees and sub-committees 
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whereas the certification is conducted by independent agencies. Some of the most 
popular ISO standards include ISO/IEC 17025 Testing and Calibration Laboratories, 
ISO 9001 Quality Management, ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management, ISO 
14001 Environment Management, ISO 50001 Energy Management and ISO 45001 
Occupational Health and Safety. Almost all of these (besides ISO/IEC 17025) are 
management system standards or standards for the design and management of 
organisations rather than specific products and services. ISO 9001 Quality 
Management and ISO 14001 Environment Management standards are the most 
popular with nearly 1.3 million organisations across 178 countries adopting them by the 
end of 2010 (Heras-Saizarbitoria and Boiral, 2013). Anganwadi centres in Aurangabad 
district were certified for ISO 9001:2008 Quality Management System Standards. 
 
Given their widespread diffusion, international standards and standardisation 
processes have been studied to understand their impact on organisational systems 
and performance. They have been analysed for their role in facilitating international 
trade and the functioning of transnational corporations by addressing information 
asymmetries between potential exchange partners and providing market signals. In 
terms of their larger implications, standardisation and certification processes have been 
studied as a form of non-governmental, supranational regulation, and hybrid 
governance (Fonseca, 2015; Heras-Saizarbitoria and Boiral, 2013).  Finally, scholars of 
governmentality have analysed standards as a technology of rule that facilitates the 
‘conduct of conduct’, aids marketization and enables government at a distance (Gibbon 
and Henriksen, 2012, 2011; Higgins and Larner, 2010; Higgins and Hallstrom, 2007), 
the key features of neoliberal governance (Brown, 2015; Burchell, 1993; Rose, 1996). 
In this framework, standards, especially management system standards serve to 
propagate the core ‘practices of the self’ – internalised discipline, self-reporting and 
inspectability – for organisations and their workers (Gibbon and Henriksen, 2012). 
Organisations are expected to voluntarily adopt international standards for ensuring 
quality, managing environmental impact and risk, keeping accounts and so on, in 
response to market demands and through such self-regulation exercise the regulatory 
functions of government (Higgins and Hallstrom, 2007). Governance through standards 
enables government at a distance or the dispersal of regulation across a variety of 
institutions including international and national standard bodies, certification agencies 
and autonomised groupings such as the ‘business community’, ‘accounting 
community’, ‘consumers’, ‘parents’ etc (Higgins and Hallstrom, 2007). Finally, by 
providing a metrics of comparison, standards enable discrete units, whether 
businesses, organisations or individuals; private or public to compete with each other, 
		
129 
generating possibilities for the marketization of different aspects of human activity 
(Gibbon and Henriksen, 2012). Not the least of which, is a market in management 
standard related literature as well as experts and businesses focused on consulting, 
auditing and certification (Higgins and Hallstrom, 2007). 
 
For Power (2003), the ISO 9001 quality management certification is part of the line of 
‘quality assurance’ ideas that formed a crucial base for the audit explosion of the 1980s 
and 1990s. This audit explosion represented a rise of ‘control of control’ in which ‘… 
first- order questions of quality…(were)…subordinate to a logic of management system 
integrity, and in which audit serve(d) a virtualist form of ‘meta-regulation’.’ (Power, 
2003, p. 189) The ISO 9001 standards focused on an organisation’s management 
system for defining and monitoring performance rather than people, practices and 
products, a shift that enabled a variety of complex operations such as schools, 
hospitals and the police force to become ‘auditable’. Quality certification was achieved 
by demonstrating the existence of mechanisms of quality control rather than good 
teaching, caring, manufacturing or banking. The focus on management systems rather 
than first order performance objectives homogenised and standardised audit processes 
making them cost-effective and economical and thereby facilitating their proliferation. 
Audit processes in turn lead to organisations reshaping themselves into auditable 
commodities, adopting the norms, procedures and subjectivities demanded by 
auditors. 
 
Governmentality analyses of standards are based on a distinction between the 
rationalities and technologies of governing such that technologies are the means for 
making rationalities of rule possible in programmatic form. For Gibbon and Henriksen 
(2012, 2011) much of this analysis focuses on the underlying links between techniques 
and rationalities and their implications for practices of governing, but there is not as 
much research on the contexts from which these technologies emerge and their 
translations into neoliberal political programmes. Similarly, Higgins and Larner (2010) 
argue that governmentality analyses of standards tend to study technologies of 
governing from the perspective of ‘programmers’ rather than the everyday problematics 
of implementation. They highlight that while technical devices can enact political 
programmes at a distance, they can also act in contradiction to intended political 
objectives.  Building on this argument, in this chapter, I explore the problematics of ISO 
9001:2008 quality management system certification in the Aurangabad district ICDS 
programme. 
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While standardisation processes are expected to generate an enterprising subjectivity, 
the ISO initiative in Aurangabad district itself emerged from a programme context that 
valued innovation and enterprise by functionaries. Historically, the district had been the 
centre of two nationally recognised and lauded innovative initiatives on addressing 
child undernutrition – the Marathwada Initiative (2001-2004) which grew into the 
Rajmata Jijau Mother-Child Health and Nutrition Mission (RJMCHN) (2005 onwards).  
The RJMCHN was a state-wide nutrition mission which built on the many learnings of 
the Marathwada Initiative. It was subsequently replicated in different states. RJMCHN 
worked specifically by encouraging innovative thinking, building capacity among front 
line workers and fostering ownership, leadership and motivation amongst them. One of 
the main strategies for motivating workers was by promoting healthy rivalry, rating 
performance and offering rewards (R4D and Amaltas, 2016; Ramani, 2011). 
Subsequently, a focus on innovation was built into ICDS programme processes such 
that Sundar Block Project Supervisors, in their performance report for 2013-14 and 
plan for 2014-15, were mainly required to state the innovative initiatives they had 
implemented in the previous year and were planning for the next. Inspired by this 
‘enterprise culture’ a dynamic Supervisor raised community contributions for upgrading 
the appearance of and facilities in anganwadis of her beat. The Supervisor and her 
CDPO then approached a local firm for ISO 9001:2008 certification and initially had 
three anganwadi centres ISO certified. Enthused by this work, the Deputy CEO in-
charge of administering the ICDS at the district level at the time, encouraged other 
CDPOs and Supervisors to replicate these efforts and the initiative spread. The 
Supervisor who started ISO 9001 certification was widely feted and recognised for her 
work including by senior state and district level bureaucrats, the local MP and MLA and 
officials of UNICEF. Articles were published in the local newspaper about her and she 
received several awards including best supervisor, best employee and best woman 
employee, the last two from the Governor and the Chief Minister of Maharashtra 
respectively. When I met the Supervisor in October 2014, she was the proud 
administrator of a Whatsapp group of state bureaucrats, UNICEF officials, Deputy 
CEOs, CDPOs and Supervisors from across the state, set up to share innovative 
practices and initiatives implemented in their respective areas. The Deputy CEO under 
whose leadership ISO certification spread across the district was also widely credited 
with the transformation and revitalisation of the ICDS and received a promotion for his 
efforts. 
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However, it is also important to note that the ISO 9001 quality management system 
standardisation process followed for anganwadi centres in Aurangabed district was 
quite different from that specified by ISO. According to Hoyle (2001), the five main 
requirements of ISO 9001 (condensed from the 250 or so specific ones) are: (1) the 
organisation should determine the needs and expectations of customers and other 
interested parties; (2) it should establish policies, objectives and a work environment 
necessary to motivate workers to satisfy these needs; (3) it should design, resource 
and manage a series of interconnected processes necessary to implement the policy 
and attain the objectives; (4) it should measure and analyse the adequacy, efficiency 
and effectiveness of each process in fulfilling its purpose and objectives; and (5) it 
should pursue the continual improvement of the system from an objective evaluation of 
its performance. In contrast, the process followed in Aurangabad focused on the 
standardisation of anganwadi infrastructure, interiors, equipment, education material 
and pre-school skills, that is, on outputs rather than the quality management system. 
An Aurangabad based consultancy firm, that had certified nearly 1000 anganwadi 
centres, interpreted the ISO 9001:2008 quality management system requirements for 
anganwadi centres in terms of a list of 89 parameters which were used for rating 
anganwadi centres during the daylong ISO audit. Each parameter has a specific 
maximum score such that every anganwadi centre was rated out of a total of 359 
points.  The parameters could be roughly categorised under 15 broad heads. The 8 
main heads that accounted for 78 percent of the parameters and almost 80 percent of 
the points were as follows:  
Table 6: Parameters used for rating anganwadi centres 
 
S. 
No. 
Category Number of 
Parameters 
Points Percentage 
 
1 Pre-school skills 14 57 16 
2 Interiors 10 43 12 
3 Educational material 13 37 10 
4 Infrastructure & Fittings 7 35 10 
5 Services 11 32 9 
6 Neatness & Cleanliness 6 30 8 
7 Records 2 30 8 
8 Beneficiary Interviews 6 20 6 
 Total 69 284 79 
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Amongst these 8 heads, 4 related to the infrastructure and material available in the 
anganwadi and its upkeep whereas the other 4 referred to the services provided, with 
the former accounting for half the parameters and points. The specific parameters 
developed were often quite simple such as those under the head ‘Interiors’ which 
included checking for the provision of a mirror, dustbin, shoe stand etc, the head 
‘educational material’ which involved checking for specific charts such as those on 
animals, parts of body etc, the head ‘infrastructure and fittings’ which included checking 
for the availability of a toilet, wash basin etc and the head ‘pre-school skills’ which 
included singing of 3 specific Hindi, English and Marathi songs. The four service-
related categories were dominated by demonstrable ‘pre-school skills’ which accounted 
for 41 percent of the 139 total service-related points while all other services accounted 
for a mere 23 percent. The main auditor was particularly focused on the pronunciation 
of English numbers and alphabets by anganwadi workers and checked them for their 
Marathi accent. He had recorded videos of anganwadi workers reciting numbers and 
letters with an American or English accent and played them at every opportunity. 
 
Further differences between ISO standardisation processes and the process followed 
in Aurangabad relate to the understanding of the ‘organisation’ being standardised and 
certified. While each district level ICDS programme could be regarded as an 
organisation given that all ICDS employees were district government staff (although 
programme policies are still set at the state and central government level) and each 
ICDS project could be regarded as a unit of such an organisation, the standardisation 
process followed in Aurangabad district treated every anganwadi centre as an 
independent organisation that needed to standardise and certify its quality 
management system. Anganwadi centres were voluntarily registered for ISO 
certification by the worker and the concerned Supervisor by paying the audit fees of 
Rs. 6500.0 per anganwadi centre. This was a significant sum for Sundar block even 
though it was a reduction from the initial price of Rs.10,000.0 per anganwadi centre 
charged by the consultancy firm for the first set of ISO certified anganwadi centres. 
During my fieldwork, I observed the Sundar Block CDPO and Supervsior discuss the 
possibility of shifting to other cheaper consultancy firms because of their discomfort 
with the fees being charged. A Supervisor even highlighted the incongruity and 
perverse incentives in the auditee directly paying the auditor for the certification.   
 
On registration, anganwadi workers were to be trained on the ISO requirements, but 
this was rarely done. Post audit, the consultancy firm awarded ISO 9001:2008 
certificates that said, ‘This is to certify that Quality Management System of Anganwadis 
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(Name of ICDS Project) (List of Anganwadis) has been assessed and found to conform 
to the requirements of ISO 9001:2008 for the following scope: to implement 
government policies run by ICDS for the children between age group of 0 to 6, to 
enhance the services towards pregnant women, lactating mothers, teenagers girls, to 
remove malnutrition completely, to improve and maintain sound standard of pre-school 
education’. The consultancy firm that had devised the ISO certification process for 
anganwadis in Aurangabad and conducted the audits did not have the necessary 
accreditation for issuing ISO certificates. ISO certificates were issued in partnership 
with a Delhi based accredited firm. Although ISO certification as a process of third 
party, ‘independent’ verification holds the promise of greater accountability and 
transparency, the initiative in Aurangabad district exemplifies that audit processes 
themselves can be quite vague and non-transparent (Higgins and Larner, 2010). For 
Power (2003), however audits make little contribution towards the goal of transparency 
and are more likely to foreclose questioning rather than stimulate it. 
 
Implementation of ISO certification in Sundar block 
 
In the Sundar block ICDS project 61 of 235 anganwadi centres were ISO certified. The 
ISO certification process in the project began in 2013-14 under the leadership of the 
previous CDPO when for the first time 23 anganwadi centres across the 8 beats were 
ISO certified. In that year each beat had a target of ISO certifying at least 1 anganwadi 
centre. In the second year, this number was raised to 5 per beat. The table below 
details ISO certification in Sundar block: 
 
Table 7: ISO certification of anganwadi centres in Sundar Block 
 
S. 
No. 
Beat Number of 
anganwadi 
centres 
Number of anganwadi centres 
ISO certified 
2013-14 2014-15 
1 Laldera 33 1 5 
2 Rajegaon 30 1 5 
3 A 24 5 2 
4 B 30 2 5 
5 C 35 3 5 
6 D 31 5 8 
7 E 24 3 4 
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8 F 28 3 5 
 Total 235 23 39 
  
ISO certificates to the 39 anganwadi centres that successfully cleared the audit in 
2014-15 were distributed in a grand function attended by anganwadi workers and 
Supervisors from across the district. The event was organised at a large public 
auditorium in Aurangabad city and graced by dignitaries such as the CEO of the 
Aurangabad Zilla Parishad, the Deputy CEO, Women and Child Department, the 
Chairperson of the Aurangabad Panchayat Samiti, the Chairperson Education & Health 
Committee, Aurangabad Zilla Parishad and the Chairperson of Sillod Panchayat 
Samiti. The function honoured CDPOs who had contributed significantly towards ISO 
certification in the district including the CDPO in whose project the first anganwadi 
centre was ISO certified. It also conferred awards on 7 ‘Double Digit Supervisors’, 
those who had ensured the ISO certification of more than 9 anganwadi centres in their 
beats, a number which ranged from 10-25. These honours included an award for the 
previous CDPO of Sundar Block project who had achieved the certification of 62 
anganwadi centres in the project as well the Sundar Block Supervisor who had 
completed the certification of 13 anganwadi centres in her beat. The certificates 
awarded to individual anganwadi centres were received by the anganwadi worker but 
also usually by the Sarpanch of the village gram panchayat along with other members. 
 
Once an anganwadi worker had agreed for ISO certification, the implementation 
process began through her attempts to raise money for the audit fees and collecting 
information on the ISO requirements. The latter was usually accomplished by 
contacting anganwadi workers with ISO certified anganwadis or Supervisors who had 
successfully facilitated such certification. Anganwadi workers and Supervisors then 
estimated the work needed to refurbish an anganwadi centre to the expected standard 
and began the all-important process of raising the financial resources required. 
Anganwadi centres located in peri-urban areas, such as the ‘hi-tech’ anganwadi centre, 
were able to raise substantial contributions from nearby businesses and industries, 
with Supervisors and even CDPOs holding meetings with owners and managers to 
convince them of the genuineness of the cause. However such resource raising was 
far more difficult for the majority of anganwadis located in rural areas. Anganwadi 
workers predominantly used the following three strategies for the implementation of 
ISO certification - staging, patronage and investment. 
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1. Staging ISO requirements 
 
As the ISO certification was based on a visit by the auditors to the anganwadi centre 
on a fixed day, anganwadi workers laboured to make their fulfilment of ISO 
requirements visible to external auditors on that day. The Anganwadi centre was 
spruced up, records readied for inspection, children coached to recite poems, songs, 
alphabets and numbers, beneficiaries readied for interviews, gram panchayat members 
gathered as a welcoming committee on behalf of the village – the whole procedure 
taking on ‘…the feel of an artificial and staged performance’ (Shore and Wright, 2000, 
p. 72). I examine three aspects of the staging of ISO requirements in detail – facilities, 
records and financial receipts.  
 
Staging facilities: Shore and Wright (2000) and Kipnis (2008) have noted that 
performance audits typically include an element of staging - universities run dress 
rehearsals for Total Quality Assessment visits, tutoring students and teachers on what 
to say and what not to say (Shore and Wright, 2000); while school students put on 
performances and give speeches (Kipnis, 2008). The anganwadi ISO audits also 
featured such formalised and choreographed elements but in this case the theatricality 
was extended to the anganwadi centre, which functioned almost as a stage. Many 
facilities displayed during the audit were withdrawn once it was completed and the 
certification obtained. Most common among these were audio-visual appliances such 
as television and VCR/DVD players, furniture and decorations. Electronic appliances 
were usually borrowed from the anganwadi workers’ home or extended family and 
returned after the audit. In some instances, anganwadi furniture such as small plastic 
chairs for pre-schoolers and/or desk and chair for the anganwadi worker were also 
borrowed, the small chairs from other anganwadi centres which had already been 
audited and the desk and chair from the panchayat office. Other anganwadi centre 
facilities were organised for the audit and subsequently displayed but rarely used. 
These included consumables that were costly to replace, instruments and furnishing 
which would wear and tear through use as well as facilities that required regular 
maintenance. The Shanwadi ISO certified anganwadi centre displayed toothbrushes 
and combs for pre-schoolers which were never used. Children were rarely given the 
toys to play. Electric fittings were only occasionally switched on. One anganwadi centre 
rolled up and put away the floor carpet. Many put away the expensive furniture- it was 
not unusual to find anganwadi centres with furniture stacked high on the side and 
children sitting on mats on the floor. Preschoolers were not encouraged to use the 
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anganwadi toilet or steel utensils either to avoid the cleaning that would be 
subsequently required and/or because of the lack of water/running water. The 
reluctance of Maratha caste functionaries to clean up after the formerly untouchable 
caste children also played a role. Water filters were packed up and put away and 
children asked to bring their own water to avoid the responsibility of providing safe 
drinking water. What remained were the building, the wall paintings and digital 
boards/posters and some of the decorations. The rational and objective method of third 
party certification did not actually communicate the true picture. 
 
However, in the ICDS programme, it is important to note that staging was not only 
limited to occasional audits but was a regular feature of programme performance 
especially during official visits. As Ferguson and Gupta (2002) and  Gupta (2001) 
highlight, the ICDS programme had a practice of surprise inspection visits by senior 
officials (above the supervisory level) to anganwadi centres. The objective was to 
‘swoop down’ on unsuspecting anganwadi workers, take stock of the true status of 
service delivery such as the attendance of pre-school children and accordingly 
encourage, reward, discipline and punish. Ferguson and Gupta refer to a blue coloured 
UNICEF jeep used by the CDPO for these inspections in the block in UP studied by 
Gupta, with the dust raised by the jeep acting as a smoke signal for anganwadi 
workers to quickly gather children in the anganwadi centre. In a definitive sign of the 
‘national’ nature of the ICDS, the Sundar Block project also had a blue UNICEF jeep 
that the CDPO used for her surprise inspections. However, given changing times, it 
was not clouds of dust that signalled its approach but rather mobile phone calls. 
Supervisory beats in the ICDS were determined by ease of travel such that adjacent 
anganwadi centres along a particular route were part of the same beat. As soon as an 
anganwadi worker or her extended family members spotted the distinctive blue ICDS 
jeep on a particular route, the message was sent to all anganwadi centres in that beat 
and on that route. Anganwadi centres were cleaned, the entrance decorated with 
rangoli, children were called in and menu wise supplementary nutrition prepared. Often 
the driver of the jeep would initiate the signal based on his connections with the 
anganwadi workers on the route. For more senior officials from the district, the 
signalling network included the Supervisors and the CDPO as well.       
  
Staging records: ISO auditors as well as other visitors to an anganwadi centre, 
checked the many registers that anganwadi workers maintained, on the different 
services that they provided, as part of the programme MIS. According to Ferguson and 
Gupta (2002) the registers served three inter-related purposes – they were tools for 
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self monitoring or self-discipline, they enabled surveillance of the allocated population 
and simultaneously allowed surveillance of the anganwadi workers. While some 
aspects of ICDS service delivery such as pre-school attendance and provision of a hot 
cooked meal could be staged at short notice, this was not possible for the anganwadi 
registers. However the data in the registers could be and was manipulated over time. 
Anganwadi centre data was the foundation on which the performance of the 
programme at the beat, the block, the district, the division and the state level was 
determined. It was therefore under tremendous pressure to meet the performance 
expectations at each of these levels or to appear to have met them. I detail the staging 
of ICDS records by examining the collection, recording and reporting of child 
undernutrition data.   
 
A key objective of the ICDS is to reduce the prevalence of undernutrition amongst 
children in the early years of life. Towards this objective it tracked the growth of all 
children registered in the programme through monthly measurement of their weight 
and height, determined their nutritional status in terms of underweight, stunting and 
wasting and accordingly provided supplementary nutrition and access to health 
services. Data on nutritional status and service delivery was reported on a monthly 
basis by each anganwadi centre through a format known as the Monthly Progress 
Report (MPR). To demonstrate programme effectiveness and their own performance, 
Anganwadi workers were under pressure to reduce the number undernourished 
children and raise the percentage of normal children in the MPR. While this resulted in 
many anganwadi workers like Mangala Narke and Shabana Syed tracking cases of 
undernutrition, making home visits, giving nutritional advice and distributing 
supplementary nutrition, anganwadi workers also followed a set of informal reporting 
rules to keep their numbers in the expected range.  
 
The anthropometric measurements of children (weight for age, height for age and 
weight for height) were classified into 3 categories based on their position in the 
population distribution charts/tables, namely normal, underweight/stunted/wasted, and 
severely underweight/stunted/wasted. These 3 categories were colour coded into 
green, yellow and red respectively for ease of use and recall. An important informal 
rule prevalent in the Sundar Block Project was that children in red on any of the three 
parameters and/or those who suffered severe and moderate acute malnutrition were 
always reported in the MPR as they were at a higher risk and needed immediate 
attention. An unattended malnutrition death would have repercussions for the 
anganwadi worker concerned and hence workers were more vigilant. Moreover, the 
		
138 
ICDS programme was able to access funds available in the public health system for 
the care and rehabilitation of such children through an initiative referred to as the 
Village Child Development Centre (VCDC). This served as an incentive for the 
reporting of such cases. However, a related rule was that children who had undergone 
3 rounds of VCDC and had not improved but had no medical complaints were no 
longer reported. 
 
While children in the red zone were almost always reported, there was more ambiguity 
about the reporting of children in the yellow zone as these were usually the numbers 
that were trimmed to maintain the expected range. For instance, one of the informal 
rules was that babies below 6 months of age in the yellow zone were not to be 
reported. A senior anganwadi worker explained that since such young infants were 
expected to be exclusively breastfed not much intervention was possible till after 6 
months of age. Another practice was that children who were 100-200 gms short of 
normal nutritional status were reported as normal. Mangala Narke of Shanwadi justified 
this practice by arguing that if the children were weighed on a full stomach they would 
be at least 150-200 gms heavier. Meera Kale of Mangaon, on the other hand accepted 
that this was done to keep the proportion of undernourished children small but 
defended the practice by revealing that she would inform the parent about the true 
weight and nutritional status of the child and advice them to improve it. Narke madam 
also shared that differently abled children in the yellow zone who did not improve and 
were not ill, were not reported because their poor nutrition was attributed to their 
disability. 
 
Additionally, Narke madam, the most senior and experienced anganwadi worker of 
Laldera beat revealed that anganwadi workers were not always able to weigh all 
children registered with them every month - a few would usually be missed out. In such 
cases, if the child had been in the green zone previously and had not fallen ill that 
month, an increase in weight of 200 gm could easily be recorded. Similarly for height 
an increase of 1 cm could be recorded over 3 months. However she stressed that such 
a projection should only be done for 1 month, after which the child should be weighed. 
She also emphasised that children in the yellow and red zone should be weighed every 
month.  
 
While these manipulations were a result of performance targets, other were caused by 
excessive workloads. For instance, Narke madam also had the responsibility for 
another anganwadi in her village for which an anganwadi worker was yet to be 
		
139 
recruited. Sanctioned anganwadis which did not yet have a dedicated anganwadi 
worker were typically assigned to the nearest experienced anganwadi worker who did 
not receive any extra honorarium for her additional labour. In the Sundar Block Project, 
there were 29 such anganwadi centres for which anganwadi workers were 
subsequently recruited. Narke’s madam second anganwadi was in a distant hamlet at 
least 2 km away from the village centre and it was not practically feasible for her to 
serve both anganwadis simultaneously. Resultantly, her MPR for the second 
anganwadi was largely fabricated based on her few and occasional interactions with 
the children and their parents. 
 
The MPRs submitted by individual anganwadi centres were aggregated at the beat 
level by the Supervisors. Supervisors had their own informal practices for such 
aggregation. Lata Shinde, the Supervisor of Laldera beat revealed that instead of  
relying on the MPRs submitted by the anganwadi workers which tended to be riddled 
with mistakes, she preferred to work backwards based on the percentage of ‘normal’ 
children expected by the Zilla Kaksha – more than 94 percent. First, she estimated the 
number of children weighed from the total population of children in the 0-6 year age 
group in her beat. According to her this number needed to be a high but realistic 97-98 
percent. She then calculated 94-95 percent of the total children weighed in her beat to 
arrive at the number of children with normal growth and from the remaining number of 
children subtracted those in the red category to estimate the number of children in the 
yellow category.   
 
I observed Shinde Madam, who was responsible for preparing the Project level MPR 
for the months of October, November and December, also make similar adjustments to 
the Project level MPR. Based on data submitted by the Supervisors of other beats Lata 
Shinde filled in the ‘Classification of Nutritional Status by Weight for Age’ table in the 
Project level MPR form as depicted in Table 8. She found that in three columns the 
number of children weighed exceeded the total number of children in the survey 
(shaded). Moreover the total number of children weighed was 99 percent of the total 
number of children in the survey. This was too high and not realistic and needed to be 
changed. Shinde Madam adjusted data in the three problematic columns as well as 
reduced the total number of children weighed by reducing the number of normal 
children as the total number of children weighed is a sum of the children in the Normal, 
Underweight and Severely Underweight categories. The adjusted figures are depicted 
in Table 9. Working backwards, Shinde Madam also adjusted the beat wise data from 
which these totals were supposed to be derived. These adjustments are depicted in 
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Table 10. Narke madam’s rules and Shinde’s madam adjustments were representative 
of the practices by which anganwadi workers and Supervisors of the ICDS reconciled 
programme objectives with workloads and performance targets. 
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Table 10: Adjustments made by Supervisor Lata Shinde to ICDS Project MPR 
 Data Reported by Supervisors Shinde Madam’s changes 
Beat Number 
of 0-6 yr 
olds 
weighed 
Normal MUW SUW Number 
of 0-6 yr 
olds 
weighed 
Normal MUW SUW 
A 2236 2134 87 15 2226 2124 87 15 
B 2010 1975 26 9 2000 1965 26 9 
C 2556 2442 92 22 2536 2422 92 22 
D 2447 2257 149 41 2427 2237 149 41 
E 2900 2759 117 24 2890 2749 117 24 
F 2649 2492 127 30 2639 2482 127 30 
G 2788 2688 73 27 2780 2680 73 27 
H 2564 2370 161 33 2560 2367 160 33 
Total 20150 19117 832 201 20058 19026 831 201 
 
 
Staging receipts: Anganwadi workers in Rajegaon and Laldera beats spent 
significant sums of money on the ISO certification of their anganwadis. In Laldera the 
total money spent by the 6 ISO certified anganwadi centres ranged from Rs.16,000.0 
to Rs.76,000.0 whereas the 6 ISO certified anganwadi centres in Rajegaon spent 
Rs.8,000.0 to Rs. 40,000.0. More money was spent by those workers who needed to 
repair or complete the construction of their anganwadi centre building compared to 
others whose buildings were in a better condition. Workers in Laldera spent more 
money than Rajegaon as they invested in electric fittings and connection, variously 
shaped table chair combos made of iron and plywood and put up digitally printed 
posters mounted on wooden frames. In contrast, anganwadis in Rajegaon were more 
economical and used colourful wall paintings and simple plastic chairs and did not opt 
for electricity. According to a majority of anganwadi workers with ISO certified centres, 
there were three main sources of funds – the Sarpanch, the untied fund available to the 
Village Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Committee of the village gram panchayat and 
the anganwadi worker herself. In Laldera beat 36 percent of the total funds spent on 
ISO certification were sourced from the VHSNC, 38 percent contributed by anganwadi 
workers and 20 percent provided by the Sarpanch. In Rajegaon, nearly half the funds 
spent or 48 percent were sourced from the VHSNC, 37 percent from the anganwadi 
worker and only 14 percent from the Sarpanch. Community contribution, which was 
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touted as the main route to raise money for such innovation, was negligible. Model 
anganwadi centres such as the hi-tech anganwadi had successfully raised hundreds of 
thousands of rupees in donations because they were located near industrial areas. 
However, both Laldera and Rajegaon beat extended across agricultural areas so it was 
not feasible for them to raise such monies.   
 
The Village Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Committee (VHSNC), which provided the 
bulk of the money used for certification, was allocated funds under the National Health 
Mission (NHM) of the public health system. VHSNC funds were categorised as untied 
funds in the Mission and their use was to be governed by the VHSNC, chaired by the 
Sarpanch within the framework of issued guidelines. These included expenses on 
transport for pregnant women, children and other patients, immunisation sessions, 
nutrition for undernourished children, repairs to the water supply system, malaria 
prevention and so on. Each revenue village had a VHSNC, which covered all 
anganwadi centres in the village. One of the anganwadi workers was chosen to be the 
secretary of the VHSNC either by mutual agreement between the anganwadi workers 
or by the Supervisor. According to national guidelines, each VHSNC was expected to 
receive Rs.10,000.0 as an untied fund annually. However the Government of 
Maharashtra had opted for population-based disbursement of funds to account for 
differences in village size and thereby the need for funds. Under the active instructions 
of the CDPO and Supervisors, the ISO certification initiative drew heavily on these 
funds available in the VHSNC account, jointly operated by the Sarpanch and the 
anganwadi worker. There were two main modes of fund utilisation - either the entire 
annual sum allocated to the village was given to the anganwadi centre registered for 
ISO certification or an equal amount made available to all the anganwadi centres under 
the VHSNC to undertake improvements even if they were not opting for certification. 
There were few, if any actual meetings of the VHSNC and the use of the funds was 
entirely determined by the Chairperson and Secretary - the Sarpanch and the 
anganwadi worker, respectively. 
 
In the last quarter of the 2014-15 financial year, the Sundar Block Project Office 
received a copy of a letter sent by the Director, NHM to the Chief Executive Officer of 
all Zilla Parishads which directed that VHSNC funds should be utilised as per the 
recommendations in the VHSNC guidebook issued to all districts. The guidelines 
suggested that 60 percent of the VHSNC untied fund should be spent on health issues, 
20 percent on nutrition, 10 percent on sanitation and 10 percent on water supply. The 
letter further stated that in the financial years 2011-12, 12-13, 13-14 it had been 
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observed that most of the nutrition funds had been utilised towards the repair of 
anganwadi centre furniture (8.22 percent), purchase of toys and weighing machine (5 
percent) and repair and painting of the anganwadi centre building (6.64 percent). It 
pointed out that this was against guidelines and hence not acceptable and directed that 
for the year 2014-15 it should be ensured that expenditure is shared across all other 
objectives of the VHSNC and not just nutrition. This letter caused mild consternation at 
the Project Office but much concern to anganwadi workers. The CDPO simply 
instructed her Supervisors to direct anganwadi workers to procure bills for VHSNC 
expenditure that would conform to the requirements outlined in the letter. But at the 
Laldera beat meeting held at the Primary Health Centre, the Medical Officer informed 
anganwadi workers that as the Secretary of the VHSNC they would be held 
accountable for unauthorised use of VHSNC funds. Anganwadi workers had merely 
been following orders of ICDS officials in using VHSNC funds for anganwadi centre 
refurbishment but the ICDS had no decision making authority over VHSNC funds. They 
were therefore required to cover up, through false bills, for allowing the ICDS 
programme’s use of VHSNC funds for ISO certification. Such staging of VHSNC 
expenditure receipts represented yet another instance when ICDS functionaries at the 
project level improvised or engaged in jugaad to fulfil programme directives. 
 
Mathur (2016) finds that state functionaries often differentiate between ‘asli zindagi’ 
(real life) and ‘sarkari zindagi’ (state life), where the latter refers to the official version of 
state programmes laboriously produced through a variety of documents. The distinction 
between the official and the real, according to Mathur, is based on the functionaries’ 
understanding that state programmes can never actually be implemented by the 
rulebook but it is their job to make it appear as if the rules have been followed, as if 
goals have been achieved. For Mathur, the sarkari version of programmes is produced 
essentially on kagaz (paper), whereas field visits and meetings reveal the gap between 
‘paper truths’ and the real. In the context of the ICDS however, I find that the staging of 
performance is not only limited to paper but extends across meetings and visits as well.  
 
2. Political patronage 
 
Political patronage was the second strategy used by anganwadi workers to raise 
resources for ISO certification. It was also the primary means through which 
anganwadi workers engaged with the ICDS programme administration. The patronage 
of the Sarpanch and subsequently the MLA was critical for their recruitment into the 
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ICDS (see Chapter 3) and was also called upon to manage any disciplinary action as 
well as unjustified and excessive demands for commissions and other informal 
payments by senior officials (see Chapter 5). Anganwadi workers therefore turned to 
their village Sarpanch for support for the ISO certification of their anganwadis as well. 
In Shanwadi, the anganwadi worker with the ISO certified anganwadi, Ranjana Wakde, 
credited the Sarpanch for the anganwadi centre building, for which he had directly 
executed the construction contract. Although funds for anganwadi centre construction 
were provided by the district government, the Sarpanch was acknowledged for not 
cutting corners and using the best available material, as well as investing some of his 
own money to build a boundary wall for the verandah. In contrast in another village of 
the same beat, the Sarpanch left the anganwadi centre building of a worker, related to 
his political rival, incomplete, preventing her from submitting her anganwadi for ISO 
certification. In Rajegaon beat, Sarpanchs contributed to pay the audit fees. Sarpanch 
contributions to ISO certification reinforced their position as the ‘big-men’ or patrons of 
the village and they were honoured as such during the grand function for the 
distribution of ISO certificates.    
 
3. Investment 
 
Anganwadi worker contributions were the third strategy and the second major source 
of funding for ISO certification. When I asked anganwadi workers why they spent their 
own money for ISO certification several shared the same underlying reason – they 
considered it an investment into their future in the programme. Some said that since 
they expected to work at the anganwadi centre till retirement, they did not mind 
investing some money to make it a pleasant place to work. Others saw it as an 
extension of the expenditure incurred in obtaining the job. Still others revealed that they 
did not have a real choice. They were compelled by their Supervisors who in turn were 
working under the pressure of the CDPO and the Deputy CEO. The premium placed 
on new ideas and practices -- ‘innovation’ -- in terms of awards, recognition, fame and 
promotions meant that senior programme officials zealously pursued ISO certification. 
When community contributions to meet the requirements of ISO certification, were not 
forthcoming, they pressured the junior most ICDS functionary- the anganwadi worker to 
meet the gap. Anganwadi workers were particularly susceptible to this pressure not 
only because they were the lowest ranking workers of the programme but also 
because they were volunteers, paid an honorarium less than the minimum wage. All 
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the justifications used by anganwadi workers to contribute to programme expenses 
were essentially about spending money to keep their jobs.  
 
The voluntary status of anganwadi workers not only deprived them of a fair wage and 
benefits but also increased job insecurity. In the Sundar Block ICDS project, poor 
performance of anganwadi workers routinely provoked threats of dismissal by the 
Supervisor and the CDPO. While Supervisors were disciplined through confidential 
reports and threats of suspension, anganwadi workers were disciplined through pay 
cuts and threats of dismissal. The vulnerability of anganwadi workers and the 
tenuousness of their position was highlighted by the treatment meted out to Mala 
Kulkarni, a senior anganwadi worker of Laldera beat. I only met Mala Kulkarni towards 
the end of my fieldwork. She had suffered a stroke in November 2014 while working in 
the anganwadi centre. She had been carrying a vessel full of food when she collapsed. 
She was rushed to the hospital and was only able to rejoin work after 7 months in June 
2015. When she came to the Project Office to submit her rejoining letter, the CDPO 
cautioned her that the programme would not tolerate any laxity on her part and that she 
should rejoin only if she felt fully capable of fulfilling all her responsibilities as an 
anganwadi worker including performing the duties of the helper, as her helper had 
retired and the post was now vacant. Basically, the CDPO suggested that as Kulkarni 
madam had only 2 years to retire, she should not rejoin and instead allow the 
programme to hire a new anganwadi worker in her stead. However Mala Kulkarni 
insisted on rejoining. Then in July, the new Supervisor of Laldera beat complained in 
the office about Kulkarni madam’s absenteeism. She said that she had visited her 
village a few days back and found her anganwadi centre closed. The CDPO, Deepa 
Pardeshi decided to make a surprise visit to Kulkarni Madam’s anganwadi with me and 
the Supervisor Shailaja Joshi to explore if there were sufficient grounds for her 
dismissal. She was convinced that Kulkarni Madam was not able to work and was 
simply being obstinate in hanging onto her position in the programme.  
 
We reached Kulkarni Madam’s anganwadi at 1230 in the afternoon. The anganwadi 
was locked. The CDPO asked families living nearby if the anganwadi had been opened 
that day. They confirmed that it had been. Kulkarni Madam was then called and the 
CDPO set out to prove her incapacity and incompetence. She first accused Kulkarni 
Madam of shutting the anganwadi before time – before 1 pm. Kulkarni madam 
explained that she had been making a home visit and the CDPO could check with the 
family, if she desired. By then, the anganwadi centre was unlocked and we went inside. 
Once inside, the CDPO accused Kulkarni madam of not distributing the Take Home 
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Ration packets as they were all stacked against a wall. Kulkarni madam explained that 
these had just been delivered a few days ago while the older sacks had collected over 
the 7 months that she was not there and had torn packets. They were causing a rat 
menace and she was not sure what to do with them. The CDPO then said that from the 
appearance of the anganwadi, it did not seem as if any hot cooked meal had been 
served that day. Kulkarni madam explained that they had served roti and dal and 
showed the left over rotis. She also showed the snack that had been served to the 
children – laddoos of roasted and ground peanut along with sugar of 50 gms for each 
child. However the laddoos had fallen apart because of the use of sugar instead of gur. 
The CDPO seized upon this along with some mistakes that Joshi Madam had found in 
her records to again accuse Kulkarni madam of lying and being incapable of fully 
delivering her responsibilities. She threatened to dismiss her pointing out that her 
anganwadi had been shut when the Supervisor visited her village a day before. 
Kulkarni madam insisted that she had been in her anganwadi till 1 pm that day and that 
the Supervisor had in fact not visited. Her confident assertion shook the CDPO’s 
conviction and she called the Supervisor (who at that time had charge of two beats – 
temporary charge of Laldera and her own) only to find that she had been referring to 
another anganwadi worker in another village and beat. Kulkarni’s madam’s voluntary 
status in the ICDS implied that not only was she not eligible for any health benefits 
even after two decades of work, the programme would rather dismiss her for her ill 
health in the name of women and child welfare, than support her through it. 
 
However, despite its voluntary nature, the anganwadi worker position was valued in 
Sundar block for its promise of a regular, although meagre income in the short term 
and potential for regularisation, with all the accompanying benefits, in the long term. 
Given the paucity of secure, salaried employment in rural India, qualified village women 
were willing to ‘invest’ in a voluntary position of a government programme and then 
‘wait’ – wait for the honorariums to increase, for the position to be regularised and/or 
for a promotion as Supervisor. The strategy of ‘investment’ and ‘waiting’ noted by 
Jeffrey (2010) in the context of educated, unemployed young men in Meerut, Uttar 
Pradesh looking for a respectable job, was quite prevalent in Sundar block. It was 
especially common in relation to teaching positions in privately managed and publicly 
funded educational institutions commonly known as grant-in-aid schools and/or 
colleges. Substantial sums were required to secure such employment, where salaries 
were received only after the grant-in-aid was approved and disbursed which often took 
a few years. Teachers who had invested in these positions worked without pay waiting 
for the required approvals and disbursements, which were usually made with 
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retrospective effect helping them recoup their investment in a lumpsum. Narke 
madam’s daughter-in-law had invested in such a teaching position in a charity run 
school for deaf children – she had paid nearly Rs.150,000.0 for the post and worked 
without pay for two years while the school applied for a grant in aid which was received 
towards the end of my fieldwork. It was therefore not surprising that Narke madam 
coached younger anganwadi workers such as Wakde madam, her colleague in 
Shanwadi to invest in ISO certification, in her future in the ICDS. 
 
The struggle for regularisation 
 
Anganwadi workers hope for regularisation was based on their active struggle for it. 
They believed that the voluntary nature of their position was unjustified and since the   
1990s have engaged in alliance building, unionisation and collective bargaining for 
regularisation. The only justification provided in policy documents for the volunteerism 
of anganwadi workers is that it is part of the programme design. The ICDS was 
originally conceived of as being implemented through the involvement of voluntary 
work and voluntary organisations, especially the volunteerism of women, given that 
welfare policies in India have historically brought women and children together 
(Sreerekha, 2017). Women were considered as ‘naturally’ ready to volunteer for 
childcare and thereby contribute to the development of the community and the nation. 
Thus, for the state, the role of the anganwadi worker and helper in the design of the 
ICDS was merely an extension of women’s ‘natural’ and domestic duties into the public 
sphere (Gupta, 2001). Their honorarium was expected to honour their voluntary service 
and not compensate for their labour or time (Sreerekha, 2017).  
 
The higher involvement of women in voluntary work or unpaid work in the public sphere 
has been explained by some feminist scholars in terms of the sexual division of labour 
in the private sphere – the family. Women restricted by social norms to managing 
homes and caring for families find an acceptable outlet through volunteering. For 
Baldock (1998) however, the higher participation of women in day to day volunteer 
work is equally a function of the sexual division of labour in the public sphere which 
marginalises women into poorly paying, low skilled and labour intensive work. Baldock 
connects the out-sourcing of government welfare services to non-governmental 
organisations in Australia with the increasing demand for women volunteers in such 
organisations to conclude that there is a ‘continuum between volunteer and waged 
labour markets’. Women volunteers like their paid counterparts ’… form flexible and 
expendable pools of labour, available to take up volunteer work when governments 
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reduce expenditures by contracting-out and privatising services to the non-government 
sector’ (Baldock, 1998, p. 28).  For Palriwala and Neetha (2011), in the Indian context, 
state policies for women, despite the lofty goals of equality, are imbued with ‘gendered 
familialism’, which views women primarily as dependent family members and mothers 
rather than independent and productive workers and citizens. Historically, policies for 
women’s development – work and livelihood – were framed based on notions of child 
welfare and child development. Through income generation and self-help programmes 
women were encouraged to take up informal, flexible and home-based work, 
considered more conducive to the fulfilment of their domestic responsibilities with little 
attention paid to state provision of maternity benefits and childcare facilities.  
 
In the ICDS, a practical reason given for the volunteerism of anganwadi workers and 
helpers was the part time nature of their work. Officially, anganwadi workers and 
helpers were expected to work for the ICDS for only 4-5 hours a day (Committee on 
Empowerment of Women, 2011). However much research, deliberation and advocacy, 
including my own observations in Sundar block revealed that in real terms, on several 
days, they ended up working for many more hours. This was usually due to one of two 
factors. The first was that their community based location plus the detailed population 
records that they maintained made them a convenient and cheap conduit for a host of 
other government programmes. In the Sundar block ICDS project during the 9 months 
of my fieldwork itself, anganwadi workers were asked to perform 4 additional tasks18. 
The second was that the cumulative but extensive list of 21 tasks (Committee on 
Empowerment of Women, 2011) that they were expected to undertake within the 4-5 
hours that the anganwadi centre operated, often exceeded the allotted time frame. 
Further, the Sundar Block ICDS project anganwadi workers were also expected to 
implement various innovative initiatives including the ISO certification of anganwadi 
centres - all of which implied that they worked for the ICDS for many more than the 
prescribed hours.  Additionally anganwadi workers were not like other volunteers 
studied by Baldock (1998), who could choose their volunteering tasks carefully based 
on their interests and expected special treatment (gentler management) because of 
their voluntary status. In contrast, anganwadi workers as honorary or voluntary workers 																																																								18	These were (1) facilitating the enrolment of all 0-6 year olds in their village population for an Aadhaar 
number- a 12 digit unique identity number for Indian residents based on demographic and biometric 
information, (2) formation of the Village Child Protection Committee in every panchayat as part of the 
Integrated Child Protection Scheme (ICPS) and coordinating its functioning as secretary, (3) 
implementation of Sukanya Yojana of the Government of Maharashtra, a programme of financial 
assistance to poor couples with only 1-2 girl children, and enrolment of adolescent girls for computer 
literacy, vocational and self-defence training programmes.   Each of these tasks required significant 
awareness generation, counselling, mobilisation and organisation on the part of the anganwadi worker.	
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received little or no choice, were required to follow the instructions given by seniors 
officials and were routinely treated as the junior most functionaries in the ICDS 
programme hierarchy. They were expected to stand as soon as senior officials came in 
and always sat at a level lower than the officials. Finally, anganwadi workers were not 
allowed to hold elected posts in the local panchayat along with their position in the 
ICDS. They could contest the local election and if they won had to give up their 
anganwadi worker post, as a further mark of the non-voluntary nature of their 
volunteerism. In sum, anganwadi workers often worked more than 4-5 hours a day, 
were expected to follow all the instructions given by senior officials and constituted the 
lowest rung of the programme hierarchy. According to the International Labour 
Organisation's, (2007) indicators of an employer-employee relationship, they worked 
almost as formal employees of the programme even though they were deemed as 
voluntary workers and paid a minimal honorarium and few benefits.  
 
Consequently, anganwadi workers have unionised to demand better working 
conditions for themselves through regular strikes, hunger strikes, marches, 
demonstrations and protests. Their key demands include regularisation as Grade III 
and Grade IV government employees and in the interim improved wages or minimum 
wages, regular payment of wages, regular increments, social security benefits 
including gratuity, pension, health benefits, paid and medical leave and avenues for 
promotion (People’s Democracy, 2014). The street protests and blockades of 
anganwadi worker unions have not only successfully captured print and television 
media interest and thereby raised public awareness about their issues but their sheer 
number and collective strength have attracted political interest as well. Sreerekha 
(2017) lists numerous occasions ranging from 1987 to 2009 when Members of 
Parliament of either house have, based on the protests of anganwadi workers, raised 
the issue of their poor working conditions and demanded answers and/or action from 
the government of that time.  In 2006, the All India Federation of Anganwadi Workers 
and Helpers filed a petition in the Rajya Sabha on the institutionalisation of the ICDS 
and the regularisation of anganwadi workers. The petition was discussed by the 
Committee on Petitions which recommended improved working conditions for 
anganwadi workers including additional honorarium for additional work, regular revision 
of honorarium in consonance with inflation but concluded against anganwadi 
regularisation given the ‘…. huge financial implications involved….’ (Rajya Sabha, 
2006) In 2010, a Lok Sabha MP introduced a private member’s bill on the 
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regularisation of anganwadi workers, which lapsed19. In 2011, the Lok Sabha Standing 
Committee on the Empowerment of Women tabled a report on the working conditions 
of anganwadi workers in both houses of parliament which recommended a systematic 
review of the workload of anganwadi workers, instituting a system of periodic review 
and revision of their honorarium linked to the consumer price index and the extension 
of retirement benefits and health insurance to them (Committee on Empowerment of 
Women, 2011). The 2014 national election manifesto of the winning political party, the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) promised to ‘Review the working conditions and enhance 
the remuneration of anganwadi workers.’ (Bharatiya Janata Party, 2014)  
 
These examples highlight the wide recognition of the issues and concerns of 
anganwadi workers by the political class, which in turn has yielded some results – 
increases in honoraria over time and the granting of a few benefits. For instance, the 
Central Government increased the honorarium of matriculate or 10th pass anganwadi 
workers from Rs.150.0 in 1975 when the ICDS began to Rs.500.0 in 1997 (after more 
than 20 years) to Rs 1000.0 in 2002 (after another five years) to Rs.1500 in 2008 and 
finally Rs.3000.0 in 2011 (Committee on Empowerment of Women, 2011). 
Commensurate increases were also made for other categories of anganwadi workers 
based on education and experience and for anganwadi helpers. Additionally, 
anganwadi workers receive paid maternity leave of 180 days and are insured in the 
event of death, disability and critical illness. They also receive a uniform annually. 
Further, Government of India has recommended that state governments reserve 50 
percent of Supervisor positions for matriculate anganwadi workers with 10 years of 
experience, set up a grievance redressal mechanism and a welfare fund for anganwadi 
workers and helpers20.  
 
Several state governments supplement the honorarium provided by the Central 
Government, given its inadequacy, as well as provide additional benefits. However 
even these have been wrested by state and regional anganwadi worker unions through 
persistent demands and agitations. As of October 31, 2017, 32 of the 36 states and 
union territories provide additional honorarium to anganwadi workers ranging from lows 
of Rs.750.0 per month by Bihar, Rs.600.0 by Jammu and Kashmir and Rs.100.0 by 
Manipur to highs of Rs. 3062-11,937.0 per month by Goa, Rs.6750.0 by Tamil Nadu, 
Rs.6678.0 by Delhi, Rs.4000.0 per month by Telangana and Rs.3000.0 per month by 																																																								19 Please see < www.loksabha.nic.in> 20 See <www.icds-wcd.nic.in> 
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Karnataka and Uttarakhand. In contrast, Government of Maharashtra supplemented 
anganwadi worker honorarium only by Rs.2000 so that they earned a total of 
Rs.5000.0 per month (Kumar, 2018). The state government’s contribution had 
increased from Rs.1050.0 to Rs.2000.0 in April 2014 only after anganwadi workers 
across the state struck off work indefinitely in January of the same year to press for 
their demands. The strike lasted for a month and was called off only after the workers 
were assured by the Chief Minister that their demands would be met. Through this 
agitation the anganwadi workers union won not only an increase in their honorarium 
but also a retirement benefit of Rs.100,000.0 for anganwadi workers and Rs.75,000.0 
for anganwadi helpers (Shamim, 2014). Their other existing benefits include casual 
leave of 1 day per month, 20 days leave for festivals and 15 days leave in the summer 
as well as a festival allowance of Rs.500.0. 
 
In the Sundar Block project, all anganwadi workers were members of the Union and 
most were part of Maharashtra Anganwadi Balwadi Karamchari (Employee) Union 
affiliated to the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC). Anganwadi workers in both 
Laldera and Rajegaon beats participated in the successful January –February 2014 
strike but by the end of July 2015 had received only 3 months of raised honorarium 
although they were supposed to receive it from April 1, 2014 onwards. Further, in 
March 2015 the Project Office was asked by the Government of Maharashtra to take 
back the three months of raised honorarium that had already been paid and implement 
the hike from April 2015 onwards. The non-payment of dues and the change in orders 
led to further agitation by the Union with day long strikes being called almost every 
month. 
 
While anganwadi workers across the country have been successful in raising their 
honorariums and gaining some benefits through collective agitation, their core demand 
regarding regularisation as Grade III and IV government employees has been 
consistently denied by the central government. All parliamentary questions, the Rajya 
Sabha Committee of Petitions, the Lok Sabha Committee on Empowerment of Women 
which deliberated this issue have received a standard response from the central 
government, irrespective of the political party in power, that , ‘….Anganwadi workers 
and Anganwadi Helpers are ‘honorary workers’ from the local community who come 
forward to render their services, on part time basis, in the area of child care and 
development.   Since Anganwadi Workers and Anganwadi Helpers are honorary 
workers, these functionaries cannot be declared as ‘Government employees/regular 
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employees’ or extended the benefits as admissible to employees of the Government’ 
(Kumar, 2018; Rajya Sabha, 2006). 
 
Anganwadi workers and their unions have also approached the courts on the issue of 
regularisation but with mixed results.  In 1996, the Karnataka State Administrative 
Tribunal held that although anganwadi workers and helpers received an honorarium 
they were holders of a ‘civil post’ and hence could be considered government 
employees. However this decision was later overturned by the Supreme Court in 2008 
which acknowledged the employer-employee relationship between anganwadi workers 
and the state but held that as they were recruited under a scheme and not a statute 
and their recruitment was not governed by the standard rules ordinarily applicable to 
government employees, they could not be considered to hold a ‘civil post’.  On the 
other hand, a recent judgement by the Bombay High Court in 2010, while addressing a 
dispute regarding the selection of an anganwadi worker, recognised anganwadi 
workers and helpers as ‘workmen’ and the ICDS as an ‘industry’ under the Industrial 
Disputes Act, 1947, thereby once again raising hope for regularisation. 
 
Impact of ISO certification 
 
Anganwadi workers of ISO certified centres claimed that the upgradation in 
appearance and facilities had improved pre-school attendance with some citing cases 
of financially better off parents choosing the new and improved anganwadi centre over 
private schools. They also claimed that it had re-centred the attention of the village 
community on the anganwadi centre and its activities and re-energised their working. In 
the 5 anganwadi centres that I observed, pre-school attendance was more a function of 
the anganwadi worker. In Shanwadi more children regularly attended the senior and 
experienced anganwadi worker, Narke madam’s tin roofed old anganwadi centre than 
the shining new ISO certified anganwadi centre run by the younger but not yet trained 
Wakde madam. Narke madam used local material – pebbles, grain – to create 
activities and games for children and hence was more popular. In Mangaon, amongst 
the two anganwadi centres that had buildings, the one where the anganwadi worker 
was regular although younger and untrained was better attended than the other where 
the anganwadi worker was senior and experienced but irregular. Thus, regularity of the 
anganwadi worker followed by creativity were important for pre-school attendance 
rather than ISO certification. 
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The practices of standardisation and audit have been extensively analysed by 
governmentality scholars as techniques for the engendering of neoliberal subjectivities 
that enable governance of conduct from a distance. As these techniques become 
increasingly prevalent, they are expected to effect neoliberal rationalities of rule by 
transforming the objects and subjects that they seek to govern. In contrast, I found that 
in the ICDS programme of Sundar Block, the implementation of ISO 9001:2008 quality 
management system had little transformative effect on programme practices or 
anganwadi worker subjectivities, rather the ISO certification initiative was shaped 
through the needs and practices of the ICDS.   
 
Shore and Wright (2000) build on Power (1994) to detail the way in which audit 
practices and cultures transform organisations particularly universities by making the 
curriculum more market oriented, quantifying and standardising the learning 
experience, changing definitions of quality and performance and introducing new forms 
of auditable records. Kipnis (2008) compares audit cultures in post socialist China and 
Poland with the United States to find that each context introduced numeric 
performance measures that ended up distorting the phenomena being measured 
producing dissatisfaction amongst the affected employees. However, in Sundar Block I 
found that the ISO 9001:2008 quality management standards were radically altered to 
address the needs that had given rise to the initiative. ICDS functionaries anticipating 
competition from the growing private pre-school sector wanted their anganwadi centres 
to be certified, by a trusted authority in the market, to be as good as private providers. 
For such certification to be considered legitimate, anganwadi centres had to look like 
private pre-schools. Consequently, the ISO requirements emphasised infrastructure, 
facilities, appearances and accents, aspects relating directly to the quality of services 
rather than quality management control systems.   
 
Similarly, there was little autonomisation and responsibilisation of anganwadi workers 
as anticipated by governmentality analyses, even though anganwadi centres were 
audited independently rather than as part of the ICDS project. Supervisors and CDPOs 
were expected to meet ISO targets and were actively involved in motivating and 
supporting anganwadi workers for the same. ISO certification was used for its market 
signalling function and did not enable governance at a distance – no new performance 
measures linked to budgets and bonuses were introduced. Rather the ISO certification 
initiative was implemented through the routine strategies that anganwadi workers 
employed to perform in the ICDS – staging, patronage and investment. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I analyse the implementation of the much lauded ISO certification 
initiative in Sundar block of Aurangabad district. The initiative emerged in a programme 
context that valued innovation and grew to prepare anganwadi centres to respond to 
the perceived threat of competition from private pre-schools. Select anganwadi centres 
were refurbished and resourced to resemble private pre-schools and then 
independently certified for quality as per the requirements of the ISO 9001:2008 quality 
management standards. Targets were set for ISO certification and awards and honours 
instituted to motivate ICDS functionaries – CDPOs, supervisors and anganwadi 
workers to achieve and exceed targets. 
 
Standardisation and audit practices have been understood as technologies of 
neoliberal governance that aid marketization and enable rule at a distance by 
engendering an enterprising subjectivity and facilitating competition. The frames of 
such governmentality scholarship anticipate that anganwadi workers would 
independently prepare anganwadi centres for ISO certification and through this 
process significantly alter anganwadi centres practices. However, neither 
transformation of object or subject took place in the ISO certification initiative in Sundar 
Block. Instead, the ISO certification process was altered to suit ICDS programme 
needs. The parameters developed for certification were focused on resourcing 
anganwadi centres to look like private schools rather than the establishment of a 
quality management system. While anganwadi workers resorted to the routine 
practices of ICDS implentation, for ISO certification as well. These included the 
practices of staging, patronage and investment.       
 
Anganwadi workers staged the audit day, MIS records and financial receipts in their 
implementation of ISO certification. In each case, such staging enabled anganwadi 
workers to reconcile the realities of programme implementation with the rules of the 
programme.  They staged the ISO audit to arbitrate the resource intensive demands of 
ISO certification with their resource poor contexts. They staged records to reconcile 
their workloads with performance targets and they staged receipts to reconcile their 
use of ‘untied funds’ as per the directives of block officials rather than official 
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guidelines. In each case, ICDS workers made it appear as if rules had been followed 
while devising informal practices to implement the programme (see Mathur, 2016).  
 
Additionally, anganwadi workers made use of their patronage networks to raise 
resources for ISO certification and finally, in several cases, invested their own monies. 
This last strategy emerged from a context in which the paucity of regular salaried 
employment in rural areas meant that educated women were willing to ‘invest’ in a 
voluntary position offered by the district government and ‘wait’ for it to be regularised. 
However such waiting was not passive but involved vigorous unionisation and 
collective bargaining. Anganwadi workers employed performative protests and used 
political as well as judicial forums to demand their perceived rights. Much like Anjaria's 
(2011) street hawkers in Mumbai, they deployed their voluntary status to create spaces 
of negotiation and claim making with the state. 
 
In sum, I demonstrate that initiatives of state reform based on neoliberal technologies 
do not always unleash neoliberal subjectivities, rather they engage with existing 
bureaucratic practices and may be reformed in turn. The introduction of the neo-liberal 
techniques of standardisation and audit in the Sundar block ICDS project did not 
produce entrepreneurial subjects but rather led to the production of documents and 
staging of visits to make it appear as if such entrepreneurship had been generated. 				 
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Chapter 6 	
Conclusion 
 
 
In this thesis, I studied how the everyday governance of one of the largest child 
development programmes in the world, the Integrated Child Development Services 
(ICDS) was determined at the sub-district or implementation level. Governance in the 
context of development has been largely understood as ‘good governance’; instead I 
built on a non-normative concept of governance (de Sardan, 2009; Lemke, 2007) to 
study the entire process of the everyday production and supply of ICDS services (de 
Sardan, 2009) or the translation of development programme design into practice. While 
the ICDS has been researched to identify whether its implementation is effective 
(Kandpal, 2011; Planning Commission, 2011) and the consequent implications for 
design (Das Gupta et al., 2005; Gragnolati et al., 2006), the question of how the 
programme is implemented, produced or translated has not been adequately 
addressed.  For Mosse (2004) and Mathur (2016) implementation is often derided in 
development literature but rarely described except in terms of an ‘unintended ‘gap’ 
between theory and practice, to be reduced by better policy more effectively 
implemented’ (Mosse, 2004, p. 640).  
 
Focusing on the ‘how’ questions, I described the processes and practices through 
which the ICDS was implemented in the everyday, and through which gaps in plan and 
implementation were produced. In the context of state-implemented development 
programmes in India such gaps have been largely attributed to the social 
embeddedness of the state in society (Corbridge et al., 2005). Political and 
anthropological literature offers three broad explanations for why the boundaries 
between state and society are blurred in India. Some scholars contend that the state is 
dominated by a coalition of classes for the promotion of their interests both at the 
national and intermediate level (Bardhan, 1999; Harriss-White, 2003), others argue that 
the postcolonial Indian state is too modern for the majority of its population who 
consequently access it in groups, through brokers, mediators and the frames of social 
identity rather than individual, undifferentiated citizenship (Chatterjee, 2004; Kaviraj, 
2010), whereas still others conceive of the state-society boundary as a construction, an 
effect of bureaucratic practices reflective of relations of power and social control 
(Mitchell, 1991; Sharma and Gupta, 2006).  
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I build on this Foucauldian understanding to study ICDS implementation as a set of 
bureaucratic or state practices. State practices have been studied to understand citizen 
imaginary of and engagement with the state (Anand, 2011; Anjaria, 2011; Corbridge et 
al., 2005; Gupta, 2006; Jeffrey, 2000; Lazar, 2005; Parry, 2000) as well as the way the 
state ‘sees’ populations (Scott, 1998), however the role of state functionaries has not 
been sufficiently addressed (Bernstein and Mertz, 2011; Blundo, 2014). I contribute to 
the anthropological literature on the state by illuminating how state functionaries 
construct, negotiate and perform state practices to determine the everyday governance 
of state implemented development programmes, and through this, provide an 
explanation for the disjuncture between development programme design and 
implementation.  
 
State functionaries in India are known to work in a context of political mediation of 
everyday public services (Berenschot, 2010). State and local politicians use 
government programmes to extend patronage to their supporters (Corbridge et al., 
2005) and generate campaign finance through informal systems of percentages or 
commissions (Berenschot, 2010; Witsoe, 2012a). Concurrently, liberalisation of the 
Indian economy in the 1990s has led to reforms of state and governance (Joseph, 
2007). Accordingly, I studied how ICDS functionaries engaged with local political 
relations, vertical systems of ‘corruption’ and bureaucratic initiatives of reform to 
construct, negotiate and perform state practices.  
 
The political mediation of the Indian state has been linked to the politicisation of caste 
(Witsoe, 2012a, 2012b). Castes have historically competed for state power (Gupta, 
2005) and the caste order has been shaped by colonial (Dirks, 1992) and postcolonial 
state policies (Jodhka, 2012). I built on the links between caste and state to explore 
how the performative politics of caste shapes the everyday implementation of the 
ICDS. I found that in Sundar Block, the dominant Maratha caste deployed social and 
political power through kinship, caste and political networks to corner a majority of 
ICDS field positions and thereby programme benefits and resources. Additionally, 
Maratha anganwadi workers used everyday programme/state practices to perform 
caste dominance and produce Dalit localities, communities and bodies as 
‘untouchable’, ‘polluted’ subjects. Dalit localities and beneficiaries were excluded from 
ICDS services thereby subverting ICDS programme objectives and producing gaps in 
development programme implementation. However, in a significant departure from 
available literature on state and development, I also found that Dalit state functionaries 
(a group that has historically energised Dalit political mobilisation) in the ICDS, 
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challenged and resisted Maratha domination by invoking the structures and rules of 
Weberian bureaucracy. A Dalit anganwadi worker and a Dalit Supervisor confronted 
Maratha attempts to undermine their bureaucratic position and subordinate their labour 
by invoking the imaginary of the formal, rule bound state. This Dalit challenge 
performatively reconfigured the local politics of caste, reset state practices and re-
established the state–society boundary that had been blurred by the Maratha use of 
state power as caste power. The intersection of local caste politics with everyday state 
practices reproduced dominance and exclusion and thereby gaps between policy and 
practice, but also created spaces for confrontation, resistance, competing imaginaries 
and the reconstitution of politics, practices and boundaries. 
 
Political mediation is also known to influence state functioning through systems of 
vertical and horizontal corruption to generate campaign finance (Berenschot, 2010; 
Witsoe, 2012a). Such corruption is regarded as the main cause of the Indian state’s 
inability to deliver welfare and development in popular discourse (Mathur, 2016). I took 
an anthropological approach that eschewed moral framings and built on legal 
pluralism, to study informal financial practices in the ICDS. I studied two aspects of the 
ICDS programme that emerged as ethnographically significant during fieldwork – the 
Supplementary Nutrition Programme and the administrative process of promotions and 
transfers. I found that the process of provision of daily supplementary nutrition at the 
anganwadi centre was governed by a regime of informal payments called takkewari. 
Anganwadi workers contracted to supply hot, fresh meals and snacks to pre-schoolers 
at low rates inflated attendance numbers, menus and bills to extract earnings and paid 
Supervisors and CDPOs a percentage or takkewari to do so. Informal payments were 
also required for promotions and transfers in the ICDS at the district level especially the 
promotion from anganwadi worker to Supervisor. However unlike much existing 
literature on informal financial practices in India, I found that the takkewari system was 
not driven by political demands and neither were promotions and transfers effectively 
mediated by political brokers. Rather, the takkewari system emerged as a means to 
address the contrariness and thereby un-implementability of bureaucratic rules and 
enabled supplementary nutrition services to be delivered, anganwadi workers to gain 
incomes and Supervisors and CDPOs to recover the monies spent to acquire their 
promotions and transfers. Instead of being part of larger systems of political and social 
control, the takkewari system was local and performatively produced through 
continuous negotiations of power and authority across bureaucratic levels. Informal 
financial practices in the ICDS did produce gaps in implementation by affecting the 
quality of supplementary nutrition and worker motivation, however, they did not impede 
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beneficiary access to ICDS services. These findings challenge prevalent 
anthropological understandings, based on the methodological difficulties of studying 
informal practices and the wider pathologisation of financial informality, that ‘corruption 
talk’ far exceeds its reality.    
 
Reforms to the Indian developmental state, initiated in the 1990s, amidst a 
transnational context of neoliberalism and good governance (Gupta and Sharma, 
2006) have contributed to the proliferation of the new orienting values of fiscal 
austerity, marketization, consensus, transparency and decentralization (Bear and 
Mathur, 2015). In the Sundar block ICDS project, these values inspired a project of 
local level state reform, ISO certification, under which ICDS officials anticipating 
competition from private pre-schools sought to secure the future of the programme by 
requiring anganwadi workers to entrepreneurially refurbish and redecorate anganwadi 
centres to resemble private pre-schools. The spruced up anganwadi centres were then 
independently certified for quality as per the ISO 9001:2008 quality management 
system. Scholarship on standardisation and audit technologies emphasises that these 
processes generate new relations of governance and power but I built on the insight 
that the translation of technologies into rationalities is mediated by the problematics of 
implementation to study the ISO certification initiative. I found that most anganwadi 
workers operating in resource poor contexts struggled to raise the resources required 
for ISO certification and ultimately resorted to their routine practices of implementation 
namely, staging, patronage and investment, for ISO certification as well.  Anganwadi 
workers staged the audit day, MIS records and financial receipts to reconcile the 
realities of programme implementation with the incompatibility of programme rules. 
They raised funds from political patrons and in several cases invested their own funds. 
This last strategy emerged from a larger context of anganwadi workers anticipating and 
struggling for the regularisation of their position as volunteers in the ICDS. Neo-liberal 
technologies thus did not generate entrepreneurial subjects but led to the improvisation 
of strategies to make it appear as if such entrepreneurship had been produced.     
 
In sum, governance of the ICDS at the sub-district or implementation level was 
determined in interaction with the politics of caste and the unimplementability of 
programme rules but not vertical systems of corruption or neoliberal rationalities. ICDS 
functionaries performed and negotiated caste politics through state practices as part of 
local struggles of domination and subordination. They also improvised and staged 
programme practices in response to resource scarcity and the impracticalities of 
adhering to programme rules and expectations. ICDS functionaries’ performances, 
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negotiations and improvisations produced gaps and variations between programme 
policy and practices. However, these gaps and variations did not always imply that 
programme objectives were being subverted and services not delivered.  
 
Interpreting the gaps between development policy and practice 
 
For Mosse (2013, 2004) the disjuncture between development policy and practice is 
the inevitable outcome of the differences between, respectively, the worlds of policy 
thought and developmental action. Mosse conceives of policy as a mobilising metaphor 
around which transnational, national and local agencies including donors, governments 
and non-governmental organisations as well as professional communities of 
researchers and administrators coalesce. Enrolling and building coalitions between 
such dispersed and diverse interests requires policy to be necessarily vague and 
ambiguous (including concepts such as empowerment, participation, partnership, 
governance, social capital) and thereby essentially un-implementable or a poor guide 
for action. Practice, on the other hand, is shaped by the relations, interests and 
cultures of implementing organisations. Building on Latour (1999), Mosse and Lewis 
(2006) use the concept of ‘translation’ to understand the processes underlying the 
transformation of policy (development models, strategies and project designs) into 
practice. In this understanding, people and institutions that enrol into/adopt particular 
policy models and programme designs translate them into the different logic of their 
interests, goals and ambitions, which in turn determines practices. In a participatory 
rural development project in india, Mosse (2005) found that participatory planning 
processes were dominated by the village elite who used them to reproduce power 
relations, garner public support for private interest and grab project resources for 
themselves and/or their patronage networks. Similarly, the ‘local choices’ that emerged 
were found to be influenced by the development agenda of the scientists, researchers, 
government officials and consultants associated with the project from time to time. 
Finally, the managerial and organisational systems of the implementing agency such 
as budgeting, approval and accounting systems profoundly shaped project choices and 
practices. Thus, the policy design of ‘participation’ was translated through the everyday 
action of tribal villagers, field workers, office staff, project managers, consultants and 
researchers into non-participatory project practices of tight schedules, quantified 
targets and pre-determined budgets as well as relationships of patronage and 
hierarchy.  However, at the same time, this diverse group of actors also worked 
actively to uphold the policy model of ‘participation’ to which project success, financial 
resources and support communities were attached. For Mosse development projects 
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thus work as systems of representations oriented towards wider policy goals and 
funding institutions rather than operational realties. Policy models are not implemented, 
they do not generate practices rather practices emerge from organisational contexts 
and sustain policy designs that offer the most coherent interpretation of events 
 
Building on this influential analysis, a growing body of anthropological work has 
explored the inner workings, practices and processes of international development. 
These studies underscore the socially constructed nature of development programmes 
highlighting that development actors at all levels from ‘beneficiaries’ to project 
managers exercise agency assigning a variety of goals and meanings to projects, 
acting in diverse and not always expected ways in the context of specific development 
models and creating order and unity through political acts of composition (Beck, 2016). 
Bending and Rosendo (2006) and Rossi (2006) find that beneficiaries of development 
are not passive recipients but actively collude with the dominant rhetoric and/or 
manipulate it through many small acts of reinterpretation to serve their own ends. 
Similarly, Desai (2006) and Shrestha (2006) highlight that frontline workers, who are 
expected to bridge the disjuncture between policy and practice actively work to 
maintain such disjunctures as part of the construction and maintenance of their own 
professional identities. Such distributed agency leads to the multiplication of criteria for 
and claims of success (Mosse, 2013). Development projects may lead to unexpected 
outcomes, project outcomes may not be uniform across beneficiaries and beneficiaries 
may regard a project as successful even if policy goals remain unmet and vice versa 
(Beck, 2016). Finally, development expertise/knowledge/policy ideas are found to be 
shaped institutionally and maintained through extrainstitutional and/or transnational 
networks of experts (Mosse, 2013).   
 
Much of this research on development policy and practice has been described as 
‘aidnography’ (Mosse, 2013, p. 232) as it focuses on the international development 
apparatus and amongst other issues, examines the tensions between the development 
goals and organisation goals of NGOs (Beck, 2016). My thesis builds on and 
contributes to this analytical literature on development by highlighting the constructed 
nature of state practices, particularly, the agency of state functionaries in shaping these 
practices. I detail how the social lives and professional motivations of state 
functionaries at the sub-district level as well as the incompatibility of programme rules 
to operational contexts influenced ICDS programme implementation and practices. 
ICDS functionaries used state practices to perform caste dominance and produce the 
exclusion of marginalised groups. The intersection of state practices with caste politics, 
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however, also opened up spaces for confronting the caste order. That is, functionaries 
from the dominant caste used state power to reproduce caste power, whereas those 
from marginalised groups used state power to challenge caste power. Additionally, 
ICDS workers’ objectives of gaining contractual incomes from the Supplementary 
Nutrition Programme as well as obtaining convenient posts, career advancement and 
ultimately social mobility supported a system of informal financial practices within the 
programme which compromised the quality of supplementary nutrition services. Finally, 
the un-implementability of programme rules based on resource limitations, unrealistic 
targets and the contrary directives of senior officials generated a variety of functionary 
improvisations including,the staging of audits, manipulation of MIS records, faking of  
financial receipts and the investment of personal funds. This last strategy was 
motivated by frontline functionaries’ desire for the regularisation of their volunteer 
position.    
 
Mathur (2016) in her study of state practices in India too identified that officials believed 
that programme rules could never really be implemented as intended and they needed 
to improvise to make it appear on paper as if they they had been. However I also found 
that such improvisation by ICDS functionaries was not a given, that is official 
representation and programme realities did not always diverge. There were instances 
when programme goals cohered with the interests of workers especially when these 
related to establishing the legitimacy of their roles, the programme and the state. That 
is ICDS workers also needed to be seen as performing their roles by the community. 
So, while ICDS workers manipulated undernutrition data in the Monthly Progress 
Reports (MPRs) to match unrealistic targets, they reported data on children with severe 
acute malnutrition accurately as the legitimacy of their roles as anganwadi workers, the 
ICDS programme and the state was linked to the reduction of undernutrition related 
child deaths. Thus not all data in the MPR was a fabrication to generate an official 
reality or uphold particular policy models. Similarly, while anganwadi workers did 
source funds by inventing receipts, the funds were indeed used and often 
supplemented to materially alter the appearance of their anganwadi centres and 
secure the future of the programme and thereby their own future.  
 
One of the significant findings of the thesis is that the interaction of caste politics with 
development programme practices enabled performative sites for challenging the 
dominant social and political order. The assertion of Scheduled caste ICDS 
functionaries was facilitated by the policies of reservation in public sector employment, 
which enabled them to access state power and bureaucratically claim the same or 
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higher social status as members of the dominant and general castes. The exclusion 
produced through the politics of caste in welfare programmes was thus countered 
through the assertion inherent in the politics of reservation. This finding sheds light on 
the additional paths through which state implemented development programmes can 
potentially facilitate social change. 
 
Finally, I highlight that the practices of ICDS functionaries were both performative as 
well as sometimes a performance. Performative practices such as providing hot 
cooked meals to pre-schoolers, measuring and recording weights of under 6s, 
preparing MPRs, refurbishing anganwadi centres and attending meetings produced the 
ICDS programme and the developmental state as effects as well as ICDS workers, 
anganwadi centres and MPRs as agents and symbols of the developmental state. 
Interactions with the politics and performativity of caste as well as incompatibility of 
rules influenced everyday enactments creating gaps between design and practice. The 
disjuncture, which produced exclusion of the marginalised but also facilitated 
implementation, was concealed through ‘performance’.  
    	  
		
166 
Bibliography 
 
Abrams, P., 1988. Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State. J. Hist. Sociol. 1. 
Anand, N., 2011. Pressure: The Polytechnics of Water Supply in Mumbai. Cult. 
Anthropol. 26, 542–564. 
Anders, G., 2009. Like Chameleons: Civil Servants and Corruption in Malawi, in: 
Blundo, G., Le Meur, P.-Y. (Eds.), The Governance of Daily Life in Africa: 
Ethnographic Explorations of Public and Collective Services. BRILL, Leiden. 
Anders, G., Nuijten, M., 2007. Corruption and the Secret of Law: An Introduction, in: 
Nuijten, M., Anders, G. (Eds.), Corruption and the Secret of Law: A Legal 
Anthropological Perspective. Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire. 
Anderson, S., Francois, P., Kotwal, A., 2015. Clientelism in Indian Villages. Am. Econ. 
Rev. 105, 1780–1816. 
Anjaria, J.S., 2011. Ordinary states: Everyday Corruption and the Politics of Space in 
Mumbai. Am. Ethnol. 38, 58–72. 
Appadurai, A., 2016. Corruption, Scale and Governance in India, in: Charnoz, O., 
Pedregal, V.D. (Eds.), Local Politics, Global Impacts: Steps to a Multi-
Disciplinary Analysis of Scales. Routledge, London. 
Baldock, C., 1998. Feminist discourse of unwaged work: the case of volunteerism. 
Aust. Fem. Stud. 13, 19–34. 
Bardhan, P., 1999. The Political Economy of Development in India: Expanded edition 
with an epilogue on the political economy of reform in India. Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi. 
Bardhan, P., 1984. The political economy of development in India. Blackwell, Oxford. 
Baviskar, A., 2004. Between Micro-politics and Administrative Imperatives: 
Decentralization and the Watershed Mission in Madhya Pradesh, India. Eur. J. 
Dev. Res. 16. 
Baviskar, A., Sundar, N., 2008. Democracy versus Economic Transformation? Econ. 
Polit. Wkly. 43, 87–89. 
Baviskar, B.S., 2007. Cooperatives in Maharashtra: Challenges Ahead. Econ. Polit. 
Wkly. 42, 4217–4219. 
Baviskar, B.S., 1980. The Politics of Development: Sugar Co-operatives in Rural 
Maharashtra. Oxford University Press, Bombay. 
Baviskar, B.S., 1968. Co-operatives and Politics. Econ. Polit. Wkly. 490–95. 
Bayly, S., 1999a. Caste, Society and Politics in India: From the Eighteenth Century to 
the Modern Age. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
		
167 
Bayly, S., 1999b. Western “Orientalists” and the Colonial Perception of Caste, in: 
Caste, Society and Politics in India: From the Eighteenth Century to the Modern 
Age. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Bear, L., 2011. Making a river of gold: Speculative state planning, informality, and 
neoliberal governance on the Hooghly. Focaal-J. Glob. Hist. Anthropol. 61, 46–
60. 
Bear, L., Mathur, N., 2015. Remaking the Public Good: A new Anthropology of 
Bureaucracy. Camb. J. Anthropol. 33, 18–34. 
Beck, E., 2016. Repopulating Development: An Agent-Based Approach to Studying 
Development Interventions. World Dev. 80, 19–32. 
Bending, T., Rosendo, S., 2006. Rethinking the Mechanics of the “Anti-Politics 
Machine,” in: Lewis, D., Mosse, D. (Eds.), Brokers and Translators: The 
Ethnography of Aid and Agencies. Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, USA. 
Berenschot, W., 2014. Political fixers in India’s patronage democracy, in: Piliavsky, A. 
(Ed.), Patronage as Politics in South Asia. Cambridge University Press, New 
Delhi. 
Berenschot, W., 2010. Evereyday Mediation: The Politics of Public Service Delivery in 
Gujarat, India. Dev. Change 41, 883–905. 
Bernstein, A., Mertz, E., 2011. Bureaucracy: Ethnograghy of the State in Everyday Life. 
PoLAR Polit. Leg. Anthropol. Rev. 34, 6–10. 
Beteille, A., 2010. Caste and Political Group Formation in TamilNad, in: Kothari, R. 
(Ed.), Caste in Indian Politics. Orient Blackswan Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi. 
Bevir, M., 2012. Governance: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Bevir, M., 2011. Governance and governmentality after neoliberalism. Policy Press 39, 
457–71. 
Bevir, M., 2009. Key Concepts in Governance. SAGE Publications Ltd, London. 
Bevir, M. (Ed.), 2007. Encyclopedia of Governance. SAGE Publication Ltd, Thousand 
Oaks, California. 
Bhaduri, A., Nayyar, D., 1996. The Intelligent Person’s Guide to Liberalisation. Penguin 
Books, New Delhi. 
Bharatiya Janata Party, 2014. Election Manifesto 2014 “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas.” 
Biswas, J., Verma, J.S., 2009. Tackling Child Undernutrition in India: Governance 
Challenges Need More Attention. IDS Bull. 40, 111–124. 
Blundo, G., 2014. Seeing like a State Agent: The Ethnography of Reform in Senegal’s 
Forestry Services, in: Bierschenk, T., de Sardan, J.P.O. (Eds.), States at Work: 
Dynamics of African Bureaucracies. BRILL, Leiden. 
		
168 
Blundo, G., de Sardan, J.P.O., 2006. Everyday corruption in West Africa, in: Blundo, 
G., de Sardan, J.P.O., Arifari, N.B., Alou, M.T. (Eds.), Everyday Corruption and 
the State: Citizens and Public Officials in Africa. Zed Books Ltd., London and 
New York. 
Blundo, G., Le Meur, P.-Y., 2009. Introduction: An Anthropology of Everyday 
Governance: Collective Service Delivery and Subject Making, in: Blundo, G., Le 
Meur, P.-Y. (Eds.), The Governance of Daily Life in Africa: Ethnographic 
Exploration of Public and Collective Services. BRILL, Leiden and Boston. 
Brown, W., 2015. Undoing democracy: Neoliberalism’s remaking of State and Subject, 
in: Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. MIT Press, Zone 
Books. 
Burchell, G., 1993. Liberal government and techniques of the self. Econ. Soc. 22, 267–
282. 
Butler, J., 1990. Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse, in: 
Nicholson, Li. (Ed.), Feminism/Postmodernism. Routledge, New York. 
Census of India, 2011a. District Census Handbook, Aurangabad Maharashtra. 
Directorate of Census Operations, Maharashtra, Mumbai. 
Census of India, 2011b. Urban agglomerations/Cities having population 1 million and 
above. Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. 
Chatterjee, P., 2008. Democracy and Economic Transformation in India. Econ. Polit. 
Wkly. 43, 53–62. 
Chatterjee, P., 2004. The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in 
Most of the World. Columbia University Press, New York. 
Chatterjee, P., 2001. On Civil and Political Society in Post-Colonial Democracies, in: 
Kaviraj, S., Khilnani, S. (Eds.), Civil Society: History and Possibilities. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Chatterjee, P., 1999. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative 
Discourse, in: The Partha Chatterjee Omnibus. Oxford University Press, New 
Delhi. 
Chatterjee, P., 1997. Development Planning and the Indian State, in: Byres, T.J. (Ed.), 
The State, Development Planning and Liberalisation in India, SOAS Studies on 
South Asia. Oxford University Press, Delhi. 
Chen, K.-H., 2003. Civil society and min-jian: on political society and popular 
democracy. Cult. Stud. 17, 877–896. 
Chhibbar, Y.P., 2001. PUCL petitions Supreme Court on starvation deaths. PUCL Bull. 
Citizens’ Initiative for the Rights of Children Under Six, 2006. Focus on Children Under 
Six Report. Secretariat of Right to Food Campaign, New Delhi. 
		
169 
Coleman, S., von Hellermann, P., 2011. Introduction: Queries, Collaborations, 
Calibrations, in: Coleman, S., von Hellermann, P. (Eds.), Multi-Sited 
Ethnography: Problems and Possibilities in the Translocation of Research 
Methods. Taylor and Francis, New York. 
Commissioner for Co-operation & Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 2005. Co-
operative movement at a glance in Maharashtra. Government of Maharashtra, 
Pune. 
Committee on Empowerment of Women, 2011. Working Conditions of Anganwadi 
Workers (No. Eighth Report). Parliament of India, New Delhi. 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2012. Report of the Comptroller and Auditor 
General of India on Performance Audit of Integrated Child Development 
Services (ICDS) Scheme. Government of India. 
Comptroller and Auditor General of India, 2011. Audit Report on National Rural Health 
Mission (NRHM), Uttar Pradesh for the year 2010-11. Government of India. 
Corbridge, S., 1998. “Beneath the pavement only soil”: The povert of post-
development. J. Dev. Stud. 34, 134–148. 
Corbridge, S., Harriss, J., 2000. Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism 
and Popular Democracy, Second. ed. Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 
Corbridge, S., Shah, A., 2013. Introduction: the underbelly of the Indian boom. Econ. 
Soc. 42, 335–347. 
Corbridge, S., Williams, G., Srivastava, M., Veron, R., 2005. Seeing the State: 
Governance and Governmentality in India. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Dahiwale, S.M., 1995. Consolidation of Maratha Dominance in Maharashtra. Econ. 
Polit. Wkly. 30, 336–342. 
Dandekar, A., Naravade, S., 2013. The Case of Maharashtra’s Disappearing Water. 
Econ. Polit. Wkly. XLVIII. 
Das Gupta, M., Lokshin, M., Gragnolati, M., Ivaschenko, O., 2005. Improving child 
nutrition? The Integrated Child Development Services in India. Dev. Change 36, 
613–640. 
Datar, A., Ghotale, V., 2013. Maharashtra Cabinets: Social and Regional profile, 1960-
2010. Econ. Polit. Wkly. XLVIII, 37–42. 
de Sardan, J.P.O., 2011. The Eight Modes of Local Governance in West Africa. IDS 
Bull. 42. 
de Sardan, J.P.O., 2009. State Bureaucracy and Governance in Francophone West 
Africa: An Empirical Diagnosis and Historical Perspective, in: Blundo, G., Le 
		
170 
Meur, P.-Y. (Eds.), The Governance of Daily Life in Africa: Ethnographic 
Exploration of Public and Collective Services. BRILL, Leiden and Boston. 
de Sardan, J.P.O., 1999. A moral economy of corruption in Africa? J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 
37, 25–52. 
Desai, B., 2006. Inside Out: Rationalizing Practices and Representations in Agricultural 
Development Projects, in: Lewis, D., Mosse, D. (Eds.), Development Brokers 
and Translators: Ethnography of Aid and Agencies. Kumarian Press, 
Bloomfield, USA. 
Deshpande, A., 2005. Affirmative Action in India and the United States (Background 
Papers), World Development Report 2006. World Bank. 
Deshpande, R., 2006. Politics of frustrations, anxieties and outrage. Econ. Polit. Wkly. 
41, 1304–1307. 
Deshpande, R., 2004. Kunbi Maratha as OBC: Backward Journey of a Caste. Econ. 
Polit. Wkly. 39, 1448–1449. 
Deshpande, R., Palshikar, S., 2017. Political Economy of a Dominant Caste, in: 
Nagaraj, R., Motiram, S. (Eds.), Political Economy of Contemporary India. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Dickey, S., 2011. The Pleasures and Anxieties of Being in the Middle: Emerging 
Middle-Class Identities in Urban South India. Mod. Asian Stud. 46, 559–599. 
Dirks, N.B., 1992. Castes of Mind. Representations No. 37, 56–78. 
Dreze, J., 2006. Universalisation with Quality: ICDS in a Rights Perspective. Econ. 
Polit. Wkly. 41, 3706–3715. 
Dumont, L., 1991. Hierarchy, Status and Power: The Caste System and Its 
Implications, in: Social Stratification. Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 
Evans, P.B., Rueschemeyer, D., Skocpol, T. (Eds.), 1985. Bringing the State Back In. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Fairhead, J., 2011. Part C Introduction, in: Coleman, S., von Hellermann, P. (Eds.), 
Multi-Sited Ethnography: Problems and Possibilities in the Translocation of 
Research Methods. Taylor and Francis, New York. 
Falzon, M.A., 2012. Introduction, in: Falzon, M.A. (Ed.), Multi-Sited Ethnography: 
Theory, Praxis and Locality in Contemporary Research. Ashgate Publishing 
Limited. 
Ferguson, J., 1994. The Anti-Politics Machine:’Development’, Depoliticisation and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
USA. 
Ferguson, J., Gupta, A., 2002. Spatializing States: Towards an Ethnography of 
Neoliberal Governmentality. Am. Ethnol. 29, 981–1002. 
		
171 
Fonseca, L.M., 2015. From Quality Gurus and TQM to ISO 9001:2015: A review of 
several quality paths. Int. J. Qual. Res. 9, 167–180. 
Fuller, C.J., 1996. Introduction: Caste Today, in: Fuller, C.J. (Ed.), Caste Today. Oxford 
University Press, Delhi. 
Fuller, C.J., Harriss, J., 2001. For an anthropology of the Modern Indian State, in: 
Fuller, C.J., Benei, V. (Eds.), The Everyday State & Society in Modern India. C. 
Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London, pp. 1–30. 
Gadgil, M., 2018. Marathwada, northern Maharashtra staring at drought once again. 
Mumbai Mirror. 
Ganguly, D., 2000. Can the Dalit speak: Caste, Postcoloniality and the New 
Humanities? South Asia J. South Asian Stud. 23, 43–62. 
Ghoge, K., 2016. Jayakwadi not worth a dam in Marathwada. Hindustan Times. 
Ghosh, S., 2006. Food Dole or Health, Nutrition and Development Programme. Econ. 
Polit. Wkly. Vol. XLI. 
Gibbon, P., Henriksen, L.F., 2012. A Standard Fit for Neoliberalism. Comp. Stud. Soc. 
Hist. 54, 275–307. 
Gibbon, P., Henriksen, L.F., 2011. On the Pre-history of ISO 9000: The Making of a 
Neo-liberal Standard, in: Ponte, S., Gibbon, P. (Eds.), Governing through 
Standards: Origins, Drivers and Limitations. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Goffman, E., 1973. Presentation of self in everyday life. The Overlook Press, New 
York. 
Gokhale, J., 1986. The Sociopolitical Effects of Ideological Change: The Buddhist 
Conversion of Maharashtrian Untouchables. J. Asian Stud. 45, 269–292. 
Gorringe, H., 2016. Drumming out oppression, or drumming it in? Identity, culture and 
contention in dalit politcs. Contrib. Indian Sociol. 50, 1–26. 
Gorringe, H., Rafanell, I., 2007. The Embodiment of Caste:Oppression, Protest and 
Change. Sociology 41(1), 97–114. 
Gragnolati, M., Bredenkamp, C., Das Gupta, M., Lee, Y.-K., Shekhar, M., 2006. ICDS 
and Persistent Undernutrition: Strategies to Enhance the Impact. Econ. Polit. 
Wkly. 41, 1193–1201. 
Gudavarthy, A., 2012a. Introduction: Why Interrogate Political Society?, in: 
Gudavarthy, A. (Ed.), Re-Framing Democracy and Agency in India: 
Interrogating Political Society. Anthem Press, London. 
Gudavarthy, A. (Ed.), 2012b. Reframing Democracy and Agency in India: Interrogating 
Political Society. Anthem Press, London. 
Gudavarthy, A., Vijay, G., 2007. Antinomies of Political Society - Implications of Uncivil 
Development. Econ. Polit. Wkly. 42, 3051–60. 
		
172 
Gupta, A., 2017. Changing forms of corruption in India. Mod. Asian Stud. 51, 1862–
1890. 
Gupta, A., 2012. Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural violence and Poverty in India. 
Duke University Press, Durham and London. 
Gupta, A., 2006. Blurred Boudaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of 
Politics and the Imagined State, in: Sharma, A., Gupta, A. (Eds.), The 
Anthropology of the State: A Reader. Blackwell Publishing Ltd., Massachusetts, 
USA. 
Gupta, A., 2001. Governing Population: The Integrated Child Development Services 
Programme in India, in: Hansen, T.B., Stepputat, F. (Eds.), States of 
Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State. Duke 
University Press, Durham and London. 
Gupta, A., 1995. Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of 
Politics and the Imagined State. Am. Ethnol. 22, 375–402. 
Gupta, A., Sharma, A., 2006. Globalization and Postcolonial States. Curr. Anthropol. 
47. 
Gupta, A., Sivaramakrishnan, K., 2011. Introduction: The State in India after 
Liberalization, in: Gupta, A., Sivaramakrishnan, K. (Eds.), . Routledge, Oxon. 
Gupta, D., 2005. Caste and Politics: Identity Over System. Annu. Rev. Anthropol. 21, 
409–427. 
Gupta, D., 2004. Introduction: The Certitudes of Caste: When Identity trumps 
Hierarchy. Contrib. Indian Sociol. 38. 
Gupta, D., 2000. Introduction: Why interrogate caste?, in: Interrogating Caste: 
Understanding Hierarchy and Difference in Indian Society. Penguin Books, New 
Delhi. 
Gupta, D.B., Gumber, A., 2001. Concurrent Evaluation of Integrated Child 
Development Services: National Report. National Council of Applied Economic 
Research (NCAER), New Delhi. 
Haddad, L., 2009. Lifting the Curse: Overcoming Persistent Undernutrition in India. IDS 
Bull. 40, 1–8. 
Hannerz, U., 2003. Being there...and there...and there! Reflections on multi-site 
ethnography. Ethnography 4, 201–16. 
Hansen, T.B., 1996. The vernacularisation of Hinndutva: The BJP and Shiv Sena in 
rural Maharashtra. Contrib. Indian Sociol. 20. 
Hansen, T.B., Stepputat, F., 2001. Introduction, in: Hansen, T.B., Stepputat, F. (Eds.), 
States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State. 
Duke University Press, Durham and London. 
		
173 
Harriss, J., 2007. Antinomies of Empowerment: Observations on Civil Society, Politics 
and Urban Governance in India. Econ. Polit. Wkly. 42, 2716–2724. 
Harriss-White, B., 2003. India Working: Essays on Society and Economy. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Heaton Shrestha, C., 2006. “They cant mix like we can”: Bracketing Differences and 
the Professionalization of NGOs in Nepal, in: Lewis, D., Mosse, D. (Eds.), 
Development Brokers and Translators: Ethnography of Aid and Agencies. 
Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, USA. 
Heras-Saizarbitoria, I., Boiral, O., 2013. ISO 9001 and ISO 14001: Towards a 
Research Agenda on Management System Standards. Int. J. Manag. Rev. 15, 
47–65. 
Heywood, P., 1997. Political Corruption: Problems and Perspectives. Polit. Stud. XLV, 
417–435. 
Higgins, V., Larner, W., 2010. Standards and Standardization as a Social Scientific 
Problem, in: Higgins, V., Larner, W. (Eds.), Calculating the Social: Standards 
and the Reconfiguration of Governing. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Higgins, W., Hallstrom, K.T., 2007. Standardization, Globalization and Rationalities of 
Government. Organization 14, 685–704. 
Holy, L., 1984. Theory, methodology and the research process, in: Ellen, R.F. (Ed.), 
Ethnographic Research: A Guide to General Conduct. Academic Press Limited, 
London. 
Hovland, I., 2011. “What do You Call the Heathen These Days?”: For and Against 
Renewal in the Norwegian Mission Society, in: Coleman, S., von Hellermann, P. 
(Eds.), Multi-Sited Ethnography: Problems and Possibilities in the Translocation 
of Research Methods. Taylor and Francis, New York. 
Hoyle, D., 2001. ISO 9000: Quality Systems Handbook, Fourth. ed. Butterworth-
Heinemann, Oxford. 
Inden, R., 1986. Orientalist constructions of India. Mod. Asian Stud. 20, 401–446. 
International Labour Organisation, 2007. The Employment Relationship: An annotated 
guide to ILO Recommendation No. 198. International Labour Organisation, 
Geneva. 
Jaffrelot, C., 2008. “Why should we vote?”: The Indian Middle Class and the 
Functioning of the World’s Largest Democracy, in: Jaffrelot, C., Veer van der, P. 
(Eds.), Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China. SAGE 
Publications India Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi. 
Jaffrelot, C., 2006. The Impact of Affirmative Action in India: More political than 
Socioeconomic. India Rev. 5, 173–189. 
		
174 
Jaffrelot, C., 2004. Dr. Ambedkar and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting Caste. 
Permanent Black, Delhi. 
Jaoul, N., 2007. Political and “Non-Political” Means in the Dalit Movement, in: Pai, S. 
(Ed.), Political Process in Uttar Pradesh: Identity, Economic Reforms and 
Governance. Pearson/Longman, New Delhi. 
Jauregui, B., 2014. Provisional agency in India: Jugaad and the legitimation of 
corruption. Am. Ethnol. 41, 76–91. 
Jeffrey, C., 2010. Timepass: Youth, Class and the Politics of Waiting in India. Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, Columbia. 
Jeffrey, C., 2002. Caste, Class and Clentelism: A Political Economy of Everyday 
Corruption in Riral North India. Econ. Geogr. 78, 21–41. 
Jeffrey, C., 2001. “A fist is stronger than five fingers”: caste and dominance in rural 
north India. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. Vol. 26, 217–236. 
Jeffrey, C., 2000. Democratisation without representation? The power and political 
strategies of a rural elite in North India. Polit. Geogr. 19, 1013–36. 
Jodhka, S.S., 2012. Caste, Oxford India Short Introductions. Oxford University Press, 
New Delhi. 
Jodhka, S.S., 2010. Dalits in Business: Self-employed scheduled castes in North-West 
India. Econ. Polit. Wkly. 45, 41–48. 
Jodhka, S.S., Newman, K., 2007. In the name of globalisation: Meritocracy, productivity 
and the hidden language of caste. Econ. Polit. Wkly. 42, 4125–4132. 
Jodhka, S.S., Prakash, A., 2016. The Indian Middle Class. Oxford University Press, 
New Delhi. 
Joseph, S., 2007. Neo-liberal Reforms and Democracy in India. Econ. Polit. Wkly. 42, 
3213–8. 
Joseph, S., 2001. Democratic Good Governance: New Agenda for Change. Econ. 
Polit. Wkly. 36, 1011–14. 
Kandpal, E., 2011. Beyong Average Treatment Effects: Distribution of Child Nutrition 
Outcomes and Program Placement in India’s ICDS. World Dev. 39, 1410–1421. 
Kaviraj, S., 2010. On State, Society and Discourse in India, in: The Imaginary 
Institution of India: Politics and Ideas. Permanent Balck, Ranikhet. 
Kaviraj, S., 1984. On the crisis of political institutions in India. Contrib. Indian Sociol. 
18, 223–43. 
Kipnis, A., 2008. Audit cultures: Neoliberal governmentality, socialist legacy, or 
technologies of governing? Am. Ethnol. 35, 275–289. 
Kitschelt, H., Wilkinson, S.I., 2007. Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction, in: 
Kitschelt, H., Wilkinson, S.I. (Eds.), Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of 
		
175 
Democratic Accountability and Competition. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK. 
Kjaer, A.M., 2004. Governance. Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Kohli, A., 1989. Politics of Economic Liberalisation in India. World Dev. 17, 305–28. 
Kosar, K.R., 2011. Street Level-Bureaucracy: The Dilemmas Endure. Public Adm. Rev. 
299–302. 
Kothari, R., 2010. Introduction: Caste in Indian Politics, in: Kothari, R. (Ed.), Caste in 
Indian Politics. Orient Blackswan Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad, India. 
Kothari, R., 1970. Introduction: Caste in Indian Politics, in: Kothari, R. (Ed.), Caste in 
Indian Politics. Orient Longman Limited, Delhi. 
Kothari, R., Maru, R., 2002. Federating for Political Interests: The Kshatriyas of 
Gujarat, in: Shah, G. (Ed.), Caste and Democratic Politics in India. Permanent 
Black, Delhi. 
Krasner, S.D., 1978. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and 
U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
Krishna, A., 2007. Politics in the middle:mediating relationships between the citizens 
and the state in rural North India, in: Kitschelt, H., Wilkinson, S.I. (Eds.), 
Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and 
Political Competition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Kulkarni, P., 2010. Benz makes history as Aurangabad gets 150 Mercedes cars at one 
go. Indian Express. 
Kumar, V., 2018. Rajya Sabha Unstarred Question No. 795: Regular Employment to 
Anganwadi Workers. 
Lambsdorff, J.G., 2006. Causes and consequences of corruption: What do we know 
from a cross-section of countries?, in: Rose-Ackerman, S. (Ed.), International 
Handbook on the Economics of Corruption. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 
Latour, B., 1999. Pandora’s hope: Essays on the reality of science studies. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Lazar, S., 2005. Citizens despite the State: Everyday Corruption and Local Politics in 
El Alto, Bolivia, in: Haller, D., Shore, C. (Eds.), Corruption: Anthrpological 
Perspectives. Pluto Press, London. 
Lele, J., 1990. Caste, class and dominance: political mobilisation in Maharashtra, in: 
Frankel, F.R., Rao, M.S.A. (Eds.), Dominance and State Power in Modern 
India: Decline of a Social Order  Vol. 2. Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 
Lemke, T., 2007. An indigestible meal? Foucault, governmentality and state theory. 
Distinktion J. Soc. Theory 8, 43–64. 
		
176 
Lipsky, M., 1980. Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public 
Services, Second. ed. Russell Sage Foundation, New York. 
Madan, T.N., 1997. Modern myths, locked minds: secularism and fundamentalism in 
India. Oxford University Press, Delhi. 
Mander, H., 2012. Food from the Courts: The Indian Experience. IDS Bull. 43, 15–24. 
Manor, J., 2010. Prologue: Caste and Politics in Recent Times, in: Kothari, R. (Ed.), 
Caste in Indian Politics. Orient Blackswan Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi. 
Manor, J., 1989. Karnatake: Caste, Class, Dominance and Politics in a Cohesive 
Society, in: Frankel, F.R., Rao, M.S.A. (Eds.), Dominance and State Power in 
Modern India: Decline of a Social Order Volume 1. Oxford University Press, 
New Delhi. 
Mathur, N., 2016. Paper Tiger: Law, Bureaucracy and the Developmental State in 
Himalayan India. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Matthews, S., 2017. Colonised minds? Post-development theory and the desirability of 
development in Africa. Third World Q. 38, 2650–2663. 
Measham, A.R., Chatterjee, M., 1998. India: Wasting Away - The Crisis of Malnutrition 
in India. Health, Nutrition and Population Unit, South asia Region, World Bank. 
Menon, N., 2010. Introduction, in: Empire and Nation. Columbia University Press, New 
York. 
Menon, P., Deolalikar, A., Bhaskar, A., 2009. India State Hunger Index: Comparisons 
of Hunger Across States. IFPRI/Welthungerhilfe/University of California, 
Washington DC/Bonn/Riverside. 
Miliband, R., 1969. The state in capitalist society. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London. 
Ministry of Women and Child Development, 2013. Status of ICDS Scheme as on 30-
09-2013(Physical Progress). URL http://wcd.nic.in/icds/icdsdatatables.aspx 
(accessed 3.26.14). 
Ministry of Women and Child Development, 2007. Affidavit on behalf of Respondent 
No. 1, Union of India represented by Ministry of Women and Child 
Development. 
Mitchell, T., 1999. Society, Economy and the State Effect, in: Steinmetz, G. (Ed.), 
State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn. Cornell University Press, 
NY and London. 
Mitchell, T., 1991. The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics. 
Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 85, 77–96. 
Mooij, J., 2001. Economic Reform and political Interpretations: A Review of the 
Literature on the Politics of the Reform Process in India. Indian J. Polit. Sci. 62, 
486–518. 
		
177 
Mosse, D., 2013. The Anthropology of International Development. Annu. Rev. 
Anthropol. 42, 227–46. 
Mosse, D., 2005. Cultivating Development: An ethnography of aid policy and practice. 
Pluto Press, London. 
Mosse, D., 2004. Is good policy unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of 
Aid Policy and Practice. Dev. Change 35, 639–671. 
Mosse, D., Lewis, D., 2006. Theoretical Approaches to Brokerage and Translation in 
Development, in: Mosse, D., Lewis, D. (Eds.), Development Brokers and 
Translators: The Ethnography of Aid and Agencies. Kumarian Press, 
Bloomfield, USA. 
Nambissan, G.B., 2010. The Indian Middle Classes and Educationa Advantage: Family 
Strategies and Practices, in: Apple, M.W., Ball, S.J., Gandin, L.A. (Eds.), The 
Routledge International Handbook of the Sociology of Education. Routledge, 
London and New York. 
National Institute of Public Cooperation and Child Development, 1992. National 
Evaluation of Integrated Child Development Services. National Institute of 
Public Cooperation and Child Development (NIPCCD), New Delhi. 
National Sample Survey Office, 2016. Education in India NSS 71st Round (January - 
June, 2014). Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government 
of India, New Delhi. 
Naudet, J., 2008. “Paying back to society”: Upward social mobility among Dalits. 
Contrib. Indian Sociol. 42, 413–41. 
Nayar, B.R., 2009. The Myth of the Shrinking State: Globalisation and the State in 
India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 
Neveling, P., 2014. Structural contingencies and untimely coincidences in the making 
of neoliberal India: the Kandla Free Trade Zone, 1965-1991. Contrib. Indian 
Sociol. 48, 17–43. 
NIPCCD, 2006. Three Decades of ICDS: An Appraisal. National Institute of Public 
Cooperation and Child Development, New Delhi. 
Nisbett, N., 2007. Friendship, Consumption, Morality: Practising Identity, Negotiating 
Hierarchy in Middle-Class Bangalore. J. R. Anthropol. Inst. 13, 935–50. 
Office of Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India, 2011. Primary Census 
Abstract Data Highlights - 2011 (India & States/UTs). Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Government of India, New Delhi. 
Omvedt, G., 1977. Women and Rural Revolt in India. Soc. Sci. 6, 3–18. 
		
178 
Ong, A., 2006. Introduction: Neoliberalism as exception, exception to neoliberalism, in: 
Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Duke 
University Press, Durham and London. 
O’Reilly, K., 2005. Ethnographic Method. Routledge, New York. 
Pai, S., 2002. Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution: The Bahujan 
Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh. SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi. 
Palriwala, R., Neetha, N., 2011. Stratified Familialism: The Care Regime in India 
through the Lens of Childcare. Dev. Change 42, 1049–78. 
Palshikar, S., 2007. Beyond Uttar Pradesh: New Implications for Party Politics. Econ. 
Polit. Wkly. 42, 1890–92. 
Palshikar, S., 2006. Caste politics through the prism of region, in: Vora, R., Feldhaus, 
A. (Eds.), Region, Culture and Politics in India. Manohar Publishers, New Delhi. 
Palshikar, S., 2002. Triangular competition and bi-polar politics: Elections to local 
bodies in Maharashtra. Econ. Polit. Wkly. 37, 1273–1280. 
Palshikar, S., Birmal, N. (Eds.), 2007. Maharashtrache Rajkaran: Rajkiya Prakriyeche 
Sthanik Sandarbh. Pratima Prakashan, Pune. 
Palshikar, S., Deshpande, R., 1999. Electoral Competition and Structures of 
Domination in Maharashtra. Econ. Polit. Wkly. 34, 2409–22. 
Parry, J.P., 2000. “The Crisis of Corruption” and “the Idea of India”: a worm’s eye view, 
in: Pardo, I. (Ed.), The Morals of Legitimacy. Berghahn Books, New York and 
Oxford. 
Patel, T., 2008. Stigma goes backstage: Reservation in Jobs and Education. Sociol. 
Bull. 57, 97–114. 
Patnaik, P., 2000. Economic Policy and its Political Management in the Current 
Conjuncture, in: Frankel, F.R., Hasan, Z., Bhargava, R., Arora, B. (Eds.), 
Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy. Oxford 
University Press, New Delhi. 
Pedersen, J.D., 2000. Explaining Economic Liberalisation in India: State and Society 
Perspectives. World Dev. 28, 265–82. 
People’s Democracy, 2014. AIFAWH Delegation meets WCD Minister Anganwadi 
Demands Day to be observed on July 4. Peoples Democr. URL 
http://peoplesdemocracy.in/2014/0622_pd/aifawh-delegation-meets-wcd-
minister-anganwadi-demands-day-be-observed-july-4 (accessed 5.4.18). 
Philp, M., 1997. Defining Political Corruption. Polit. Stud. XLV, 436–462. 
Philp, M., David-Barrett, E., 2015. Realism about Political Corruption. Annu. Rev. Polit. 
Sci. 18, 387–402. 
		
179 
Pieterse, J.N., 2010. Development Theory. SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd, New 
Delhi. 
Planning Commission, 2013. Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012-17): Vol. III - Social 
Sectors. Government of India, New Delhi. 
Planning Commission, 2011. Evaluation Report on Integrated Child Development 
Services. Government of India, New Delhi. 
Power, M., 2003. Evaluating the Audit Explosion. Law Policy 25, 185–202. 
Power, M., 1994. The Audit Explosion. Demos, London. 
Prakash, A., 2015. Dalit Capital: State, Markets and Civil Society in Urban India. 
Routledge, New Delhi. 
Purandare, P., 2013. Water Governance and Droughts in Marathwada. Econ. Polit. 
Wkly. XLVIII. 
Purohit, K., 2012. Near their largest dam lie the driest villages. Hindustan Times. 
Qureshi, A., 2015. The Marketization of HIV/AIDS Governance: Public-Private 
Partnerships and Bureaucratic Culture in Pakistan. Camb. J. Anthropol. 33, 35–
48. 
R4D, Amaltas, 2016. Documentation of Rajmata Jojau Mother-Child Health and 
Nutrition Mission in Maharashtra: Pushing the Nutrition Agenda Forward. 
UNICEF, New Delhi. 
Rajya Sabha, 2006. On the Petition praying for Institutionalisation of Integrated Child 
Development Services (ICDS) scheme by converting it into a Regular 
Department under the Ministry of Human Resource DEvelopment and 
Regularisation of Services of Anganwadi Worker/Helpers as Emloyees of that 
Department (No. 129). Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi. 
Ramani, V., 2011. The Maharashtra State Nutrition Mission: Learning by Doing. 
RajMata Jijau Mother-Child Health and Nutrition MIssion. 
Rao, A., 2010. The Caste Question: Dalits and the Politics of Modern India. Permanent 
Black, Ranikhet. 
Rao, M.S.A., 1989. Some Conceptual Issues in the Study of Caste, Class, Ethnicity 
and Dominance, in: Frankel, F.R., Rao, M.S.A. (Eds.), Dominance and State 
Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order Volume 1. Oxford University 
Press, Delhi. 
Rao, U., 2012. Habits of Democracy: Newswriting and the reworking of democratic 
traditions in India. Commun. Polit. Cult. 45, 78–95. 
Reddy, G.R., 1989. The Politics of Accommodation: Caste, Class and Dominance in 
Andhra Pradesh, in: Frankel, F.R., Rao, M.S.A. (Eds.), Dominance and State 
		
180 
Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order Volume 1. Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi. 
Riccio, B., 2011. Exploring Senegalese Translocal Spaces: Reflections on Multi-Sited 
Research, in: Coleman, S., von Hellermann, P. (Eds.), Multi-Sited Ethnography: 
Problems and Possibilities in the Translocation of Research Methods. Taylor 
and Francis, New York. 
Robbins, P., 2000. The rotten institution: corruption in natural resource management. 
Polit. Geogr. 19, 423–43. 
Rose, N., 1996. Governing “advanced” liberal democracies, in: Barry, A., Osborne, T., 
Rose, N. (Eds.), . The University of Chicago Press. 
Rose-Ackerman, S., 2006. Introduction and Overview, in: Rose-Ackerman, S. (Ed.), 
International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption. Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK. 
Rose-Ackerman, S., Palifka, B.J., 2016. Corruption and Government: Causes, 
Consequences and Reform. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Rossi, B., 2006. Aid policies and Recipient Strategies in Niger: Why donors and 
recipients should not be compartmentalised into separate “worlds of 
knowledge,” in: Lewis, D., Mosse, D. (Eds.), Brokers and Translators: The 
Ethnography of Aid and Agencies. Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, USA. 
Rowe, M., 2012. Going Back to the Street: Revising Lipsky’s Street-level Bureaucracy. 
Teach. Public Adm. 30, 10–18. 
Saberwal, S., 1996. The roots of crisis: interpreting contemporary Indian society. Sage, 
New Delhi. 
Sachs, J.D., Varshney, A., Bajpai, N., 1999. Introduction, in: Sachs, J.D., Varshney, A., 
Bajpai, N. (Eds.), India in the Era of Economic Reforms. Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi. 
Sandvik, K., 2011. Blurring Boundaries: Refugee Resettlement in Kampala-between 
the Formal, the Informal, and the Illegal 34, 11–32. 
Sanyal, K., 2007. Rethinking Capitalist Development: Primitive Accumulation, 
Governmentality and POst-Colonial Capitalism. Routledge, New Delhi. 
Sarkar, S., 2012. Political Society in a Capitalist World, in: Gudavarthy, A. (Ed.), Re-
Framing Democracy and Agency in India: Interrogating Political Society. 
Anthem Press, London. 
Saxena, N.C., Mander, H., 2005. Sixth Report of the Commissioners. The Office of 
Supreme Court Commissioners, New Delhi. 
Saxena, N.C., Mander, H., 2004. Fifth Report of the Commissioners. The Office of 
Supreme Court Commissioners. 
		
181 
Saxena, N.C., Srivastava, N., 2009. ICDS in India: Policy, Design and Delivery Issues. 
IDS Bull. 40, 45–52. 
Scott, J.C., 1998. Seeing like a State: How certain schemes to improve the human 
condition have failed. Yale University Press. 
Shah, A., 2009. Morality, corruption and the state: Insights from Jharkhand, Easter 
India. J. Dev. Stud. 45, 295–313. 
Shah, G., 2002. Introduction: Caste and Democratic Politics, in: Shah, G. (Ed.), Caste 
and Democratic Politics in India. Permanent Black, Delhi. 
Shamim, S., 2014. Historical Indefinite Strike of Anganwadi Workers and Helpers in 
Maharashtra. URL shubhashamin.blogspot.in 
Sharma, A., 2018. New Brooms and Old: Sweeping Up Corruption in India, One Law ar 
a Time. Curr. Anthropol. 59, S72–S82. 
Sharma, A., 2011. Specifying citizenship: subaltern politics of rights and justice in 
contemporary India. Citizsh. Stud. 15, 965–80. 
Sharma, A., 2010. Paradoxes of Empowerment: Development, Gender and 
Governance in Neoliberal India. Zubaan, New Delhi. 
Sharma, A., Gupta, A., 2006. Introduction: Rethinking Theories of State in an Age of 
Globalization, in: Sharma, A., Gupta, A. (Eds.), The Anthropology of the State: 
A Reader. Blackwell Publishing Ltd., Massachusetts, USA. 
Shastri, V., 1997. The politics of economic liberalisation in India. Contemp. South Asia 
6, 27–56. 
Shore, C., Haller, D., 2005. Introduction - Sharp Practice: Anthopology and the Study 
of Corruption, in: Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives. Pluto Press, 
London. 
Shore, C., Wright, S., 2000. Coercive accountability: the rise of audit culture in higher 
education, in: Strathern, M. (Ed.), Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in 
Accountability, Ethics and the Academy. Routledge. 
Skocpol, T., 1979. States and Socil Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, 
Russia and China. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Sreerekha, M.S., 2017. State without Honour: Women Workers in India’s Anganwadis. 
Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 
Srinivas, M.N., 1959. The Dominant Caste in Rampura. Am. Anthropol. 61, 1–16. 
Srinivasan, V., Narayanan, S., 2007. Food Policy and Social Movements: Reflections 
on the Right to Food Campaign  in India. Cornell University, New York. 
Stensota, H.O., 2011. Political Influence on Street-Level Bureaucratic Outcome: 
Testing the Interaction between Bureaucratic Ideology and Local Community 
Political Orientation. J. Public Adm. Res. Theory 22, 553–571. 
		
182 
Strumpell, C., 2014. The politics of dispossession in an Odishan steel town. Contrib. 
Indian Sociol. 48, 45–72. 
Subramanian, D., 2014. From monopoly power to deregulated markets: the travails of 
a state owned firm (ITI Ltd). Contrib. Indian Sociol. 48, 73–102. 
Sundar, A., Sundar, N., 2012. The Habits of the Political Heart: Recovering Politics 
from Governmentality, in: Gudavarthy, A. (Ed.), Re-Framing Democracy and 
Agency in India: Interrogating Political Society. Anthem Press, London. 
Supreme Court of India, 2004. Supreme Court Order of October 7, 2004. 
Supreme Court of India, 2001. Supreme Court Order of November 28, 2001. 
Torsello, D., Venard, B., 2016. The Anthropology of Corruption. J. Manag. Inq. 25 (1), 
34–54. 
Trouillot, M.-R., 2001. The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalization: Close 
Encounters of the Deceptive Kind. Curr. Anthropol. 42. 
Vanaik, A., 1990. The painful transition: bourgeois democracy in India. Verso, London. 
Varshney, A., 1995. Democracy, Development and the Countryside: Urban-Rural 
Struggles in India. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Vithayathil, T., Singh, G., 2012. Spaces of Discrimination: Residential segregation in 
Indian cities. Econ. Polit. Wkly. 47, 60–66. 
Vora, R., 2009. Maharashtra or Maratha Rashtra?, in: Jaffrelot, C., Kumar, S. (Eds.), 
Rise of the Plebeians?: The Changing Face of the Indian Legislative 
Assemblies. Routledge, pp. 215–44. 
Wade, R., 1985. The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State Is Not Better at 
Development. World Dev. 13, 467–497. 
Wade, R., 1982. The system of administrative and political corruption: Canal irrigation 
in South India 18, 287–328. 
Waghmare, B.S., 2009. Political Inequality Among Dalits: A Case of Maharashtra. 
Contemp. Voice Dalit 2, 177–99. 
Waghmore, S., 2013. Civility against Caste: Dalit Politics and Citizenship in Western 
India. SAGE Publications India Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi. 
Wankhede, H.S., 2008. The Political and the Social in the Dalit Movement Today. 
Econ. Polit. Wkly. 43, 50–57. 
Weiss, T.G., 2000. Governance, good governance and global governance: Conceptual 
and actual challenges. Third World Q. 21, 795–814. 
Witsoe, J., 2012a. Evereyday Corruption and the Political Mediation of the Indian State: 
An Ethnographic Exploration of Brokers in Bihar. Econ. Polit. Wkly. 47, 47–54. 
Witsoe, J., 2012b. Caste and democratisation in postcolonial India: an ethnographic 
examination of lower caste politics. Democratization Vol. 19, 312–333. 
		
183 
Witsoe, J., 2011. Corruption as power: Caste and the Political Imagination of the 
Postcolonial State. Am. Ethnol. Vol. 38, 73–85. 
Working Group for Children Under Six, 2007. Strategies for Children Under Six - A 
Framework for the 11th Plan. Econ. Polit. Wkly. 42, 87–101. 
Zelliot, E., 1970. Learning the Use of Political Means, in: Kothari, R. (Ed.), Caste in 
Indian Politics. Orient Longman Limited, Hyderabad, India. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
